Metaphysics Without Truth: On the Importance of Consistency Within Nietzsche's Philosophy (Marquette Studies in Philosophy) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Metaphysics without truth. Is this possible? A difficult and nevertheless interesting question. Stefan Lorenz Sorgner explores in his thesis the conceptions of "metaphysics" and "truth", and the "consistency" within Nietzsche's philosophy. Sorgner's work is of particular importance for the research in Nietzsche, because Nietzsche has not published a systematic book about his theory of metaphysics and truth. But apart from his big works, which present his basic opinions about metaphysics or truth, we do have Nietzsche's fragments, rather unsystematic as to their order.
In the introducing chapters (pp. 11-33), Sorgner outlines in some facts, partly historical ones, what is meant by "metaphysics" and "truth" and what Nietzsche meant by these terms. Nietzsche was a sceptic concerning truth. He was not sure, if there is "the truth" - by that he has influenced the later post-modern philosophy of the 20th century in its way of thinking about truth as something relative (see Danto, Nehamas, and Poellner), although Nietzsche's thoughts are in many ways different from post-modernism! Nietzsche never speaks of "the truth" in an emphatic sense, but of "his truth" not in a purely subjective sense.
Even if he builds up a strong metaphysical conception regarding coherence and stringency, Nietzsche's conception could be considered as weak because of his sceptical view of truth. A strong metaphysical conception, like the classic metaphysics (e. g. Plato or Aristotle), has also a stringent conception of truth. So the question is, what Nietzsche's metaphysics is based on, if he denies "the truth".
The main part of Sorgner's thesis is divided into three chapters: "Apollo", "Dionysos", and "Apollo & Dionysos reconciled". Nietzsche's philosophy is famous for the distinction between "Apollo" and "Dionysos": In his early book "The Birth of Tragedy" (1872), he distinguished the "apollinic" as a creative power, as clear, and formal, and the "dionysic" as a destructive power, as formless, and dark.
In "Apollo" (pp. 34-70), Sorgner describes how Nietzsche's metaphysics is constructed. In his conception of "will to power", which is extremely diffcult to restore, because Nietzsche himself did not write a book about "will to power", Nietzsche was influenced by Schopenhauer. Therefore "will to power" is constructive for life and it is the first category. Sorgner differentiates the terms "force" and "will to power" in Nietzsche's thoughts (p. 39).
Nietzsche's metaphysics is also characterized by the idea of "Eternal Recurrence". Sorgner points out that the two conceptions, "will to power" and "Eternal Recurrence", do not contradict each other, because Nietzsche has never said "that will to power implies that what has been cannot be again" (p. 68). Metaphysics in Nietzsche's philosophy is mainly constructed by "will to power" and "Eternal Recurrence".
In "Dionysos" (pp. 71-115), Sorgner expounds the destructive elements of Nietzsche's metaphysics and its "artistic" character. "Artistic" means that Nietzsche's metaphysics is not founded in "the truth", but in "his (Nietzsche's) truth", which is called "perspectivism" (pp. 71/2). Thus Nietzsche does not regard his metaphysics as corresponding to the truth and it is that, which is the destructive element in his metaphysics and leads to nihilism.
In "Apollo & Dionysos reconciled" (pp. 116-149), Sorgner explains that Nietzsche's metaphysics, although it lead to "perspectivism", because Nietzsche's metaphysics is not based on the truth, does not destroy itself by its artistic character. In the end Nietzsche's metaphysics and his world-view are sustained by the spirit, not by the truth. This spirit is not influenced by Christianity, which declined in the late 19th century and was criticized by Nietzsche as weak and sick, but by science. Nietzsche links science with his metaphysical conception of "Eternal Recurrence", "the 'most scientific of hypotheses'" (p. 136). Therefore one can say that Nietzsche's metaphysics is not based on the truth, but on a scientific spirit, which is almost identical with the spirit of time of the late 19th/beginning of the 20th century.
Sorgner says, he does "not agree with Nietzsche's metaphysics" (p. 150), nor do I, but he "will state" his reasons "in another study" (p. 150): see St. L. Sorgner, Narzismus und 'Wille zur Macht', in: R. Reschke [ed.], Zeitenwende - Wertewende (Berlin, 2001), pp. 249-254. Concerning the introductory question, metaphysics without truth is not possible in my opinion, as Nietzsche's metaphysical conception presents, because it is consistent, but does not correspond with reality.
Sorgner's thesis is clear in its words, strong in its arguments and disposition. He keeps the reader consequently focussed on the main questions and terms of his thesis: "metaphysics", "truth" and "consistency" in Nietzsche's philosophy. The bibliography is very rich including the most important English and German literature on Nietzsche.

HANS OTTO SEITSCHEK, M. A., assistant at Munich University (LMU), department of philosophy