Nagasaki; The Necessary Bomb? [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

This book is about the dropping of the second atomic bomb. It focuses on three main topics - the bombing mission itself (which was fraught with difficulties and was almost aborted), the actions in Japan between the dropping of the first bomb at Hiroshima and the final acceptance of the Potsdam Peace terms nine days later (particularly the diplomatic response and the development of an almost successful coup d'état which attempted to prevent any surrender) and finally the question of necessity of the second bomb.

I have had this book on my shelf for many years and was prompted to read it by a brief discussion of the Nagasaki bombing mission that was provided in "D Days in the Pacific". As noted above, the details of this second mission make up part of "Nagasaki", but I actually found that the discussion in D Days (written about thirty years after "Nagasaki") to be superior. While an important part of "Nagasaki", the bombing mission itself makes up only a very small part of the book and did not focus (as it does in D Days) on the underlying reason why there were so many problems with the second mission. Most of "Nagasaki" is taken up with the struggle within Japan between those who recognized that surrender was the only option that might allow Japan to survive and those who wanted to literally fight to the death, even if it meant that in the end there would be no Japan or Japanese. The final 20 pages of "Nagasaki" focus on conclusions, particularly on the necessity of dropping the second bomb. The author makes a clear, and I think convincing case for the proposition that without the second bomb Japan might not have surrendered. Indeed, there was no surrender in the three days between the first and second bombs and it took an additional six days after the second bombing before the Japanese surrendered. The author makes the case that if there were no second bomb available the war would likely have continued, requiring more conventional bombing and unbelievably costly invasions of the Japanese home islands. The second bomb showed that the first was not a fluke or a one of a kind weapon (an argument made by some Japanese military men) enabling enough of the military to accept surrender and not give their support to the coup d'état, which might have succeeded with their support. The bombs gave some in the military a way to save face because no one, no matter how patriotic or fanatical, could stand up to their power. The book also discuses why the author feels that alternatives, such as a demonstration bomb that would not have caused any death or destruction would not have worked and might even have been counter productive in bring about a surrender without the need for an invasion of the home islands.

The book contains some good quality pictures of Japanese leaders, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs (actually bomb case models), the bomb crew for the Nagasaki mission, and Nagasaki ground zero before and after the bombing. It also contains an index and a glossary of important Japanese leaders, but there are no footnotes, endnotes or even a bibliography. Without these notes or bibliography the book is of little use for a historian as there is no way to check sources or to get additional information. I understand why a publisher tries to avoid notes as they make the book seem too academic, but in this case I think that their deletion is a serious flaw. Otherwise, the book was very good, so in spite of this flaw I am still rating this as a four-star book.