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Breaking 27 years of silence, former defense secretary McNamara seeks "to put Vietnam in context" and counter "the cynicism and even contempt with which so many people view our political institutions and leaders." The two administrations McNamara served made their "terribly wrong" decisions, he argues, because of "an error not of values and intentions but of judgment and capabilities." Though one brief chapter sketches McNamara's life before 1961, In Retrospect is more than memoir: Annapolis history professor VanDeMark--author of Into the Quagmire (1990)--supplied thorough research files, including newly declassified documents, and reviewed McNamara's drafts for historical accuracy. McNamara maintains that U.S. Vietnam policy rested on contradictory premises: a "domino" theory that, in retrospect, overstated the threat to U.S. security and world peace if Ho Chi Minh's forces won; and recognition that if the South Vietnamese were not committed to defending themselves, no other nation could do it. McNamara assumes responsibility for failing to address that contradiction and other unexamined assumptions and undebated disagreements that plagued decision making in these years. He identifies "eleven major causes for our disaster in Vietnam" and six points when the U.S. could legitimately have withdrawn. Certainly not the last word on this still-controversial subject but an essential acquisition for most libraries. Mary Carroll
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From Library Journal
McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1967 under both presidents Kennedy and Johnson, has remained silent about U.S. policy toward Vietnam until now. This memoir reveals a decent, loyal, and able man who struggled to remain loyal to the president and yet to get the United States out of Vietnam. When McNamara left office, 15,979 Americans had been killed in Viet Nam; by the time the United States left Vietnam, the number stood at over 58,000. McNamara's recollections are put to rigorous testing by his junior author, VanDeMark, who checked them against the now-declassified written and taped records of the period. Publicly perceived as a "hawk," McNamara documents his attempts from 1966 on to find a way for the United States to exit from the war. The culmination of his effort is a May 19, 1967 memorandum to LBJ, calling for U.S. withdrawal. President Johnson never sent a reply. McNamara reveals that "I do not know to this day, whether I quit or was fired." At any rate, McNamara left the Pentagon to begin a successul ten-year term as president of the World Bank. In looking back, he holds that "we sought to do the right thing...but in my judgment hindsight proved us wrong." McNamara's unpretentious, genuine, and touching memoir should contribute further to healing the wounds of the Vietnam experience; it belongs in all public and academic libraries.?James Rhodes, Luther Coll., Decorah, Ia.
Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.
Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.
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4 von 4 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Format:Taschenbuch
Almost 30 years after his departure from the Department of Defense, Robert McNamara has decided to share his views of what led to and furthered US involvement in Vietnam. McNamara makes a few points that are helpful in understanding the decision-making process used by McNamara and his fellow policymakers. For example, McNamara is quick to remind us that US involvement in Vietnam began long before the Kennedy presidency. He also carefully outlines the mindset in which he and others were working. This mindset involved an absolute misunderstanding of the Vietnamese people and an incredible fear of the spread of Communism. These, among others described, were very real errors committed by McNamara and other policymakers. They failed to consult experts concerning many issues surrounding US involvement in Vietnam. What McNamara does not address, however, is the countless deaths, injuries and emotional scars experienced on both the American and Vietnamese sides. The only death McNamara seems affected by is that of a protester that burned himself to death 40 feet beneath McNamara's Pentagon office window. McNamara is interested in accepting his share of the blame for poor policy making, but seems unable to come to terms with the carnage that resulted from his errors. After reading McNamara's book, I have come to the conclusion that he is telling the truth about certain errors he made, but it is only half of the story. Also, beware of McNamara's ability to provoke sympathy. He describes his position with the Pentagon as being a very small part of a huge policymaking machine. He says he disagreed with many of the policies put forth, but failed to voice his opinions or his opinions were crushed by fellow policymakers. This, I do not believe. McNamara was an extremely powerful and influential policymaker during his stint as Secretary of Defense.
If you are interested in the history surrounding the Vietnam War, read this book, but be sure to read others as well. This is one part of US involvement, but fails to tell the whole story. The book also has interesting insights into decision-making on a national level.
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Format:Taschenbuch
For every person who has ever asked, "How did we ever get into Vietnam," former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's book, "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam," is a must read. In it, Mr. McNamara details clearly what actions American government leaders took at each phase of the conflict, why they did what they did, the assumptions their actions were based upon, and why, in retrospect, their actions were wrong, and what they should have done instead. Their intentions were indeed pure: prevent the spread of communism world wide. However, the result of their actions was to uninitentially plunge two nations at opposite ends of the economic spectrum into the hell that was Vietnam.
Throughout, Mr. McNamara takes full responsibility for his actions or inactions, something no one else has ever done. He also does an outstanding job of describing the cold war mentatlity that that made South Vietnam seem worth the sacrifice of so many millions of lives and so many billions of dollars. In short, it seemed that the loss of Vietnam would start the fall of nations, like dominos, ending perhaps at the shores of the United States itself. It seemed there was adequate reason to think that given the rape of Eastern Europe by the Soviets after WWII, the stalemate in Korea, the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, and Soviet Premier Kruschev's bellicose statement, "We will bury you,!" and the national hysteria and long-term damage caused by McCarthyism. McNamara and Company made their decisions accordingly. The present and future generations that did not and will not grow up under a nuclear shaped cloud called the, "Cold War," will benefit from reading this account as virtually all decisions were made under these assumptions for over 40 years.
Mr. McNamara ends his work with a blueprint for future international relations based on the changing economic and political situations emerging worldwide. His assertions that American ability to shape the world in our own image is now gone and that domestic spending programs are as essential for our security as military spending are deserving of serious study.
The Holy Bible says in the book of Proverbs, Chapter 20, Verse 29, "The glory of young men is their strength; of old men, their experience." Future leaders would do well to heed this "old man's" advise, borne of hard experience. In a world now characterized by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of increasingly radical groups, we can afford to do no less.
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Format:Taschenbuch
Robert McNamara's "In Retrospect" ranks up there with David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" as one of the most enlightening books on the Vietnam tragedy. Revealing is McNamara's describing of an incident in which a protestor committed suicide outside the window of his Pentagon office. After that episode McNamara stopped talking about the war with his wife and children, all of whom were against it. Those who are interested in history will find this book absorbing and impossible to put down. However, I most recommend it to those with an interest in human behavior and decision-making.
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I Learned Nothing New
After reading Mr McNamara's book, I feel as though I learned nothing new about Vietnam. He really is justifying the incompetence that cost so many lives. Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 15. Juni 2000 von Joe Domhan
Pitiful
It is easiest to criticize in retrospect, but i'll make a grand exception in this case. I still cringe as I read and re-read about each miscalculation and misjudgement and the... Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 29. Mai 2000 von Robert Sterling
Enlightening Reading
This was a good read. I especially liked McNamara's reconstruction of the cabinet meetings (with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy) that led up to our involvement in Vietnam: it... Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 19. Mai 2000 von Leon M. Bodevin
The banality of the arrogance of evil
A thoughtful, if repellent, reflection. Unfortunately, much too little, way too late. It's a conclusive demonstration of the chains of events the unbridled arrogance of one... Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 12. Mai 2000 von James C. Adams
You Had To Be There
If we make a critical examination of this book, we will come to the same conclusion as Robert MacNamara does. And rightly so. Let's not get into intricate detail. Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 27. März 2000 von Bill Butler
You Had To Be There
If we make a critical examination of this book, we will come to the same conclusion as Robert MacNamara does. And rightly so. Let's not get into intricate detail. Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 27. März 2000 von Bill Butler
The author is a genocidal murderer
I was drafted and sent to Vietnam in 1968. I have always wondered how a man could be so evil. Unfortunately the world court does not pursue U S war criminals. Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 18. Januar 2000 von philip s. watson
Of fears and tears...
If you're a history fan in general and interested in the history of this country in particular, you'll agree that "the sixties" were a watershed era for The United... Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 11. Januar 2000 von M. Burchill
The Road to Hell is Paved With Good Intentions
For every person who has ever asked, "How did we ever get into Vietnam," former Secretary of Defense Robert S. Lesen Sie weiter...
Veröffentlicht am 3. Januar 2000 von Harold Y. Grooms
52,000 Lives Too Late
Mr. McNamara finally accepts responsibility for the political rationale of the Vietnam deception. However, the book is a poorly written attempt to rationalize the blood of 52,000... Lesen Sie weiter...
Am 2. Dezember 1999 veröffentlicht
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