"Kirby could see the panzers coming through his periscope, which was just high enough to see over the wadi's edge. His gun could not be brought to bear -- yet. The firing order blared over the radio, and US guns began to crack, including their own 37mm -- for what it was worth."
Gordon L. Rottman is the author of "M3 Medium Tank vs. Panzer III: Kasserine Pass 1943", the 10th book in Osprey's popular Duel series. The veteran author does a suitable job of analyzing and contrasting the American built M3 medium tank and the German Mark III. "Duel 10" is clearly written, well illustrated and is a fast read.
Mr. Rottman's discussion comprises the design, layout, and development of these tanks, their crew assignments, their respective army units, and their deployment. "Duel 10" concludes with a clash between the two rival tanks -- The Battle of Kasserine Pass.
With a total output of 5,688, the Mark III was Germany's most produced panzer. In 1937, for compatibility reasons, the Mark III was assigned the new high velocity 37mm gun. The Mark III was first upgraded to the short 50mm in June 1940 after battling the rugged French Char B tank. Later the main gun was upgraded again to the long 50mm, in response to the threat of the formidable Russian T-34 tank in 1941.
In 1939, realizing that no current tank matched up with the German panzers rolling through Poland, US designers hurriedly began development of the unorthodox high-profile M3 medium tank.
After reports that German panzers had crushed France were analyzed, the US Army Ordinance Committee demanded that a 75mm gun be incorporated into the M3 tank -- somehow.
This cobbled together M3 would serve in the interim until the faster, more reliable M4 Sherman could be made available in February 1942.
The M3 medium tank ably served with the British Army in North Africa, starting in May 1942. While other units had already converted to the M4 Sherman medium tank, the 2nd Battalion, 1st US Armored Division still was using M3s during the Battle of Kasserine Pass. In the Far East Theater, Commonwealth M3s served against the Japanese in India, Burma, and Borneo.
The author is unwilling to name either tank as the superior weapon. In analysis of the tanks, Mr. Rottman argues, "The M3 tank was rife with flaws, some fatal." The most predominate drawback was its very high profile. The M3 was much easier to see and a much larger target than the Mark III.
Another obvious disadvantage of the M3 tank was that the sponson-mounted 75mm main gun could only fire forward and be aimed from side-to-side with 30 degrees of total adjustment. In order to fire the 75mm main gun at a target, over half the M3 must be exposed to the enemy. The M3 commander's job was further complicated by the responsibility for two guns.
Most of the M3 tank's armor plate was riveted on -- if a shell struck a rivet head, the rivet shaft could be turned into deadly shrapnel inside the tank. Also bullets and shell fragments could enter the tank through the seams of the side hatches.
In judging the M3's armament, Mr. Rottman points out that the machine gun in the cupola was unable to track attacking aircraft and the secondary 37mm was of little value against German tanks. On the positive side, both the 37mm and 75mm guns were gyro stablised and the powerful 75mm main gun could knock out any German tank.
The Mark III's design has few flaws in comparison with the M3. Of note, it lacked gyro stabilised guns and could not fire accurately while moving. Also the turret rotation must be done manually.
By having two-way radios in all German tanks, the author feels the Mark III panzers had an advantage over the M3s. Mr. Rottman argues, "By allowing all tanks to transmit, the Germans were more responsive and able to pass information up the chain-of-command which surely enhanced German combined arms tactics."
Through superior logistics, the US Army was able to quickly replace any M3 losses. In contrast, the German Army had no spare tanks, crewmen, or trucks. Often they would use captured equipment.
I found the section on the daily life of tankers to be best part of the book. This is an insider's view of each crewman's day-to-day duties and experiences that I have not seen in other books.
The author gives us an eye witness account of armored combat in North Africa. Through the experiences of German panzer radio operator Baldur Kohler and M3 gunner Paul Kirby, the reader re-lives the opening round of this confusing tank battle.
In summary and analysis of the battle, the author argues that the defeat of the US Army at Kasserine Pass was due to American inexperience at all levels more so than marked inferiority of the M3 tank.
The US armored forces were inadequately prepared to meet the seasoned German panzers. Mr. Rottman believes that US Army units were too scattered on the battlefield to be effective. He states, "American doctrine, tactics, and techniques at the time were guilty of unrealistic expectations with inadequate preparation."
Mr. Rottman argues that by only practicing in staged exercises, the US Army leadership had not developed skills necessary to make timely battlefield decisions -- this comes only with combat experience. "They were unprepared for the speed of events, the confusion, the loss of contact between units, and nonlinear dispositions".
The US Army did learn well -- Kasserine Pass was the last German victory in the North Africa campaign.
"M3 Medium Tank vs. Panzer III: Kasserine Pass 1943" includes a great number of interesting photographs, color illustrations, diagrams, and three adequate maps of the Battle of Kasserine Pass.