In weniger als einer Minute können Sie mit dem Lesen von On The Brink: Inside the race to stop the collapse of the... auf Ihrem Kindle beginnen. Sie haben noch keinen Kindle? Hier kaufen Oder fangen Sie mit einer unserer gratis Kindle Lese-Apps sofort an zu lesen.

An Ihren Kindle oder ein anderes Gerät senden

 
 
 

Kostenlos testen

Jetzt kostenlos reinlesen

An Ihren Kindle oder ein anderes Gerät senden

Jeder kann Kindle Bücher lesen  selbst ohne ein Kindle-Gerät  mit der KOSTENFREIEN Kindle App für Smartphones, Tablets und Computer.
On The Brink: Inside the race to stop the collapse of the global financial system (English Edition)
 
 

On The Brink: Inside the race to stop the collapse of the global financial system (English Edition) [Kindle Edition]

Hank Paulson
4.8 von 5 Sternen  Alle Rezensionen anzeigen (4 Kundenrezensionen)

Kindle-Preis: EUR 8,49 Inkl. MwSt. und kostenloser drahtloser Lieferung über Amazon Whispernet

Weitere Ausgaben

Amazon-Preis Neu ab Gebraucht ab
Kindle Edition EUR 8,49  
Gebundene Ausgabe --  
Taschenbuch EUR 13,10  
Audio CD, Audiobook, Ungekürzte Ausgabe EUR 26,99  


Produktbeschreibungen

Pressestimmen

'The former US Treasury secretary gives a gripping account of how he battled to prevent complete meltdown in the financial system, with plenty of illuminating detail.' -- Financial Times

Pressestimmen

'The former US Treasury secretary gives a gripping account of how he battled to prevent complete meltdown in the financial system, with plenty of illuminating detail.' -- Financial Times

Produktinformation

  • Format: Kindle Edition
  • Dateigröße: 680 KB
  • Seitenzahl der Print-Ausgabe: 496 Seiten
  • Verlag: Business Plus (4. März 2010)
  • Verkauf durch: Amazon Media EU S.à r.l.
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • ASIN: B0049MPKMI
  • Text-to-Speech (Vorlesemodus): Aktiviert
  • X-Ray:
  • Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 4.8 von 5 Sternen  Alle Rezensionen anzeigen (4 Kundenrezensionen)
  • Amazon Bestseller-Rang: #211.085 Bezahlt in Kindle-Shop (Siehe Top 100 Bezahlt in Kindle-Shop)

  •  Ist der Verkauf dieses Produkts für Sie nicht akzeptabel?

Mehr über den Autor

Entdecken Sie Bücher, lesen Sie über Autoren und mehr

Kundenrezensionen

3 Sterne
0
2 Sterne
0
1 Sterne
0
4.8 von 5 Sternen
4.8 von 5 Sternen
Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen
5.0 von 5 Sternen Ein sehr aktuelles und relevantes Buch 10. August 2014
Format:Kindle Edition
Was auch immer der Leser denken mag über die wahren Ursachen der Finanzkrise: dieses Buch offeriert eine überraschend offene Darstellung einer entscheidenden Person, welche in den gefährlichsten Momenten als Finanzminister und ehemaliger Chef von Goldman Sachs eine einzigartige Perspektive auf die Geschehnisse hatte. Beim Lesen dieses Buches wird klar wie knapp die Ereignisse an einem sehr viel größeren Desaster vorbeigeschrammt sind. Das Buch liest sich am ehesten wie der Flug in einem Jet welcher plötzlich aus einer Nebelwand heraustritt um eine Bergspitze direkt vor sich zu sehen. Und das obwohl es bereits vorher Warnungen von einzelnen Makroökonomen gab, als leuchtendes Beispiel sei Nouriel Roubini genannt.

Auch für Leser außerhalb des Finanzsektors bietet Paulson eine leicht verständliche Darstellung der komplexen Zusammenhänge, welche sich innerhalb kurzer Zeit zur größten Finanzkrise seit der großen Depression steigerten. Es bleibt letztlich die Frage wie die Entwicklung des langfristigen Konjunkturzyklus (long-term debt cycle), welcher die kurzfristigen Zyklen überlagert besser vorausgesagt werden könnte. Die Antwort liefert Paulson auf diese Frage leider nicht, doch die minutiöse Darstellung der Ereignisse lässt erahnen das die menschlichen Akteure des Systems für einen relativ kurzen Zeithorizont geplant hatten, zum Teil aus verständlichen politischen Gründen. Ray Dalio von Bridgewater Associates steuerte auf dem World Economic Forum 2013 einen beeindruckenden Diskussionbeitrag zu dieser Frage bei. Der langfristige Konjunkturzyklus dauert demnach mehr als zwei Generationen mit ca.
Lesen Sie weiter... ›
War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich?
1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Format:Taschenbuch
The book wastes no time on lengthy introductions or narrative preambles. The very first sentence is a direct question from President Bush to Paulson. ("Do they know it's coming Hank?" - "they" being Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and "it" being the seizure of the control of those companies by the government.) The overall narrative style of the book is very direct and conversational, which makes for an easy and straightforward read. This tone of voice is at odds with the more deliberate and cerebral image that we've got of Paulson from his public appearances. In my opinion, this is one of the virtues of the book - I don't think I would be able to sit through this many pages of Paulson's monotone, and all the technical jargon would have been unbearable. Instead, we get a very personal and personable account of one of the most difficult moments in the history of US financial system. Paulson is also very generous with bringing up details of his own life, which make him even more relatable. My personal favorite was his admission that he needs eight hours of sleep at night. It may be a small thing, but I believe that good night's rest is severely underappreciated and undervalued, especially in high-power circles like the financial sector.

In the chapter on Paulson's personal life before joining the Bush administration we learn about the main highlights of his biography. The chapter is not long, even though Paulson has enjoyed a very versatile and interesting career. He had worked in Nixon administration, but since then has largely stayed out of politics. His family is very liberal, which makes for some interesting conversations at the dinner table and family reunions I'd imagine.
Lesen Sie weiter... ›
War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich?
5.0 von 5 Sternen Die Finanzkrise verstehen 18. Juni 2012
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe|Verifizierter Kauf
Ich habe dieses Buch verschlungen. Es ist sehr verständlich geschrieben und gibt einen guten Überblick über die Finanzkrise. Es wird im Detail erklärt, wie die Zusammenhänge einzelner Ereignisse waren und warum in den jeweiligen Situationen so gehandelt wurde. Empfehlenswert auch für nicht-BWLer!
War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich?
5.0 von 5 Sternen Unglaublich 17. Juli 2014
Format:Kindle Edition|Verifizierter Kauf
Das vielleicht beste nicht fiktionale Buch, das ich je gelesen habe. Einfach geschrieben und interessant wegen seiner Chronik an Ereignissen.
Solche Leute gibt's bei uns nicht.
War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich?
Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen auf Amazon.com (beta)
Amazon.com: 3.8 von 5 Sternen  153 Rezensionen
14 von 15 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
5.0 von 5 Sternen Still Undecided 31. Oktober 2012
Von HJ Szczesniak - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Verifizierter Kauf
"Between March and September 2008, eight major U.S. financial institutions failed - Bear Stearns, IndyMac, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia --- six of them in September alone.....This, the most wrenching financial crisis since the Great Depression, caused a terrible recession in the U.S. and severe harm around the world. Yet it could have been so much worse."

Thus Hank Paulson summarizes, in the Afterword, the major challenges he faced as Secretary of the Treasury, a post he assumed on July 10, 2006 and left on January 16, 2009. And this does not mention other institutions that would have failed had they not been propped up (GE Capital, Chrysler, GM, and the entire money market industry after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck).

In the recently released "Bailout: an inside account of how Washington abandoned Main Street while rescuing Wall Street", Neil Barofsky, the former Special Inspector General in Charge of Oversight of TARP, details his efforts to constrain the Geithner Treasury from unconditional dispersal of hundreds of billions of TARP funds to the largest banks with no oversight. Former FDIC Chief Sheila Bair recently said of Geithner, "Tim seemed to view his job as protecting Citigroup from me, when he should have been worried about protecting the taxpayers from Citi." While Geithner did much to accelerate what the New York Times called a "no-strings windfall to bankers", the first $350 billion was dispersed under Paulson. Was he a hero who kept the world from falling over the "brink", or was he just rescuing his inept investment banker buddies and sending the tab to the taxpayer as some would contend? What evidence does On the Brink offer?

One indeed can make the case that Paulson was the right man at the right time since only a former CEO of Goldman Sachs had the necessary knowledge of financial markets and the professional gravitas to demand attention from the likes of Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan, John Mack from Morgan Stanley, Lloyd Blankfein from Goldman Sachs, Vikram Pandit from Citigroup, John Thain from (then) Merrill Lynch, Brady Dougan from Credit Suisse, and Robert Kelly from Bank of New York Mellon.

But, one can also argue that, having drunk the Goldman Sachs kool-aid, Paulson saw only one response to the crisis - save the big banks, everything is secondary. As the crisis unfolds, it seems that Paulson and his team move heaven and earth to accommodate financial institutions but underwater homeowners are given short shrift and then only to get more money for the banks: "...devising one [a mortage mitigation plan] would be critical to getting congressional approval to release the final tranche of TARP."

Paulson summarizes, "As first responders to an unprecedented crisis that threatened the destruction of the modern financial system, we had little choice [but to take the actions they did]." He repeatedly invokes images of "market panic", "grave distress throughout the world", "financial catastrophe", "serious risk", "the world falling apart", "all hell [breaking] loose", "[threats to] the entire financial system", etc, etc as justification for his actions.

But, throughout this crisis, many members of Congress asked Paulson to delineate the consequences of NOT bailing out the big banks, and, for the most part, he seems to duck the issue then and now. In one instance, he explains, "[Florida representative Adam Putnam] suggested that I needed to tell people more explicitly how bad it would be if the financial system collapsed....but scaring the public to win support would only make things worse economically." And, "...this dilemma haunted me throughout the crisis - how to make the public understand the grave situation we faced without inflaming the markets even further."

But what about now, in this Copyright 2010 book? Wasn't this the great opportunity to explain the Sum of All Fears and spell out how the dominoes could have fallen? The only clue we get here is that hundreds of billions were dispersed so that credit would continue to flow ("..if credit stopped flowing, businesses would shut down across America and many, many jobs would be lost."). But, you can't help but hear Eartha Kitt singing "Santa Baby" as you read about the fortune lavished on the big banks who promptly sat on the funds and provided no sugar for Daddy.

Whether you agree with his actions or not, ultimately the nation owes a debt of gratitude to Paulson for stabilizing a chaotic situation and you have to admire his fortitude in dealing with wave after wave of staggering problems. However, given the strong residue of resentment that still exists over how TARP (and related programs) were handled, On the Brink represents a missed opportunity to dispel some of that resentment.

A final note: the Afterword makes for interesting reading as Paulson lists his recommended actions for preventing another similar crisis. Guess how many of his recommendations have been implemented?
82 von 104 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
1.0 von 5 Sternen Apologies for Greed 25. Januar 2011
Von Dave C - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
Like so many "over the shoulder" assessments of major historical events, Mr. Paulson's account is very self-serving.
He doesn't bother to address why - when the government had tremendous leverage in working out the bailout of AIG - it did next to nothing in holding banks like Goldman Sachs accountable for their poor decision-making. So AIG, propped up by American taxpayers, paid 100 cents on the dollar for the credit default swaps purchased by Goldman Sachs. These swaps in themselves were a suspect approach to managing risk. Moreover, the government never required the investment firms - whose senior management made atrocious gambles - to replace these inept executives (such as GS's Lloyd "We're doing God's work" Blankfein) although they didn't hesitate to take out the head of GM (Rick Wagoner)when we bailed out the auto industry.
So how to explain Mr. Paulson's role in all this and his self-justifying apologies for greed? Well here's an astonishing coincidence: he's the former CEO of Goldman Sachs. Surprise, surprise! And another tidbit about where Mr. Paulson acquired his ethical compass: he was a special assistant to John Ehrlichman in the Nixon White House.
I invite people to read this book, but I would advise against attaching any credibility to Mr. Paulson's view of the near collapse of our financial system.
114 von 150 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
4.0 von 5 Sternen Insider narrative, but still ignores a few important factors 1. Februar 2010
Von Jim Galt - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
A book like this should be read only along with books like The Failure of Risk Management: Why It's Broken and How to Fix It or The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. These books are about the much broader topics of risk management and risk in finance, respectively, but they do put On the Brink in context.

Paulson has written a detailed, blow by blow, narrative account of several specific meetings leading up to and during the financial crisis. Less of the book deals with stepping outside of these meetings to analyze other specific causes, but there is some of that. The reader has to be careful of an attempt by Paulson to recast his own role in a more favorable light, but I haven't seen anything detailed enough to specifically contradict him, yet.

Paulson does mention an interesting and almost complete list of players in this crisis - Freddie, Fannie, Bernanke, Bush, etc. But he is almost silent on some of the more subtle players like the mathematical models that underestimated these risks (Taleb and Hubbard do and excellent job of this). He reiterates throughout the book that the events seemed "impossible" and yet they are events that seem to happen once or twice a century (Especially considering some of the relaxed regulation and oversight that preceeeded it).

He does mention the role of Credit Default Swaps in the crisis but not, say, the Gaussian Copula, Options, or Value at Risk. The use of such methods are at least partly to blame.

The reader has to assume Paulson's agenda of getting history to come out the way that casts him the way he would like to see it. But it is still an excellent account. We should like to see the accounts of Bernanke and Geithner someday and compare them side-by-side.
3 von 3 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
5.0 von 5 Sternen Would love to hear the complete story 19. Juli 2011
Von Brian McAndrews - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Read this book and Too Big To Fail after seeing the HBO movie. Paulson intrigued me partially because he's from a couple towns down the road from me. This book is very approachable and kept me wanting to turn the page on my Nook. Sometimes the cast of characters and government agencies and programs get a bit confusing, but it didn't take away from this remarkable story. Paulson presents himself as a practical man grounded in his Midwest roots devoted to his family and religion. One irony is when he remarks that he often chastised is fellow bankers for living in lavish mansions, meanwhile he goes off and buys an island. He states throughout the book that he admires how President Bush handled the crisis and that he got skeptical family members to feel the same. However, except for getting accounts of the President saying do whatever is needed, we aren't given any insight into the Presidents handling of the crisis.

Since Mr. Paulson was the CEO at Goldman Sachs while this crisis was brewing, I would love to read his take on what was happening out on the street that brought this crisis to bear. Maybe a prequel?

Brian McAndrews
3 von 3 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
4.0 von 5 Sternen First-hand riveting account of the 2008 financial meltdown 11. Juli 2011
Von Dr. Bojan Tunguz - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
The book wastes no time on lengthy introductions or narrative preambles. The very first sentence is a direct question from President Bush to Paulson. ("Do they know it's coming Hank?" - "they" being Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and "it" being the seizure of the control of those companies by the government.) The overall narrative style of the book is very direct and conversational, which makes for an easy and straightforward read. This tone of voice is at odds with the more deliberate and cerebral image that we've got of Paulson from his public appearances. In my opinion, this is one of the virtues of the book - I don't think I would be able to sit through this many pages of Paulson's monotone, and all the technical jargon would have been unbearable. Instead, we get a very personal and personable account of one of the most difficult moments in the history of US financial system. Paulson is also very generous with bringing up details of his own life, which make him even more relatable. My personal favorite was his admission that he needs eight hours of sleep at night. It may be a small thing, but I believe that good night's rest is severely underappreciated and undervalued, especially in high-power circles like the financial sector.

In the chapter on Paulson's personal life before joining the Bush administration we learn about the main highlights of his biography. The chapter is not long, even though Paulson has enjoyed a very versatile and interesting career. He had worked in Nixon administration, but since then has largely stayed out of politics. His family is very liberal, which makes for some interesting conversations at the dinner table and family reunions I'd imagine.

The chapter on the economic and financial turbulence that preceded the great banking crash of 2008 is very fascinating and educational. Even though it deals with many subtle and technical topics, it is written extremely well and even people who have never been exposed to the inner workings of the financial system should be able to follow it without much difficulty. Even so, it is impossible to keep track of all the moving parts that constitute such a complex system, so if you feel that you still don't understand everything that went wrong, you are not alone. It is doubtful that even those who were in charge of situation at the time fully appreciated the problems that were brewing.

The chapter on Bear Stearns crisis in March of 2008 is a fascinating study in behind-the-scenes happenings of one dire crisis. Most of the most important events happened over one tumultuous weekend, and this chapter details all of the relevant negotiations that were going on at the time. We are led to believe that the bailout of Bear Stearns was inevitable, and the least evil of all options that were on the table at the time. Paulson keeps stressing that a failure of the government to act at that moment would have had major serious ramifications for the entire financial sector (a theme that he comes back to throughout the book), but he doesn't go into the details of why in fact this would have been the case.

By late March, however, it became increasingly obvious that another major financial institution was working under an increased strain. Lehman Brothers was having major difficulties, and unless something got done about it the company was headed for a collapse. However, it is still not entirely clear why this should be the government's problem. A collapse of such an important player would certainly have dire consequences and would unsettle many investors, but it is not clear that this would cause the collapse of the entire financial system. Meanwhile, the problems with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to simmer, with no immediate political solution in sight.

When the summer rolled in, the crisis with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was coming to a head. For better or worse the requisite government measures that Paulson was proposing had much more support among the Democrats than Republicans. This is not surprising at all - they were in control of Congress and had much more leverage which to use to get their own legislative agenda through, including the very unpalatable block grants. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were becoming amenable to government's terms, and by the end of summer it started to seem that the worst was over.

Unfortunately, the sense of calm was not to last. In September it became obvious that Lehman Brothers would not survive and to Paulson and others in the Treasury Department it became an imperative to work out a deal with private buyers to rescue Lehman. Paulson insists that during the negotiation with the potential buyers the position of the US government was very clear: there will be no government financing of the rescue. However, the very fact that the government worked so industriously and doggedly at rescuing Lehman must have sent a signal to anyone that government felt that it had to do absolutely anything in its power to help Lehman survive. It is hard to imagine that this not have a very strong impact on potential buyers when they were looking into their options. At the very least it would have made them extremely skittish to risk their own money to bail out a competitor when it was more than likely that the government would eventually have to do the same without their help. In fact, there was no legal way for the government to help, but that was not exactly clear to the potential buyers. In the end the most serious potential buyer, UK's Barclays, decided against buying. After that the faith of Lehman Brothers was sealed; they had to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy within a week.

And that's when the wheels really started to come off the cart. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves through the World markets that no one had anticipated, or so are we led to believe. Soon enough investors around the world started having doubts in solvency of other major investments banks, and it started to look like all of them might soon be under the peril of having to declare bankruptcy. The whole World financial system, so it seemed, was on a brink of total collapse. The consequences of such a dire predicament would have been catastrophic indeed, on par with the Great Depression, or worse.

We also finally learn where the $700 billion dollar TARP price tag came from. In a nutshell, if the total value of all the mortgages in the US is $11 trillion, and only about 10% of those are in a peril of imminent foreclosure, then about $1 trillion would sound like a reasonable amount of money that needed to be available for a bailout. However, $1 trillion sounds pretty bad, so if you can make it look like much less than that it would politically be much more feasible to get the Congress to foot the bill. Many pundits in the media had suspected as much, but it's good to finally get a confirmation from Paulson himself. To me at least, it looks rather sketchy that the secretary of the Treasury would be making such off-the-cuff estimates of required funds. I would have much preferred that there were a much more solid technical analysis that had led to this number.

Most of the rest of the book is a blow-by-blow narrative of how Paulson worked with various government officials, prominent politicians from both houses, and top-level bankers on coming up with the plan and legislation that would help prevent the total financial collapse. This narrative can be rather gripping and high-paced at times, but there are also moments when it overwhelms with technical details. However, these details in my opinion are absolutely necessary for the purpose of this story.

Fortunately, there is a glossary of all the terms and acronyms at the end of the book. There is also a list of all the main protagonists at the beginning. Unless you are complete political and economic information junky, you will definitely appreciate both of these lists.

In one aspect this book may not be able to achieve its goals. In terms of pure politics, the narrative raises many red flags for those who have a nagging suspicion that Paulson is in fact a committed big-government Republican, or even worse - a RINO. He is a bit too quick to praise some very prominent Democrats (like Barney Frank, Barack Obama, Chris Dodd, etc.) and is either mute on characterizing some Republican political operatives (Karl Rove), mostly critical (John McCain), or largely critical (Sarah Palin). His appraisal of President Bush is rather too defensive (He's a good guy, honest!) and seems to be geared more towards appeasing liberals (including all the members of his immediate family) than towards reaffirming his standing with the small-government conservatives. In fact, Bush is the only Republican politician that features even remotely prominently throughout the book. His attitude towards Chinese government officials is a bit troubling as well. I understand that as the chairman of Goldman Sachs he had built his reputation and fortunes by working closely with Chinese market, but it's a not a good sign when on several occasions a Chinese official that Paulson interacted with comes across as a more market-oriented of the two. I might be misreading those particular anecdotes, but my gut-level impression supports the notion of Paulson being a big-government politician, his repeated support for free markets notwithstanding.

The final chapter of the book ("The Afterward") is a bit puzzling as well. It is not strictly speaking an afterward of the policies that had been implemented, but more of a chapter dedicated to the lessons that he took home from the crises. Most of those lessons seem very plausible, but I feel that there is an inherent contradiction between some of his positions. On one hand he decries the fact that the top ten US financial institutions control some 60% of the overall market, and yet he calls for an increased control and regulation. The last time I checked it is exactly the excessive regulation that is favorable to the existence of few big companies. The smaller ones just don't have enough resources to invest into the ever more burdensome regulatory compliance.

However, the strangest aspect of the afterward is that there is no reappraisal of TARP and other controversial policies that had been talked about in this book. A year has passed since Paulson left the office, and even thought it still might be too early to make a complete analysis, certain general comments could have been made. As is we are left to make up our own mind about the legacy of those policies. In particular, I would have liked to hear his take on other major financial interventions that have happened under the Obama administration. Many of those policies, rightly or wrongly, see TARP as the template on which they were based. I was really surprised to find Paulson mum on this subject.

All of the shortcomings aside, this is an extremely fascinating and very readable book. It gives a first-hand account of the epicenter of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, and the seriousness of the situation is very palpable from every page. The dire situation could also be compared to some other non-financial crises, like the Cuban Missile Crises for instance. In fact, I think it would even make a good movie. It would be fun to see who would get to play Paulson.
Waren diese Rezensionen hilfreich?   Wir wollen von Ihnen hören.
Kundenrezensionen suchen
Nur in den Rezensionen zu diesem Produkt suchen

Beliebte Markierungen

 (Was ist das?)
&quote;
Fear of failure is ultimately selfish; it reflects a preoccupation with self and overlooks the fact that ones strength and abilities come from the divine Mind. &quote;
Markiert von 13 Kindle-Nutzern
&quote;
never be awed by title or position. Later, I would frequently caution young professionals never to do something they believed was wrong just because a boss had ordered it. &quote;
Markiert von 11 Kindle-Nutzern
&quote;
There are different ways to build relationships. It helps to socialize, but I liked to sell substance. I had a very direct approach that clients needed time to get used to. I wanted people to feel theyd learned something from me each time we met. &quote;
Markiert von 9 Kindle-Nutzern

Kunden diskutieren

Das Forum zu diesem Produkt
Diskussion Antworten Jüngster Beitrag
Noch keine Diskussionen

Fragen stellen, Meinungen austauschen, Einblicke gewinnen
Neue Diskussion starten
Thema:
Erster Beitrag:
Eingabe des Log-ins
 

Kundendiskussionen durchsuchen
Alle Amazon-Diskussionen durchsuchen
   


Ähnliche Artikel finden