The authors suggest, reasonably enough, that one's personal political and cultural predispositions affect how one assess the risk of different possible social dangers. If this were the only factor affecting people's risk assessment, it would be quite difficult to generate an informed social policy in a democratic society, and research in to actual risk levels associated with different degrees of social damage would be worthless, since people simply listen to the gurus that support their personal positions.
The authors present no data. Why is data important? Because if 90% of voters fit their description, we are in a much different situation that if 10% do. My best guess is that people systematically underestimate most social risks (e.g. accidental nuclear war, deadly SARS-type plagues) and overestimate a few (riskiness of air travel, danger of poisons in food). Most people, however, are willing to let the ideologues battle it out, and are strongly affected by the way the journalistic accounts of the battle portrays the cogencies of different positions. If I am right, the extremists on either side of positions, of the sort depicted by the authors, perform a valuable function but do not determine the outcome for the purposes of social policy. For instance, there are vehement supporters of gun control and equally vehement supporters of the rights of gun owners. Most voters, however, lie somewhere in the middle and are swayed both by events and scientific evidence. If that is so, the possibility of effective social policy is possible in a democracy. But, some say, the extremists are willing to put in time and money to sway the public, so ideology wins the day in this manner. I respond that it is wise for voters to take the strength of preferences into account in making social policy decisions. At any rate, no balanced discussion of these issues will be found in this volume.
