Fly By Wire: The Geese, The Glide, The 'Miracle' on the Hudson [Kindle Edition]

As a retired airline pilot who flew both Boeing and Airbus aircraft, I was "teased" into reading this book by the implication that somehow the automation of the A320 was a major factor in the successful ditching. I had heard the author on a NPR radio interview extolling the virtues of the Airbus fly by wire system (which the author uses interchangeably for aircraft automation}, and I was hardpressed to see how this affected the outcome. After finishing the book, nothing the author wrote convinced me that the ditching would have been any less successful had Captain Sullenberger been flying a Boeing under the identical conditions. While the book was a quick and enjoyable read that provided some interesting insights into the airline world these days, I really didn't learn anything new about the accident and there was a lot of "padding" in areas of little interest - i.e. migratory geese. Another complaint I had with the book was the author's advocacy of the Airbus design philsophy that basically takes as much control away from the pilot as the engineers can achieve. It seemed to me that he was using the Hudson ditching as a validation of the Airbus design philosophy, when in reality, it was the captain's skill that brought about the successful outcome. The author gives ample credit to the pilots, but he also credits the Airbus automation with "keeping the wings level," and "preventing a stall" just before touchdown, both conditions easily controllable by a capable pilot. Clearly, the extent to which aircraft should be automated is a hotly debated topic among pilots, engineers and air safety experts, with Boeing engineers leaving considerably more control in the hands of the pilots that does Airbus. A book written on this topic with the pros and cons of each design philosophy would be most interesting and informative for the flying public, but this book proves nothing except that experience and skill in the cockpit are still the most important factor in air safety.

William Langewiesche's analysis of all the factors which contributed to the "Miracle on the Hudson" is a story that matches the events themselves in terms of excitement. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, pilot of the Airbus A320 which hit a flock of geese, lost both engines, and landed in the Hudson River with no loss of life on January 15, 2009, has rightly been lauded for his performance and has become a popular hero. But he was not alone in the making of this miracle. The plane itself contributed mightily to the successful outcome and the saving of the lives of all one hundred fifty passengers and five crew. Designed to remain stable under the most extraordinary conditions, the European-made Airbus is controlled by computerized systems which can not be over-ridden by pilots as they make split second moves during emergencies. "This marriage between electrical control circuits and digital computer [has become known] as fly-by-wire."

Langewiesche, an award-winning journalist and pilot, is at home with his subject, and he has interviewed virtually everyone who could give input into this story, creating a vibrant, lively, and thoughtful analysis of all the individual elements--including luck--which contributed to this happy ending. At the same time, he also analyzes some of the elements which may have led to the accident, including the issue of bird strikes throughout aviation history and why they happen. In his attempt to give the complete picture, Langewiesche also considers the financial problems of the airlines, the power of the pilots' unions, the comfortable relationship between the NTSB and the airlines and unions, and the competition between Airbus and Boeing. He includes a number of case studies of major accidents, many of which will be familiar to readers, and one of which is the disappearance into the Atlantic of the Air France flight from Brazil to Paris in June, 2009.

As Langewiesche describes the flight from takeoff to landing in the Hudson a mere five minutes later, he really hits his stride, creating a fast-paced narrative full of tension and human drama. Co-pilot Jeffrey Skiles, air traffic controller Patrick Harten, and the flight attendants, are praised. Ultimately, Langewiesche grants enormous credit to Sullenberger for his decisions, including the decision to head for the Hudson when many thought he might have made it to an airport. "Sullenberger made the right decision. No matter what," Langewiesche says. Sullenberger also made a few original decisions based on his feel for the plane and his intense concentration during the emergency, despite the fact that these moves have never been included in any operations manual. One of these decisions helped prevent a more catastrophic loss. A serious study which nevertheless has moments of humor, Fly by Wire is a thoroughly absorbing account of a great moment in aviation history and the people and the plane which made this moment a "miracle." Mary Whipple

After reading "Fly By Wire" on a recent trip, I find it interesting to visit Amazon.com and see a recapitulation of the passionate debate that Langewiesche describes in his book. On the one hand, there are those who feel that "fly by wire" technology is overrated and perhaps even dangerous--these reviewers tend to give the book low marks and hard reviews, some of which strike me as a bit unfair. Other reviewers--admirers of Langewiesche's journalistic style or the cogent explanations that he offers--give him high grades. On balance, I enjoyed "Fly by Wire," but I can understand how it will hit some raw nerves.

For the record, Langewiesche has nothing but high praise for Captain Sullenberger and his crew. He agrees that they did a superb job under incredibly difficult conditions, and the fact that they did it in an Airbus A320 takes nothing away from their accomplishment. As near as I can tell, the crew of US Airways Flight 1549 are real heroes and deserve the praise they have received.

"Fly by wire" technology combines electrical control circuits and digital computers to replace traditional hydraulic and mechanical flight control systems. Langewiesche really "pokes the bear" and elicits a strong emotional response from many of his readers when he suggests that "fly by wire" was a major contributor to the Miracle on the Hudson. Readers who want their heroes to be like Beowulf, brave and omnisciently skilled, dislike the suggestion that Captain Sullenberger and his team may have been helped by the revolutionary design of the A320. Pilots who are concerned about losing control over their aircraft to computers are also bound to take issue with Langewiesche's core theme, which is that the revolution in "fly by wire" technology pioneered by Airbus has saved lives and will continue to save them. It's not unreasonable for people to argue with Langewiesche's thesis, but I'm glad that he and others are having this debate--I suspect that in the long run many air travellers will be safer for it.

Regardless of your views on this hot topic, the book is worth a read. The author is an experienced pilot, so he is able to offer more insights than most journalists who covered this story. He does a good job of discussing bird strikes (especially the somewhat unusual one that crippled Flight 1549), the development of the A320, several crashes where "fly by wire" technology might have saved hundreds of people, and other examples where highly skilled pilots "pushing the envelope" in passenger aircraft have confidently done things that are amazingly dangerous, with disastrous results.

At the end of the day, I'm sympathetic to Langewiesche's argument that even great pilots can make mistakes, and that computers can help them accomplish things at the edge of their skills and experience that they would have a hard time doing on their own. Whether the computer or the crew was the decisive factor in The Miracle on the Hudson is at some level beside the point--not every pilot will be as skilled or capable of concentration as Captain Sullenberger, and computers can help prevent mistakes by crew who are pushing the outer edge of their experience and abilities.

For those who are convinced that "fly by wire" can never outperform a great pilot, consider two things. First, the question is not really whether fly by wire can outperform Captain Sullenberger, but whether it can outperform the average pilot with the average level of experience and savoire faire. Put another way, the next time you board an airplane, ask yourself whether the pilot flying your aircraft is one of the greats who will act like Captain Sullenberger, or one who has less skill or experience (the law of probability suggests that on any given flight, you are more likely to have the latter at the controls). Second, if you believe that "great" pilots are superhumans who never make mistakes, read Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior, which describes how KLM's famous and accomplished chief pilot made a series of errors that resulted in the worst air disaster in aviation history. Everyone, no matter how skilled, makes mistakes--"Fly By Wire" helps us to understand how we can harness our technology to avoid errors at the edge of the envelope where the skills or experience of most people gets spottier.