The Generalship of Alexander the Great is not primarily a biography but rather, as the title indicates, an analysis of the Macedonian's generalship and statesmanship. Writing "the art of war . . . was the same in Alexander's day as it is now" J. F. C. Fuller presents the campaigns and policies of the Macedonian as examples from which to derive useful lessons. At the Camberley Staff College he used Alexander's operations as lesson material and argues "had statesmen and generals-in-chief been acquainted with the history of Greece in the fought century B.C., they might have avoided many of the colossal blunders perpetrated by them in the Second World War." While giving civil and military leaders much to think about, Fuller's book will also appeal to laymen as well.
Historians will be interested in and pleased with the author's sources. Fuller utilizes many primary sources, most notably Arrian's Anabasis, and discloses where these sources conflict, as they often do over battle fatalities and troop estimates. Many secondary sources, like W. W. Tarn's two-volume Alexander the Great, are also used along with the works of Plato and Clausewitz. The sources are good and well documented for easy reference.
The book's organization divides it into two halves and, for the most part, is reader-friendly. The first section is devoted to chronologically summarizing the Macedonian's exploits while the second half devotes a chapter to examining all of Alexander's battles, then one to his sieges, et cetera. This arrangement makes it easy to both get a good overview of the conqueror's accomplishments and to directly compare his battles with each other. The only drawback is that this makes it difficult to place the battles in their chronological and political setting. Another helpful feature of the book's organization is the inclusion of chapters on the political background of Alexander's age and on the Macedonian army. These, along with information on the Persian Empire and the geography of the region, make the volume accessible to the general public.
The account of Alexander's life and deeds is set out roughly chronologically and progresses logically. The narrative is pleasantly interspersed with biographical stories about Alexander such as when he approached the Delphic oracle and extracted the prophecy "thou art invincible, my son!" and the account of his visit to the tomb of Achilles. However, the reader looking for a biography of Alexander would be better to look elsewhere. Even with these interesting tidbits, the strategical narrative moves quickly and understandably.
Alexander began his career by securing Macedonia's borders and then his position as hegemon of the Hellenic League. He did the first with quick campaigns against tribes on the Danube and the second by razing Thebes after it resisted his authority (a move he later regretted). After guaranteeing the loyalty of Hellas, Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Anatolia and won his first major victory at the River Granicus. Once Darius is defeated in battle and assassinated by one of his own satraps Alexander became king of Persia and changed his focus from one of conquest to one of administering and unifying his empire. Fuller explains how "as an administrator, Alexander build on what existed, reformed and experimented with it as far as time permitted, and did not adhere to any system that failed to stand the test of practice." Many of these reform policies angered the Macedonian veterans but "they belonged to the old world, and . . . the new . . . was comprehensible to Alexander alone."
The analysis of Alexander's policies, which were relatively egalitarian and very lenient to his defeated enemies, is excellent. As Fuller points out, "throughout his life Alexander consistently subordinated strategy to policy, which is the essence of grand strategy" and the analysis of the battles and strategy in the book's second section is vigorous and comprehensible. Fuller, who rose to the rank of major general, carefully lays out the military units and commanders involved on both sides and summarizes the battle action succinctly and in a manner that non-experts can easily grasp. A map is provided for each battle (two for the battle of Arbela) and, while not of excellent quality, all the maps are sufficient.
Fuller traces the advance of the Macedonians to India where they refused to go on. Alexander then returned to his empire where he reformed corruption and dissent which had arisen in his absence. Shortly after that, the great king died at the age of thirty-three and his empire was divided up amongst his top generals. Fuller goes into speculation on what Alexander would have done had he lived (deciding that he would have consolidated his empire) and concludes that "Alexander's conquest of the Persian empire, his new cities and financial reforms, were to lead to the rise of the Hellenistic kingdoms, and through the Roman empire which absorbed them, to lay the foundations of European culture and civilization." Following that, the author returns to his purpose and in nine pages argues how, had lessons from Alexander been applied, costly mistakes made in World War II could have been avoided. Throughout, Fuller shows the applicability of Alexander's examples with numerous accounts of emulation by such figures as Caesar, Hannibal, and Napoleon.
J. F. C. Fuller's prose is clear and concise, the organization of the book is superb, and all points and information are presented in a coherent manner. The first half especially will appeal to casual readers and historians will find the work to be very useful as the starting point for further research into any aspects of Alexander's life and career. The author is careful to show Alexander's faults along with his gifts and avoids casting the Persians as hopelessly inept. He proves his thesis and convincingly argues for paying greater attention to the lessons of antiquity lest generals and statesmen remain doomed to repeat history's mistakes.
