British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign,... und über 1,5 Millionen weitere Bücher verfügbar für Amazon Kindle. Erfahren Sie mehr


oder
Loggen Sie sich ein, um 1-Click® einzuschalten.
Alle Angebote
Möchten Sie verkaufen? Hier verkaufen
Der Artikel ist in folgender Variante leider nicht verfügbar
Keine Abbildung vorhanden für
Farbe:
Keine Abbildung vorhanden

 
Beginnen Sie mit dem Lesen von British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign,... auf Ihrem Kindle in weniger als einer Minute.

Sie haben keinen Kindle? Hier kaufen oder eine gratis Kindle Lese-App herunterladen.

British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918 (Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence) [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

Yigal Sheffy

Statt: EUR 138,62
Jetzt: EUR 138,48 kostenlose Lieferung. Siehe Details.
  Alle Preisangaben inkl. MwSt.
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Nur noch 1 auf Lager (mehr ist unterwegs).
Verkauf und Versand durch Amazon. Geschenkverpackung verfügbar.

Weitere Ausgaben

Amazon-Preis Neu ab Gebraucht ab
Kindle Edition EUR 96,94  
Gebundene Ausgabe EUR 138,48  
Taschenbuch --  

Kurzbeschreibung

Juli 1998 Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence
Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

Produktinformation


Mehr über den Autor

Entdecken Sie Bücher, lesen Sie über Autoren und mehr

Produktbeschreibungen

Synopsis

Shortly after the end of the First World war, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime British Director of Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had been certain because all his opponent's cards were known to him; he was consequently able to play his own hand with perfect assurance. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Drawing on extensive British archival documentation, as well as on Ottoman and German sources, the book examines the development and efficacy of Brtish military intelligence in the campaign against the Ottoman empire in Egypt and Palestine during the war. Sheffy explains the failure in the first battle of Gaza through inadequate British intelligence and traces its resultant improvement to the point where wireless interception, cryptanalysis and air-photography, in the later part of the war, lent British commanders a distinct battlefield advantage. He also adopts a novel approach to the traditional heroes of the campaign such as T.E.Lawrence.

This book provides a comprehensive and original study of the relationship between intelligence gathering and battle-field performance in the desert during the Great War.


In diesem Buch (Mehr dazu)
Ausgewählte Seiten ansehen
Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis
Hier reinlesen und suchen:

Kundenrezensionen

Es gibt noch keine Kundenrezensionen auf Amazon.de
5 Sterne
4 Sterne
3 Sterne
2 Sterne
1 Sterne
Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen auf Amazon.com (beta)
Amazon.com: 4.0 von 5 Sternen  2 Rezensionen
4 von 4 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
4.0 von 5 Sternen How British Intelligence evolved into a war-winning tool 10. Mai 2000
Von R. A Forczyk - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
This is a well-documented history of British intelligence in the First World War, that grew out of a PhD dissertation written by a former Israeli military intelligence officer. When the war began, British forces in Egypt had little reliable information on Turkish forces or intentions. At first, the British underestimated the ability of the Turks to attack the Suez Canal, but after a minor raid they grossly overestimated their capability. Throughout the war, British intelligence in the Mideast was hindered by both cultural bias against the Turks combined with an Anglo-Centric view that the Palestine front was a major front for the Ottoman Empire (which actually regarded the Caucusus and the Russians as the main theater of war). Several noted figures appear in the text, such as T E Lawrence (AKA "Lawrence of Arabia"), and their true roles and participation in the war are depicted without the usual colorful embellishments. Sheffy concludes that overall human intelligence (HUMINT) made little contribution to the British victory because the information provided was generally too little, too late. The one effective spy ring, the "Nili Organization" of Jews in occupied Palestine, was quickly broken up by the Turks in 1917. The only worthwhile human information came from prisoners and defectors. Sheffy claims convincingly that the most significant intelligence development brought by the war was the shift from dependence on human sources to reliance on technical means. Indeed, the British made very effective use of early imagery intelligence from aircraft and radio intercepts. By the end of the war the British had honed intelligence to the point that it could greatly contribute to the final operational campaign. Sheffy's book is well-written, if a bit dry at times, and benefits from the insights of an intelligence professional. This is a good addition to any well-rounded First World War library collection.
4 von 4 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
4.0 von 5 Sternen British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 5. August 2001
Von Daniel Pipes, Middle East Forum, Philadelphia - Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Format:Taschenbuch
In 1921, just three years after the end of World War I, Great Britain's director of Military Intelligence made the astounding statement that General Allenby had won in Palestine because he "knew from his intelligence every disposition and movement of the enemy. Every one of his opponents' cards was known to him, and he was consequently able to play his own hand with the most perfect assurance. In those circumstances victory was certain." Sheffy's precise and far-ranging research pieces together in masterly fashion just how Allenby benefited from such extraordinary information about his foes. In the process, he shows not only how a key military campaign was fought and won, but also how the modern intelligence service took shape in a spontaneous and amorphous fashion. Along the way, Sheffy demonstrates the near-uselessness of human intelligence (spies, travelers, prisoners of war, et al.), dismissing the whole lot with a quote from the time: "What can agents find out about the intentions of Governments that have no notion what their own intentions are?" In contrast, technical means (air reconnaissance, radio interceptions) proved highly valuable. He establishes how the latter gave the British a much better idea of tactics than of grand strategy, and how they paid heavily for their wrong guesses about the latter. Despite their fair share of mistakes, the British intelligence operatives made a very credible start at bringing a "hitherto hidden dimension . . . into the forefront of modern warfare."
Middle East Quarterly, March 1999
Waren diese Rezensionen hilfreich?   Wir wollen von Ihnen hören.

Kunden diskutieren

Das Forum zu diesem Produkt
Diskussion Antworten Jüngster Beitrag
Noch keine Diskussionen

Fragen stellen, Meinungen austauschen, Einblicke gewinnen
Neue Diskussion starten
Thema:
Erster Beitrag:
Eingabe des Log-ins
 

Kundendiskussionen durchsuchen
Alle Amazon-Diskussionen durchsuchen
   


Ähnliche Artikel finden


Ihr Kommentar