How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

Michael Shermer has made a significant effort to detail the background thinking [or lack of it] that sustains the concept of The Sprite so firmly in the American psyche. How does the idea of a divine creator persist when the logic supporting it weakens with every forward stride of knowledge? Why do so many Americans, supposedly the most literate nation on earth, retain such adherence to superstition? Who are the believers and why do they believe?

Half a century ago, Robert Nathan wrote a delightful social satire, DIGGING THE WEANS. Archeologists from a future Africa crossed the seas to learn about the extinct people known as the US. In particular, they sought answers to why the US seemed so different from other people. One wonders what Nathan might think today. Since his time 'globalization' has become a smokescreen term for Americanization. How these new imperialists think is a compelling issue. Shermer's book has provided insight to one facet of that thinking. It's of particular meaning to those of us living elsewhere. If there's a serious flaw in this book, it's a failure to make some valid comparisons with other people and their faiths.

Still, Shermer tries valiantly to fulfill the mandate he's given himself. How Americans believe is depicted by numerous quantitative studies. How many PhDs, bank managers or trash collectors, burdened with fears of the afterlife [or lack thereof] cling to the image of The Sprite? Shermer can't truly extract which of these is hopeful of something better on The Other Side, or simply fleeing an envisioned post-perish punishment. We can't blame him for this, since the faithful probably can't express, either.

Shermer's attempts to provide insight into WHY so many Americans are so persistent in their piety fall rather flat. The studies quoted seemed rather simplistic, but the question can only be, do you believe in The Sprite, or not. The discussions about agnosticism, non-theist or theist are engaging, but don't address the difficult question: why does the nation with the most Nobel winners remain the most superstitious? Perhaps Shermer would have done better to simply beg off attempting the question as too difficult. At least in only 290 pages. Yet, the question arises repeatedly. It titles the fourth chapter and an appendix and is the theme of Chapter 5. He uses it as a subtopic and for table headings, but we never find out why such a powerful people need to escape reality for the elusive solace of neo-Christianity.

The cure for yellow fever [and smallpox and polio] came from science workers, not faith[ful] healers. Twain wanted priority recognition for those researchers and instead watched the credit go to [g]od. With such a high proportion of Americans expressing faith, it's inevitable that even scientists will find themselves in different camps. In one of the strangest sections in this book, Shermer launches an assault on Daniel C. Dennett's critique of Steven J. Gould. Gould, co-author of the 'punctuated equilibria' mechanism of evolution, is particularly deft at disclosing Gould's mental gymnastics in expressing his ideas. In this context, Gould sells Shermer on eschewing the term 'random' in favour of 'contingency' in describing evolution's process. Dennett, following Richard Dawkins, rightly sees Gould introducing 'skyhooks' in his attempts to modify Darwin's theme of natural selection. Shermer is clearly unhappy at this tarnishing of his hero, firmly chastising Dennett at 'protesting overmuch'.

Why does Shermer take off on Dennett so strongly? Is it merely because Gould forwarded his last book? Shermer awards Gould too much credit for giving 'contingency' a deep philosophical meaning in contrast to 'random', a quirky and apparently less definable term. Gould rises in his own defence of contingency, wrapping the evidence in the term 'sequence' in his definition of evolution's modus operandi. This seems to give 'contingency' a respectability lacking in 'random'. The presentation is convoluted and the evidence misleading, however. Random necessarily avoids sequence; otherwise it's no longer random. Nor is contingency sequential - unless, as in this case, evolution makes it so. Saying Dennett 'doth protest overmuch', Shermer ignores the stature of Gould as America's best-known science writer. If Gould gets it wrong, the impact will be widespread. And he got it wrong.

In terms of creative content the book's most important contribution is Chapter 10, "Glorious Contingency." Here Shermer expands on a theme credited to S.J. Gould, the central idea being that the evolutionary chain leading to H. Sapiens (us) was contingency-intensive, and therefore probably irreproducible if a repeat trial could somehow be arranged. Gould attributes the irreproducibility not primarily to true randomness or asteroid-type disasters, but rather to overwhelming practical uncertainties rooted in the sensitivity of final outcomes to initial conditions and early events in lengthy, complex processes. As the author points out, recent trends in Chaos Theory lend support to such a conclusion. After addressing some criticisms of Gould (primarily from Daniel Dennett), Shermer introduces his own concept, Contingent-Necessity, which is generalized to cover not just biological evolution, but any historical sequence or process. He proposes a shifting balance (bifurcation) between contingency and necessity that could clarify the nature and genesis of events ranging from punctuated equilibria in evolution to the great social upheavals in human history.

A common complaint about Shermer's books is that he tends to ramble; that is, every chapter is not centered on the book's title subject. True enough, but I don't see a serious problem if the material is at least related to the book's main theme. One Amazon reviewer saw no satisfactorily-explained connection between religion and the above-described Chapter 10. It seems to me that in the chapter's last section ("Finding Meaning in a Contingent Universe"), the connection becomes clear enough: To evaluate intelligently any religion's view of how and when we got here, one requires more than passing familiarity with what science, with its built-in BS detectors, can tell us about the very same subject. On the critical side, I have to agree with the reviewer who found Shermer's reference to science as "a type of myth" quite annoying. The problem isn't so much the statement itself as the author's assumption that no supporting explanation was necessary.