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On The Brink: Inside the race to stop the collapse of the global financial system (English Edition) [Kindle Edition]

Hank Paulson
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'The former US Treasury secretary gives a gripping account of how he battled to prevent complete meltdown in the financial system, with plenty of illuminating detail.' -- Financial Times


'The former US Treasury secretary gives a gripping account of how he battled to prevent complete meltdown in the financial system, with plenty of illuminating detail.' -- Financial Times


  • Format: Kindle Edition
  • Dateigröße: 680 KB
  • Seitenzahl der Print-Ausgabe: 496 Seiten
  • Verlag: Business Plus (4. März 2010)
  • Verkauf durch: Amazon Media EU S.à r.l.
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • ASIN: B0049MPKMI
  • Text-to-Speech (Vorlesemodus): Aktiviert
  • X-Ray:
  • Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 4.8 von 5 Sternen  Alle Rezensionen anzeigen (4 Kundenrezensionen)
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5.0 von 5 Sternen Paulson: On the brink, but we had not fallen 22. Oktober 2014
Format:Kindle Edition
The financial crisis 2007/2008 has raised the interest in books written by three different groups of authors: journalists like Walter Bagehot - "Lombard Street, 1873, edition 2006" - and Andrew Ross Sorkin - "Too Big to Fail", edition 2010 -,
academics like Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber - "Manias, Panics and Crashes, 6th edition" - and Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff - "This Time is Different, edition 2009" -,
insiders like Thilo Sarrazin - Europa braucht den Euro nicht, 1. Auflage 2010 -, Henry M. Paulson, Jr. - "On the Brink, edition 2013" - and Timothy Geithner - "Stress Test, edition 2014" - and
experts with a mixed background like Nassim Nicholas Taleb - "The Black Swan, edition 2010" - and Wilfried Stadler - "Der Markt hat nicht immer Recht, edition 2011" - both insiders and academics.

All these books are recommendable, among them Henry Paulson's book is very important; it has been written by one of the three insiders in the eye of the hurricane (Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner) who wrote a book about what has been done to get out of the crisis.

To understand the 2007/2008 crisis in relation to the Great Depression 1929 the following books are recommendable: "The Great Crash 1929, edition 1997" by John Kenneth Galbraith (academic) and "Lords of Finance - 1929, The Great Depression, and the bankers who broke the world, edition 2010" by Liaquat Ahamed, former professional investment banker for twenty-five years.
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1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
The book wastes no time on lengthy introductions or narrative preambles. The very first sentence is a direct question from President Bush to Paulson. ("Do they know it's coming Hank?" - "they" being Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and "it" being the seizure of the control of those companies by the government.) The overall narrative style of the book is very direct and conversational, which makes for an easy and straightforward read. This tone of voice is at odds with the more deliberate and cerebral image that we've got of Paulson from his public appearances. In my opinion, this is one of the virtues of the book - I don't think I would be able to sit through this many pages of Paulson's monotone, and all the technical jargon would have been unbearable. Instead, we get a very personal and personable account of one of the most difficult moments in the history of US financial system. Paulson is also very generous with bringing up details of his own life, which make him even more relatable. My personal favorite was his admission that he needs eight hours of sleep at night. It may be a small thing, but I believe that good night's rest is severely underappreciated and undervalued, especially in high-power circles like the financial sector.

In the chapter on Paulson's personal life before joining the Bush administration we learn about the main highlights of his biography. The chapter is not long, even though Paulson has enjoyed a very versatile and interesting career. He had worked in Nixon administration, but since then has largely stayed out of politics. His family is very liberal, which makes for some interesting conversations at the dinner table and family reunions I'd imagine.
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5.0 von 5 Sternen Die Finanzkrise verstehen 18. Juni 2012
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe|Verifizierter Kauf
Ich habe dieses Buch verschlungen. Es ist sehr verständlich geschrieben und gibt einen guten Überblick über die Finanzkrise. Es wird im Detail erklärt, wie die Zusammenhänge einzelner Ereignisse waren und warum in den jeweiligen Situationen so gehandelt wurde. Empfehlenswert auch für nicht-BWLer!
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5.0 von 5 Sternen Unglaublich 17. Juli 2014
Format:Kindle Edition|Verifizierter Kauf
Das vielleicht beste nicht fiktionale Buch, das ich je gelesen habe. Einfach geschrieben und interessant wegen seiner Chronik an Ereignissen.
Solche Leute gibt's bei uns nicht.
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Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen auf (beta) 3.8 von 5 Sternen  156 Rezensionen
84 von 108 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
1.0 von 5 Sternen Apologies for Greed 25. Januar 2011
Von Dave C - Veröffentlicht auf
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
Like so many "over the shoulder" assessments of major historical events, Mr. Paulson's account is very self-serving.
He doesn't bother to address why - when the government had tremendous leverage in working out the bailout of AIG - it did next to nothing in holding banks like Goldman Sachs accountable for their poor decision-making. So AIG, propped up by American taxpayers, paid 100 cents on the dollar for the credit default swaps purchased by Goldman Sachs. These swaps in themselves were a suspect approach to managing risk. Moreover, the government never required the investment firms - whose senior management made atrocious gambles - to replace these inept executives (such as GS's Lloyd "We're doing God's work" Blankfein) although they didn't hesitate to take out the head of GM (Rick Wagoner)when we bailed out the auto industry.
So how to explain Mr. Paulson's role in all this and his self-justifying apologies for greed? Well here's an astonishing coincidence: he's the former CEO of Goldman Sachs. Surprise, surprise! And another tidbit about where Mr. Paulson acquired his ethical compass: he was a special assistant to John Ehrlichman in the Nixon White House.
I invite people to read this book, but I would advise against attaching any credibility to Mr. Paulson's view of the near collapse of our financial system.
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4.0 von 5 Sternen Insider narrative, but still ignores a few important factors 1. Februar 2010
Von Jim Galt - Veröffentlicht auf
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
A book like this should be read only along with books like The Failure of Risk Management: Why It's Broken and How to Fix It or The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. These books are about the much broader topics of risk management and risk in finance, respectively, but they do put On the Brink in context.

Paulson has written a detailed, blow by blow, narrative account of several specific meetings leading up to and during the financial crisis. Less of the book deals with stepping outside of these meetings to analyze other specific causes, but there is some of that. The reader has to be careful of an attempt by Paulson to recast his own role in a more favorable light, but I haven't seen anything detailed enough to specifically contradict him, yet.

Paulson does mention an interesting and almost complete list of players in this crisis - Freddie, Fannie, Bernanke, Bush, etc. But he is almost silent on some of the more subtle players like the mathematical models that underestimated these risks (Taleb and Hubbard do and excellent job of this). He reiterates throughout the book that the events seemed "impossible" and yet they are events that seem to happen once or twice a century (Especially considering some of the relaxed regulation and oversight that preceeeded it).

He does mention the role of Credit Default Swaps in the crisis but not, say, the Gaussian Copula, Options, or Value at Risk. The use of such methods are at least partly to blame.

The reader has to assume Paulson's agenda of getting history to come out the way that casts him the way he would like to see it. But it is still an excellent account. We should like to see the accounts of Bernanke and Geithner someday and compare them side-by-side.
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5.0 von 5 Sternen Still Undecided 31. Oktober 2012
Von HJ Szczesniak - Veröffentlicht auf
Verifizierter Kauf
"Between March and September 2008, eight major U.S. financial institutions failed - Bear Stearns, IndyMac, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia --- six of them in September alone.....This, the most wrenching financial crisis since the Great Depression, caused a terrible recession in the U.S. and severe harm around the world. Yet it could have been so much worse."

Thus Hank Paulson summarizes, in the Afterword, the major challenges he faced as Secretary of the Treasury, a post he assumed on July 10, 2006 and left on January 16, 2009. And this does not mention other institutions that would have failed had they not been propped up (GE Capital, Chrysler, GM, and the entire money market industry after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck).

In the recently released "Bailout: an inside account of how Washington abandoned Main Street while rescuing Wall Street", Neil Barofsky, the former Special Inspector General in Charge of Oversight of TARP, details his efforts to constrain the Geithner Treasury from unconditional dispersal of hundreds of billions of TARP funds to the largest banks with no oversight. Former FDIC Chief Sheila Bair recently said of Geithner, "Tim seemed to view his job as protecting Citigroup from me, when he should have been worried about protecting the taxpayers from Citi." While Geithner did much to accelerate what the New York Times called a "no-strings windfall to bankers", the first $350 billion was dispersed under Paulson. Was he a hero who kept the world from falling over the "brink", or was he just rescuing his inept investment banker buddies and sending the tab to the taxpayer as some would contend? What evidence does On the Brink offer?

One indeed can make the case that Paulson was the right man at the right time since only a former CEO of Goldman Sachs had the necessary knowledge of financial markets and the professional gravitas to demand attention from the likes of Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan, John Mack from Morgan Stanley, Lloyd Blankfein from Goldman Sachs, Vikram Pandit from Citigroup, John Thain from (then) Merrill Lynch, Brady Dougan from Credit Suisse, and Robert Kelly from Bank of New York Mellon.

But, one can also argue that, having drunk the Goldman Sachs kool-aid, Paulson saw only one response to the crisis - save the big banks, everything is secondary. As the crisis unfolds, it seems that Paulson and his team move heaven and earth to accommodate financial institutions but underwater homeowners are given short shrift and then only to get more money for the banks: "...devising one [a mortage mitigation plan] would be critical to getting congressional approval to release the final tranche of TARP."

Paulson summarizes, "As first responders to an unprecedented crisis that threatened the destruction of the modern financial system, we had little choice [but to take the actions they did]." He repeatedly invokes images of "market panic", "grave distress throughout the world", "financial catastrophe", "serious risk", "the world falling apart", "all hell [breaking] loose", "[threats to] the entire financial system", etc, etc as justification for his actions.

But, throughout this crisis, many members of Congress asked Paulson to delineate the consequences of NOT bailing out the big banks, and, for the most part, he seems to duck the issue then and now. In one instance, he explains, "[Florida representative Adam Putnam] suggested that I needed to tell people more explicitly how bad it would be if the financial system collapsed....but scaring the public to win support would only make things worse economically." And, "...this dilemma haunted me throughout the crisis - how to make the public understand the grave situation we faced without inflaming the markets even further."

But what about now, in this Copyright 2010 book? Wasn't this the great opportunity to explain the Sum of All Fears and spell out how the dominoes could have fallen? The only clue we get here is that hundreds of billions were dispersed so that credit would continue to flow ("..if credit stopped flowing, businesses would shut down across America and many, many jobs would be lost."). But, you can't help but hear Eartha Kitt singing "Santa Baby" as you read about the fortune lavished on the big banks who promptly sat on the funds and provided no sugar for Daddy.

Whether you agree with his actions or not, ultimately the nation owes a debt of gratitude to Paulson for stabilizing a chaotic situation and you have to admire his fortitude in dealing with wave after wave of staggering problems. However, given the strong residue of resentment that still exists over how TARP (and related programs) were handled, On the Brink represents a missed opportunity to dispel some of that resentment.

A final note: the Afterword makes for interesting reading as Paulson lists his recommended actions for preventing another similar crisis. Guess how many of his recommendations have been implemented?
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2.0 von 5 Sternen Hard to Believe Account From an Industry Insider 18. April 2013
Von Trading Central - Veröffentlicht auf
Having read this first hand perspective of the Treasury Secretary on the 2008 financial collapse it became apparent that really this industry insider had far more knowledge of what could have been done to prevent the meltdown than the testimonial implies.

As an ex-Goldman Sachs employee who had an extensive background in the very industry he was appointed to oversee as Treasury Secretary, it seems likely that his connection to his old firm did in some way likely mean the end for some of his previous competitors in the financial industry. The recollection of the events and writing style also appear in contrast to the manner of how the portrayal as being neutral in the decision to takeout his previous competitors was made.

While the spin is a good one, the reality remains that the financial industry was rewarded for it's practices by giving huge bonuses to the very many who had made the crisis a reality. The subsequent revelations made by the many other insiders who came from the same firm as the Treasury Secretary, paints a picture of a firm as equally morally bankrupt as all the others on Wall Street.

Admissions by Allan Greenspan to having been also duped by Wall Street, shows the great salesmanship used by the financial industry and it's executives to promote a conservative appearance of frugality where clearly excess and reckless actions are needed for promotions to earn big salaries and bonuses. Having risen to the highest position in Goldman Sachs and given his revelations one wonders how anyone in the financial industry can succeed without being just part of the crowd. Certainly being a lone wolf outside the wolf pack would have not allowed anyone to rise beyond the mail sorting room let alone become the CEO at Goldman Sachs.

About the only real insights in this book as to the events he describes are into the man himself and how in many ways his past at Goldman Sachs should have resulted in policy decisions that could have lessened the severity of the financial meltdown. It is highly unlikely given his reference at the start of the book of rebuking his colleagues at Goldman for their excessive lifestyle choices that the other excesses of the industry were not equally known to him.

The recollection of events seems well scripted, the reality remains after reading this book that actions needed to reform Wall Street were never prioritized by this industry insider. The dogmatic belief that free markets outside regulation would somehow lead to more efficient markets given what the Treasury Secretary knew about the industry and it's participants makes this tale less believable.

As a biography this book has potential, allowing the reader inside the world of a powerful insider. As a historical economic artifact this book really seems nothing more than an apology by an insider for not taking corrective actions to reform an industry that still has not learned any lessions with business as usual some five years after the fact. For the purchaser of economic history it thusly provides few useful insights or constructive remedies for reform or policy directions needed in times of financial peril.
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3.0 von 5 Sternen Good Record of Those Tumultuous Days 18. Januar 2012
Von Amazon Customer - Veröffentlicht auf
"Hank" Paulson's record of the economic meltdown of 2008 is a good primer on the events from an insider's perspective. It's fast paced and well written. It brought back many memories and emotions from those uncertain days. The books value is in the record of the event that took place and the reactions of key insiders, Bernanke, Geithner, Pelosi, Reid, Boehner, Frank, Dodd and others. Clearly, Paulson was respected by both political parties and that helped him work through the fast breaking events of the collapse.

The first shock that hits you in the book is not financial but political and personal. The book's Foreward was written by Congressman Barney Frank. Frank's lead-in is an indicator of the respect he had for Paulson. As you read through the book you can clearly see the respect Paulson had for Frank. He knew where the political power was and how to use it. What did surprise me was Paulson's power in the halls of Congress especially given he was part of a lame duck administration. He presents himself more as a knowledgeable but charming diplomat, than a hard nosed Cabinet-level politician. This may be part of Paulson's bias in writing. Other than the battle over TARP, leaders in both parties seem to capitulate to him and Bernanke.

As some of the other reviewers noted, this is not an objective book. Paulson was a major Wall Street insider and clearly a huge supporter of President Bush. However, his relationships with key Congressional Leaders showed that the substance of what Paulson proposed was not partisan. Greed and power is bi-partisan. When it comes to money, all politicians love it. The partisanship was in the implementation. This was most clearly seen in the battle on how to use the TARP money.

My favorite quote from the book is when Paulson and Bernanke were addressing Congressional leaders on the need for a $85 billion bridge loan for AIG. In that meeting Paulson wrote Barney Frank asserted himself and said "Where did you find $85 billion?". Bernanke responded back "We have $800 billion." The way I read it , was as if Barney Frank was envious of Paulson's find and Ben Bernanke silenced him by making him the financial midget in the room.

While I was reading I went to Youtube and watched some of his "Sunday show" interviews. You could see he was tired and spent. However, one in particular with George Stephanopoulos when asked if other institutions are in the same shape as Bear Stearns, at that moment he looked and acted visibly scared of his potential answer. These interviews helped put a face to what he was describing in his book regarding his physical and mental state along with knowing the market's would dissect and parse his statements.

Ultimately, what emerged from the narrative was a clear picture of a financial system completely out of control and driven by short-term greed and manipulation. I'm not sure that will ever change. However, I can't see anyone who reads this book objectively, not coming away with the opinion we need to regulate the financial industry in new and better ways.

I recommend it.
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