This is a dogmatic and petty introduction to the philosophy of science, featuring the following trademark traits of second-rate analytic philosophy:
Mathematical incompetence. It is claimed that it follows from Bayes' theorem P(H|E)=P(H)P(E|H)/P(E) that "since the expectedness [of the evidence] occurs in the denominator of the fraction, the smaller the expectedness, the greater the value of the fraction. Surprising evidence confirms hypotheses more than evidence to be expected regardless of the hypothesis." (p. 73). This is stupid. One cannot argue in this way since the evidence occurs also in the numerator. If we change the denominator we change the numerator as well, so we cannot tell whether the fraction will become greater or smaller.
Uncritical treatment of pet theories. E.g. Bayesianism, regarding which it is claimed, for example, that priors wash out (p. 84) and that "Humean sceptics who regiment their beliefs according to the axioms of probability cannot remain sceptical about [a] universal generalization in the face of ever-increasing positive instances (and no negative instances) unless they assign [to it] a zero prior" (p. 94). The mathematical theorems that are supposed to support these hubristic claims actually say something infinitely weaker. In fact, since these theorems are limit theorems they say absolutely nothing at all about any actual situation whatsoever. Such rather obvious objections are ignored in the interest of propaganda.
Authoritarian decrees. We are told that Lakatos' rational reconstructions approach "has rightly been rejected by historians" (p. 154). Why "rightly"? There is not a trace of an argument or any evidence for this.
Convoluted style. E.g.: "We find---both in contemporary science and in the history of science---that scientists do advance hypotheses from which (with the aid of initial conditions and auxiliary hypotheses) they deduce observational predictions." (p. 99).
Concern with isms rather than issues of substance. An example is the discussion of interpretations of probability theory (section 2.8), where each ism is criticised for not applying universally (e.g., the frequency interpretation cannot deal with singular events (p. 79), the propensity interpretation cannot deal with conditional probabilities (p. 80), etc.). Pitting these ism against each other is as useless as pitting the theories of physics against each other. What is the best theory of physics? Is it optics? No, it can't explain gravity. Is it Newtonian mechanics? No, it can't explain relativistic effects. Etc. The value of a theory is judged by the insights it brings and the problems it solves, not by the domains where it does not apply.
Religious faith in logic. For example, Goodman's suggestion that rules of justification are ultimately codifications of practice is scornfully mocked (p. 62). "We vindicate the basic rules of deductive logic by showing that they are truth-preserving" (p. 61). But the law of the excluded middle was challenged by Brouwer in what was clearly an adjustment of the laws of logic prompted by practice, precisely in the manner described by Goodman.
Justification of this faith by bogus history. The story goes that the logic of Frege, Hilbert and Russell became "a rich and powerful tool for analysing language and arguments." "From the perspective provided by this new tool, Kant's arguments [for example] didn't look very sound." (p. 112). However, no "rich and powerful" analysis of Kant or anyone else is provided in order to substantiate this Book of Genesis surrogate. As befits any good apostles, however, our authors are eager to steal the insights of other traditions and claim them as their own. For example: "The new philosophers of science unanimously rejected Kant's claims about the source and character of mathematical knowledge; instead, several other alternatives were pursued [such as the idea] that mathematical knowledge is tacitly [sic!] conditional and axiomatic" (p. 114). What a remarkably "rich and powerful" insight "provided by this new tool"!