- Gebundene Ausgabe: 352 Seiten
- Verlag: Little Brown Books Group (30. April 2009)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 1408701642
- ISBN-13: 978-1408701645
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 23,6 x 16,2 x 3,2 cm
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 236.089 in Englische Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Englische Bücher)
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Produktbeschreibungen
Kurzbeschreibung
In the mid 1990s, at a vast hotel complex on a private Florida beach, dozens of bankers from JP Morgan gathered for what was to become a legendary off-site meeting. It was a wild weekend. But among the drinking, nightclubbing and fist-fights lay a more serious purpose - to assess the possibility of building a business around the new-fangled concepts of credit derivatives. The group at the heart of this revolution was an intense team, made up of individuals with a supreme sense of loyalty to each other and to the bank - for years, nothing could break them apart. But when, finally, the team dispersed, the innovations spread far beyond their original intentions, producing perversions in the mortgage market that ultimately culminated in disaster. Part real-life thriller, part investigation and expose, this searing narrative takes us deep inside the shadowy world of complex finance - A PERFECT STORM for the credit crunch
Synopsis
The inside story of how the credit crunch unfolded by the first journalist to predict it Falling house prices. Rising energy and food prices. Job losses. Paralysis over whether interest rates should go up or down. Everywhere we turn, the headlines are now screaming the word 'recession'. But where did it all start? And could it have been prevented? In this fast-paced, revealing book, award-winning Financial Times journalist and social anthropologist Gillian Tett takes us inside the shadowy world of complex finance and derivatives and explains how the business of slicing and dicing debt led us to the devastating global credit crunch. Following a small tribe of exceptionally talented bankers, she shows out the innovations they created initially appeared beneficial, but then led to disaster, as the world of complex credit span out of the control of regulators, politicians ? and even the bankers themselves.
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Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis
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2 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Fool's Gold by Gillian Tett
3. November 2011
Format:Taschenbuch|Von Amazon bestätigter Kauf
I've been following the crash since 2008 and before. This is without doubt the best book I've read on the subject. Ms. Tett, a renowned reporter for the Financial Times, was on the inside at the very beginning of the derivatives fiasco and has written clearly, concisely and insightfully into the machinations which led to the collapse of the global economy. That said, she is also a very entertaining writer who knows how to keep a reader involved. I read this book from cover to cover in three days. Not only are there attributions and references, but she also adds a glossary for the complex financial instruments created and an excellent index. This is worth the money and your time. Read Fool's Gold and find out exactly what, how and who caused the crash. It will become a permanent part of your library.
0 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
THE EXPERIENCE AT J.P. MORGAN AS A PRECURSOR TO THE COLLAPSE
9. April 2012
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
Gillian Tett runs global markets coverage for The Financial Times; she is also the author of Saving the Sun: How Wall Street Mavericks Shook Up Japan's Financial World and Made Billions.
She wrote in the Preface to this 2009 book, "Were the bankers mad? Were they evil? Or were they simply grotesquely greedy?... the question we must drill into is WHY? Why did the bankers, regulators, and ratings agencies collaborate to build and run a system that was doomed to self-destruct? Did they fail to see the flaws, or did they fail to care? This book explores the answer to the central question of how the catastrophe happened by beginning with ... a small group of bankers formerly linked to J.P Morgan..."
She observes that by 1992, even small banks, midsized companies, and pension funds were turning to derivatives "not to control for future risks but to make the big gambles and realize big returns." (Pg. 29) They were expecting higher rates of return, even as bond yields were falling (pg. 93).
She documents how the 2000 "merger" between Chase Manhattan and J.P. Morgan was "humiliating to the J.P. Morgan staff," who felt that the new logo ("JP Morgan Chase") was "unbearably tacky." (Pg. 81-82)
The JPM head argued that it was "ridiculous" to worry about the possibility of massive defaults, since "There was no point ... in running a bank on the assumption that the financial equivalent of an asteroid would devastate Wall Street." (Pg. 61) She notes how "few of the bankers ... knew the details of how the securitization machine worked, let alone of the existence of the liquidity puts." (Pg. 206)
The government's explanation of its bailout of AIG---after it failed to help Lehman Brothers just 48 hours earlier---"was, at best, a fig leaf covering a major policy shift." (Pg. 239) Tett concludes, "the deals didn't quite add up to actual nationalization... Yet a rubicon had been crossed. For five long decades, American finance had worshiped at the altar of free-market ideas. A new era of finance had dawned." (Pg. 242)
This a very interesting book about one of the key components in the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
She wrote in the Preface to this 2009 book, "Were the bankers mad? Were they evil? Or were they simply grotesquely greedy?... the question we must drill into is WHY? Why did the bankers, regulators, and ratings agencies collaborate to build and run a system that was doomed to self-destruct? Did they fail to see the flaws, or did they fail to care? This book explores the answer to the central question of how the catastrophe happened by beginning with ... a small group of bankers formerly linked to J.P Morgan..."
She observes that by 1992, even small banks, midsized companies, and pension funds were turning to derivatives "not to control for future risks but to make the big gambles and realize big returns." (Pg. 29) They were expecting higher rates of return, even as bond yields were falling (pg. 93).
She documents how the 2000 "merger" between Chase Manhattan and J.P. Morgan was "humiliating to the J.P. Morgan staff," who felt that the new logo ("JP Morgan Chase") was "unbearably tacky." (Pg. 81-82)
The JPM head argued that it was "ridiculous" to worry about the possibility of massive defaults, since "There was no point ... in running a bank on the assumption that the financial equivalent of an asteroid would devastate Wall Street." (Pg. 61) She notes how "few of the bankers ... knew the details of how the securitization machine worked, let alone of the existence of the liquidity puts." (Pg. 206)
The government's explanation of its bailout of AIG---after it failed to help Lehman Brothers just 48 hours earlier---"was, at best, a fig leaf covering a major policy shift." (Pg. 239) Tett concludes, "the deals didn't quite add up to actual nationalization... Yet a rubicon had been crossed. For five long decades, American finance had worshiped at the altar of free-market ideas. A new era of finance had dawned." (Pg. 242)
This a very interesting book about one of the key components in the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
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