EUR 38,58
  • Alle Preisangaben inkl. MwSt.
Nur noch 1 auf Lager (mehr ist unterwegs).
Verkauf und Versand durch Amazon.
Geschenkverpackung verfügbar.
To the Gates of Stalingra... ist in Ihrem Einkaufwagen hinzugefügt worden
Ihren Artikel jetzt
eintauschen und
EUR 1,00 Gutschein erhalten.
Möchten Sie verkaufen?
Zur Rückseite klappen Zur Vorderseite klappen
Anhören Wird wiedergegeben... Angehalten   Sie hören eine Probe der Audible-Audioausgabe.
Weitere Informationen
Alle 2 Bilder anzeigen

To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 (Modern War Studies) (Englisch) Gebundene Ausgabe – 15. Mai 2009

Alle Formate und Ausgaben anzeigen Andere Formate und Ausgaben ausblenden
Amazon-Preis Neu ab Gebraucht ab
Gebundene Ausgabe
"Bitte wiederholen"
EUR 38,58
EUR 29,48 EUR 38,27
10 neu ab EUR 29,48 4 gebraucht ab EUR 38,27
EUR 38,58 Kostenlose Lieferung. Nur noch 1 auf Lager (mehr ist unterwegs). Verkauf und Versand durch Amazon. Geschenkverpackung verfügbar.

Wird oft zusammen gekauft

To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 (Modern War Studies) + Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 (Modern War Studies) + Endgame at Stalingrad: Book One: November 1942 the Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 3 (Modern War Studies)
Preis für alle drei: EUR 115,04

Die ausgewählten Artikel zusammen kaufen
Jeder kann Kindle Bücher lesen — selbst ohne ein Kindle-Gerät — mit der KOSTENFREIEN Kindle App für Smartphones, Tablets und Computer.


  • Gebundene Ausgabe: 655 Seiten
  • Verlag: Univ Pr of Kansas (15. Mai 2009)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • ISBN-10: 0700616306
  • ISBN-13: 978-0700616305
  • Größe und/oder Gewicht: 23,6 x 16,5 x 5,3 cm
  • Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 3.0 von 5 Sternen  Alle Rezensionen anzeigen (1 Kundenrezension)
  • Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 266.760 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)

Mehr über den Autor

Entdecken Sie Bücher, lesen Sie über Autoren und mehr



"A magisterial new survey that draws on a wealth of previously inaccessible Red Army records and will be indispensable reading for all serious students of the battle." Michael K. Jones, author of Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed "In a way never before attempted, Glantz reveals how the battle proceeded through the step-by-step, day-by-day efforts of leaders to plan, supervise, and conduct combat operations amidst the fog of war." Roger R. Reese, author of Red Commanders "Glantz is the world's top scholar of the Soviet-German War." Journal of Military History"

Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende

David M. Glantz is the author of numerous books, including The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944; Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War; and Red Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania. Jonathan M. House is the author of Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century. Glantz and House are also coauthors of When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler and The Battle of Kursk (see page 41).

Welche anderen Artikel kaufen Kunden, nachdem sie diesen Artikel angesehen haben?

In diesem Buch (Mehr dazu)
Ausgewählte Seiten ansehen
Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis | Rückseite
Hier reinlesen und suchen:


3.0 von 5 Sternen
5 Sterne
4 Sterne
3 Sterne
2 Sterne
1 Sterne
Siehe die Kundenrezension
Sagen Sie Ihre Meinung zu diesem Artikel

Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen

1 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich Von Dr. Christian Stadler am 27. September 2009
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe
This is a book not easy to review. First of all - great expectations concerning unknown data from Russian archives and from records from Axis forces captured by the Sovients are not met. Numbers and losses are rarely reported, correlations of forces are hard to grasp an even harder to follow, the maps come in very differing stiles and are sometimes hard to read because of the size of the letters. The campaigns are described on an operational level but adored with a lot of biographical details of leaders (a host of leaders but dealt with in a concise way). The authors prove their thesis that the Soviet forces tried hard to stand and fight in 1942 and paid a heavy price for doing so but were in most cases able to get away short of destruction. And even better than in 1941 the Soviet Union was able and willing to build and field new or refurbished forces and always in excess to the Axis' capacity to destroy them. Obvious mistakes are few and do not dimish the value of the book. Without the substantial backup with other sources and maps I wouldn't recommend this work and it is certainly not David M. Glantz (and J. House) at his best.
1 Kommentar War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich? Ja Nein Feedback senden...
Vielen Dank für Ihr Feedback. Wenn diese Rezension unangemessen ist, informieren Sie uns bitte darüber.
Wir konnten Ihre Stimmabgabe leider nicht speichern. Bitte erneut versuchen

Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen auf (beta) 43 Rezensionen
61 von 64 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Comprehensive coverage of Operation Blue 21. Mai 2009
Von Dave Schranck - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
I don't usually use superlatives but its hard not to with this book. This book has amazing coverage of the military aspects of the first phases of Operation Blue. The book ends just as the bulk of 6th Army reaches Stalingrad limits where the fighting for the city intensifies. The book is broken down into ten chapters by chronological order and sector. The scale of new information that is presented makes this book a must read for serious students of the war.

The first two chapters state the condition of each army as of the end of January 1942. Both sides were hurting but were determined to regroup and prepare for the spring and summer offensives. The two sides start making plans.
It also gives background info on key commanders on both sides. The appointment to command the 6th Army and his promotion to general was Paulus's first major combat field command. Working under Hitler was not easy but I seriously wonder if it was a mistake for Paulus to be the commander of 6th Army. Manstein or Guderian were available and were certainly more experienced and more aggressive than Paulus. There's much more to say about Paulus's command ability but it will have to wait until the 2nd volume is out.
The third chapter covers preliminary actions that lead up to Operation Blue. The Germans wanted to eliminate several Russian strongpoints that might interfere with the success of Operation Blue. This includes the Crimea, Kharkov, the elimination of the Southwestern Front west of the Oskol River and several smaller engagements. The Germans had inflicted heavy casualties on the retreating Southwestern Front but they had failed to encircle entire armies as they did the prior year. It was an ominous precedent that would haunt Paulus as he nears Stalingrad. Hitler, by this point, had already decided the Red Army was finished and begin considering changing the battle plan.
The summary of the battle of Kharkov with the German counterattack of 6th Army in the north and von Kleist in the south that encircled large numbers of men and materiel was excellent and sets the stage for the upcoming Operation Blue. Another important aspect covered concerns Stalin's fortifying the Bryansk Front with new tank corps that would put pressure on the German advance to Stalingrad or to block the way to Moscow if Paulus turned north at the Don River. There is an extensive accompanying table of troop disposition for both sides that shows the Soviets greatly outnumbered their enemy in tanks in this sector.

The fourth chapter covers the Voronezh battle and the ramifications of the battle concerning Hitler, Bock, Paulus and the Russian Army. The retreating Soviets put up stiff resistance for the city that surprised Hitler who thought the Soviets were finished but didn't alarm him enough to become more cautious for his plans for Stalingrad.
The fifth chapter concerns AG A and the Donbas battles as the German war machine moves south and east. The engagements include Millerovo and the advance on Rostov to the south. It also describes Hitler's changing attitude toward the retreating Red Army and changing of Operation Blue time table by issuing his infamous Directive 45 which will play a big part in 6th Army's destruction.. Hitler also fires Bock for being argumentative and too cautious. In the end, Bock will be proven right in most of his arguments
The sixth chapter deals with the confrontations in the Don Bend in late July. Even though the Russian defenses at the river were poorly planned and their counterattacks poorly timed and coordinated, the resistance of the 62nd Army at the Bend and the 64th Army to the south increased against 6th Army to the point that Paulus had to ask for reinforcements. This was another bad omen that taking Stalingrad would be difficult but Hitler didn't seem to notice.
The seventh chapter concludes the Don Bend battles with the capture of the important city of Kalach. It also includes the moving into the land corridor by 14th PzC heading toward the Volga River.

The eighth chapter extends the coverage of 6th Army as well as Hoth's panzers approaching Stalingrad and the increasing resistance the Russians put up as well as the punishment they are receiving. It includes the massive Luftwaffe raid on the 23rd as well as its daily support.
The ninth chapter breaks away from Stalingrad and covers the Caucasus campaign during August and September. The author spends a surprising amount of time covering 17th Army and 1st PzA driving south into the Caucasus capturing the Black Sea ports as well as the oil fields in the south. The oil was just as important to Stalin as it was to Hitler and went to great lengths to keep it out of German control. The tactical coverage in the Caucasus is good but its not comprehensive. Books by Tieke and Grechko are good supplements. The author also covers the fighting in the Rzhev salient and the Demyansk Pocket in August which are also of great importance to both sides.
The last chapter is the author's conclusions about the campaign, Hitler's impatient and poor strategy, the Soviet's changing tactics etc. Most of the chapter is an evaluation of the German side of the offensive. Mr Glantz is critical of Hitler of trying to do too much at the same time. AGA and AGB were not sufficiently manned or supplied to successfully accomplish their assignments. You would think he would learned from his Moscow debacle. The chapter closes with Glantz highlighting the three fallacies the Soviets and some historians have promoted since the battle and then presents the truth.

There is an appendix that covers Russian Tank commanders and their career accomplishments of all the tank corps of the four Fronts. There is a 90 page Notes section which is pretty amazing in itself that adds a wealth of additional info to your reading experience and is worth the investment in time to study it. The 13 page Bibliography has mostly German or Russian titles. There are also 23 Status Tables that are spread out throughout the book that provide quick read summaries of the condition of certain Armies or Divisions. Its a nice way to reacquaint yourself to specific units among the blizzard of information that's presented. Finally there is a comprehensive 46 page Index that makes it fairly easy to find specific concerns.

I've saved my criticism for last. There are 87 maps and most have a wealth of information concerning troop dispositions and movements etc on them. The problem is you need a magnifying glass to read many of them and a few are unreadable. its a shame for these maps, for the serious student, would be invaluable if they were more user friendly. I wish Mr. Glantz would create a huge atlas that would be widely distributed and reasonably priced with a key selection of maps of the different campaigns of the war. He could link the maps to his books. It should be easier to read and infinitely more helpful. There are a few photos; some are German related but most are Russian related. I particularly liked the picture of Karl, the 600mm mortar used at Sevastopol, Crimea.

This book is a challenging read but its definitely worth it in understanding Operation Blue itself and as a harbinger of what was to come at Stalingrad. You have to be truly interested in the campaign to take the time to digest the wealth of information of all the many regiments, divisions and corps described as well as all of their movements in addition to all the background info on Hitler, Stalin, the generals etc. I highly recommend it for the serious reader.
32 von 32 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Required Reading For Readers Interested in the Eastern Front 21. Juni 2009
Von David M. Dougherty - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
Frankly, this is the best book that Glantz (with House) has written. He/They usually approach Eastern Front operations from the Soviet side, but this one is fairly even-handed.

What makes these volumes so outstanding today is their incorporation of recently released records and materials from the Soviet side as well as the official German history of WWII, "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg", most specifically, Volume 4, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, with its accompanying maps in a separate binding.

Two factors stand out: that if the German Army was unable to destroy/capture large formations of the Red Army in the summer campaign of 1942 as well as capturing the resources necessary to continue the war (in particular, working or repairable oil fields and refining capacity) then the war was lost, and secondly, not until the fall of 1942 was the Red Army able to effect proper combined arms coordination and develop its combat leadership sufficiently to win battles under non-winter conditions. The first was specifically spelled out in "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg", and the second in Glantz's publications based on releases from the Russian archives. But here these aspects are presented and developed so as to reach the average reader.

Excepting the victory by Manstein in the Crimea (Operation Bustard Hunt) that was reported by him as a true battle of annihilation (Vernichtungskampf), none of the German victories in 1942 resulted in large numbers of Soviet prisoners as in 1941. The Soviet armies were defeated but not annihilated and were able to fight another day (although the Soviet victories in the fall of 1942 were won by new formations.) The German weakness in infantry allowed large numbers of Soviet soldiers to escape encirclement and capture, and this weakness was endemic and not to be solved subsequent to the German losses in the winter of 1941. Time and again, this fatal defect shows up in Glantz's discussions of the battles of 1942. In addition, the Soviets learned readily from the Germans in 1942 and were able to turn the tables on an ever-weakening Wehrmacht in the later Stalingrad battle and post-Citadel operations in 1943.

A side point on this excellent volume is that the German formations were blessed with extremely good leadership, particularly the armored units. The extreme cohesiveness in the German units and their sticking together under very adverse conditions time and again pulled victory out of what threatened to become a catastrophy. Although this phenomenon haas been studied at length by the American military, our political structure and policies have prevented the introduction of the training and unit cohesion needed to achieve a similar high level of effectiveness in the American Army. German units often experienced open flanks and non-continuous lines yet were still able to persevere under the most adverse conditions.

The review by David Shrank is excellent in depicting the extent of this volume and I recommend that any prospective purchaser read his review. I offer my comments only in addition to his. Please note that this work is extremely scholarly -- the various appendices, end notes, bibliography and index take up no less than 169 pages. I recommend the end notes to be read right along with the text, and as such, would have wished the authors to have included them with the text as foot notes.

I heartily recommend this very fine work to all readers interested in the military history of World War II.
34 von 35 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Toward Stalingrad 25. Mai 2009
Von T. Kunikov - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
Glantz, a veritable book producing factory, has definitely set a new standard in literature on Stalingrad. This book, the first of three, follows the Wehrmacht after the Moscow-Counter offensive of 1941/1942 through the Soviet Kharkov offensive and into Operation Blau. In doing so Glantz aims to establish three facts that have been glossed over in general histories of both the Eastern Front and the battle for Stalingrad specifically: Soviet forces did not simply retreat when confronted with Army Groups South, and after Army Groups A and B, to take the fight to Stalingrad, as if pre-planned; STAVKA did not abandon the Donbas region to preserve its forces; and the Red Army soldiers that the Sixth army finally met inside Stalingrad were not the same troops who retreated throughout the summer and finally decided, or were forced, to stand and fight. In reality the Red Army put up resistance to German advances from day one. Glantz takes the time to go through many of these operations and point out exactly how much damage Soviet troops were able to inflict on the Wehrmacht and why the Germans were still able to overcome forces that more often than not outnumbered them in either men, artillery, or armor, and sometimes in all three categories. Of personal interest to myself was the chapter on Army Group A's incursion into the Caucasus region. This is an entire campaign long ignored due to the limelight Stalingrad encompasses.

In the end it seems the Red Army was still committing mistakes they should have learned from in 1941; piecemeal attacks by mechanized and tank forces, lack of command and control in the field, failure to institute combined arms operations utilizing artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and the air force, etc. The Germans, however, are also guilty in that they once more overestimated their abilities and underestimated that of the Red Army. The final result is a detailed and highly needed study that not only provides context to the eventual clash that occurred in Stalingrad, but also highlights the actions that led up to the battle and the many battles, and even campaigns, that have gone long ignored due to Stalingrad's ever growing shadow.
11 von 11 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Military microscopy 6. April 2012
Von Adam B. Ritchie Jr. - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
To paraphrase another reviewer, you would have to do more than glance at this book to appreciate its level of detail. Putting it another way you wonder if you should read this book wearing your uniform, sitting at your bare study table near your press, and looking up once and a while to see if a cadet guard might be looking in the window of your door to see if you are goofing off during study period. But the history is subtitled, "Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942," so the reader cannot expect the more panoramic view given by Antony Beevor, whose book, "Stalingrad," is more suitable for general readers.

The author writes a conclusion section at the end of every chapter (as in a research paper), and these sections are the book's best parts. Supported by dense reporting in the body of each chapter, the author draws fascinating, unorthodox conclusions about the Soviet-German balance of power and the seeds of eventual Soviet victory and German defeat which, as in a Greek tragedy, are already sown in the characters of the two nations.

The great value of the history notwithstanding, the presentation is easy to criticize. The maps are photocopies of photocopies ad infinitum and thus are sometimes an indecipherable ink blob. (The maps are greatly improved in Volume 2 of the Trilogy.) Much of the detail should have appeared in appendices. Too much detail interrupts the flow of the writing and injects a soporific directly into the brain of the reader interfering with his comprehension. Consider the sentence, "In the north, KG von Arensdorff (consisting of the headquarters, 79th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 1st Battalion, 2nd Panzer Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 64th Panzer Grenadiers, 16th Motorcycle Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 79th Panzer Grenadiers, Artillery Detachments Zinkel and Naskolb, and 2nd Company, 16th Panzer Jagt [Hunter] Battalion) had succeeded in capturing several prominent hills with ease and dug themselves in." Everything between the parentheses in this sentence should have been presented in tabular form in an appendix.
11 von 11 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Impartial,definitive account of combat which preceded Stalingrad 8. Oktober 2009
Von Karun Mukherji - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
Glantz and House are scholars par excellence.They have combined to produce another excellent book. Rich and lavishly documented account of combat which preceded the arrival of Wehrmacht on the approaches to Stalingrad.

I have read books on Operation Case Blau. Paul Carrel's 'Hitler moves East'gives detailed narration but does not go to the extent of this work. Most Historians have been obsessed with explaining Red army's epic defence of Stalingrad while paying scant attention to operations which preceded it. This book ably fills that void. Authors have thoroughly combed official records of both sides including hitherto neglected sources. As a result they have shed new light which profoundly expands and alters our understanding of the subject.

Wehrmacht launched Case Blau on June 28,1942.This was Hitler's bid to seize Stalingrad and oil resources of Grozny ,Maikop in the Caucasus. prelude to it Germans launched a string of preliminary operations: Friedrichus I,II,Wilhelm there by gained additional territory which served as a springboard to unleash their grand offensive. Meanwhile Manstein's 11th army had broken the siege of Sevastopol in Crimea and evicted Soviets from Kerch peninsula: Operation Bustard Hunt.This opened the backdoor to Caucasus but Hitler by shifting Manstein's forces to Leningrad did not exploit opportunity that beckoned him.

From Soviet perspective ,Stalin thought Germans in summer of 1942 will renew their bid to seize Moscow. Author's have argued Reichel incident had no effect on Stalin's thinking. Soviet dictator disposed his best forces along the Moscow axis. At the same time he did not shrink from bolstering soviet defences in the south.

Authors have divided the Blau operation into 4 phases.Phase 1 was an absolute success.Within a span of 15ays panzer groupings of Armeegroup Weichs and Paulus Sixth army in a pincer move smashed and shattered the armies of Soviet Briansk and Southwestern fronts to reach Voronezh on the western bank of river Don.Phase 2 Hoth's forth panzer armyand army Group As first panzer army completed the encirclement and destruction of soviet forces in the Donbas region.Phase 3 involved fourth panzer army now under the operational command of army group A with 3 of Army group Bs panzer corps co-operating with Kleist First panzer army in outflanking and defeating Soviet southern Front which defended the approaches to Rostov. By this time Hitler had split the army Group South into two:A and B.Fourth phase saw penetration of Wehrmacht into Caucasus,a zone of war again ignored by most historians. Authors focus attention on futile German drive to seize Stalingrad in a rapier-like thrust. Stalin managed to slow the Wehrmacht by erecting a wall of armies along the western bank of Don river.

Judging from a strategic perspective Blau operation cannot be deemed an unqualified success.Why? Hitler elated by the fall of Rostov chopped the battle into two halves.He now wanted Wehrmacht to seize Stalingrad and oil resources of Caucasus simultaneously which entailed the dissipation of German strength across a sprawling territory. I feel this ruined the campaign. Splitting of effort resulted in Germans being strong nowhere.

Secondly, Red army's ability to raise fresh divisions . As authors point out no sooner Germans smash 25 Soviet divisions another 50 divisions take their place. Sounds startling! Yes,Germans underestimated Russian colossus. You cannot defeat an enemy which keeps raising and fielding fresh armies. It is like trying to tear card pack. You can tear a card but not a card pack.Because pack which is formed by cards protects the card. So quantity generates its own quality.

Attrition became so debilitating so much so when Wehrmacht neared key objectives of the operation it had lost its cutting edge.It's precisely here this book makes a radical departure from previous works.Earlier books have emphasized Red Army practising elastic defence when German attack opened. Authors have shown this to be false. Though defeated everywhere Red Army continued to resist stubbornly.

Thirdly, Germans lacked strategic air power.This would have made big difference to the campaign. Strategic bombers could have ranged deep and wide behind the Soviet fronts. By bombing railroad networks they could have blocked the movement of red army reserves to the battle zone. Key to German victory lay in isolating the latter from Soviet rear just as allies did in Normandy.

Book is divided into 12 chapters. Each chapter is impeccably researched.Back pages contain extensive research notes.Few pages feature charts ,tables showing composition of forces and force ratios.Some pages carry illustrations seen for the first time.My only grudge is about maps few of which look smudged. There is interesting biographical sketch of top Soviet and German commanders.

Finally. a word of advice. This book is meant only for serious-minded.Authors say Sixth army reached Stalingrad only in successive spurts. I finished reading it in similar fashion.
Waren diese Rezensionen hilfreich? Wir wollen von Ihnen hören.