Thumbs up, but I'd recommend you attend his workshops over the book if the opportunity presents itself.
The book is written as a fictional account of a company's journey from process hell to an environment where engineers can devote themselves more completely to the craft they love. It is complete with protagonists and antagonists. The many men and women who have devoted large portions of their careers to wrestling with new product development process issues and trying to improve the quality and efficiency of product development processes may justifiably take offense at being cast as the antagonist, but it wouldn't be much of a story without the villains.
The book raises some very good issues and points out some very good practices that have contributed to Toyota's success. Toyota's design philosophy is optimized for lowest possible risk to model year goals. American management teams would do well to think about optimizing for low risk instead of highest efficiency and lowest development cost. For many companies the cost of developing a new product is a fairly modest portion of their overall cost structure and the price they pay for missing new product introduction dates is far greater than the gains from tailoring their internal processes for the lowest cost development.
The implementation of highly redundant development paths (called sets in the book) will be far less revolutionary than the book would have you believe. It really comes down to a willingness and ability to make the necessary investments. Readers who have studied Japanese companies will find much that is familiar. Publicly held Japanese companies are far less driven by quarterly results than are their American counter parts. Japanese companies typically have few (if any) small stockholders looking for short term gains. The largest stock holders in a Japanese company are often other Japanese companies. They tend to set long term strategic goals e.g. to dominate the world car industry in 5 years. While these businesses must make money to sustain themselves they are content with smaller earnings than their American counterparts making it possible to re-invest larger portions of their revenues back into the company. Some of that reinvestment shows up as investment in engineering work that reduces risk to new product introduction dates. But make no mistake about it, there are no miracle cures. During the initial stages of introducing a risk adverse strategy you are getting less (new features) with more (investment), but on time, likely with better quality, and you can build economically on that investment for a future stream of new products.
Efficiency can be a huge problem, but not always. In many organizations engineering efficiency is disappointingly low. The book tries to make the case that Toyota's engineers are 4X more productive than the engineers of the fictitious company in the book (approx. 80% productive compared to ITRs 20%). The measure of productivity is not explained, but it is implied that it is simply the number of hours/week that engineers spend engineering instead of (presumably) unnecessary process compliance. It is unlikely that Toyota's engineers are on average really 4X more productive than the best of American engineering teams. A comparison between Toyota's engineering and one of America's best is probably a better comparison than a fictitious engineering team. The book does not sight any objective evidence for the 4X claim. Although few companies share their productivity numbers, 65% is a widely accepted number for staff utilization. If Toyota's staff utilization really is 80% then that would put them about 1.23X more productive. In actual fact productivity is far more complex to measure and since it is so complex many observers chose a metric and then measure changes rather than focus on an absolute #. Lack of evidence aside, the book does highlight some interesting opportunities for improvement in the area of knowledge retention and reuse.
I have no doubt that there are companies whose developers are 20% productive. Lack of stability in the organization is certainly a contributor. The ineptitude and unending churn of engineering management teams is a frequent cause. Many companies have suffered at the hands of corporate management teams looking for quick fixes to the perception that their projects take too long, cost too much, and fail too often. They are often executives who have no engineering experience and no way to objectively assess the performance of their teams. They are driven by fear and uncertainty. They have often set goals that are hopelessly impossible to begin with. The result from the engineer's perspective is an unending stream of organizational change meetings to roll out the new engineering management team, introduce their dramatic new ideas, and get the teams trained. This is immediately followed by or coupled with a call to heroic self-sacrifice in an effort to meet the hopeless goal with the new structure. Sound familiar? If you we're drawn to this book it probably does.
The first thing that any student of Japanese industry learns is its strong reliance on life-time employment. While there has been some decline in longevity in recent years it remains the expectation for most Japanese employees entering the workforce. The long-term expectations and thorough understanding of the company and its markets which the most senior managers obtain during their long careers fosters more emphasis on incremental improvement rather than radical re-birth. Either strategy can work, but the highest probability of long-term success is with the incremental improvement paradigm.
Mr. Kennedy is a joy to talk to with a refreshing directness and wealth of experience. The book has a "sensational" tone, but you'd expect that in a work that was intended to get your attention and interest. The advice he offers in person is well reasoned and sound. Well worth the price of admission.