Most accounts of the fall of Japan follow, understandably, the progress of the US across the Pacific, culminating in the invasions of the Philippines, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and finally the cataclysmic events of August 1945. Hastings paints a much broader picture, following events in Burma, where the British Empire forces were engaged in a stunningly successful but ultimately pointless, in terms of the final destruction of Japan, campaign, to Borneo where the Australians where relegated to fighting in a backwater, losing much of their stature gained in the Balkans and Western Desert in 1941-42 years before, and being hampered by in-fighting. Macarthur's arrogance - megalomania even - in the Philippines is described with the savage battle for Manila. The necessity for the battle for Iwo is seriously questioned with the normal answer "it saved allied aircrews" being doubted. Some of what he describes is well-known - the fire bombing of Japan's cities, the battle for Okinawa are covered well but less-known aspects are handled well: the China war (which had been going on for far longer that WW2), the Soviet invasion of Manchuria (Stalin's race to grab land before the war ended - the battles there continued for some days after the "official" surrender) and the choking of Japan's logistical supplies by the relatively small (compared with the U-Boats a couple of years earlier) US submarine force. Hastings makes the point that the sinking of Japan's merchant navy dwindled back in late 1944 and early 1945 for the very simple reason: there was pretty well nothing more to sink. He criticises the USAAF for not diverting more resources into the mining of the Inland Sea. When this did happen, the results almost crippled Japan's inter-island traffic. The actual nuclear attacks are briefly covered - I suspect that Hastings realised that they are just too well known - but the political build up, in Washington, Tokyo and Moscow, is covered is some detail. There are also excellent pen pictures of leading characters, and the failings of senior commanders are rigorously examined: General Douglas MacArthur, for example, was a paranoid megalomaniac obsessed with his personal mission to liberate the Philippines, and ignored any intelligence that didn't suit him.
None of the combatants fought a very clean war (if there can be such a thing). The Americans slaughtered many Japanese civilians and prisoners and their campaign seems to have been fuelled by a hatred of Japanese that they did not feel towards the Germans. However, upon reading of the many and hideous atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese - many denied or overlooked by Japan even today - the hatred of them by their opponents seems all too understandable. I must admit that what shocked me most (and impressed me also a lot) in this book, is the descriptions of the systematic Japanese brutality towards both Allied prisoners and fellow Asians. It is truly terrible to read that such a cultivated and kind people like the Japanese could do such barbaric acts against helpless women and children. Hastings is also careful to shade the coin, showing that not all Japanese were sadists. He concludes that if today Japan is guilty of a collective rejection of historical fact in denying its army's brutal and nihilistic actions, some US historians interpret the pursuit of decisive victory - unconditional surrender - as the American way of war, an outlook that `renders the country liable to chronic disappointment'. In Nemesis Hastings has covered a vast canvas with superbly realised detail, and has provided an excellent companion to Armageddon, his earlier study of the defeat of Germany.