An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals [Kindle Edition]

This is another outstanding edition in the Oxford Philosophical Texts series. This is a first rate book for both students and experts on Hume. It contains an excellent annotated edition of the Enquiry itself, excellent background information on Hume, a very nice introduction to the Enquiry written by Tom Beauchamp, a leading Hume scholar and moral philosopher, an outstanding guide to the Hume literature, and a good glossary. All for a very reasonable price.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM) is one of the cornerstone texts in Western philosophy and is written with Hume's characteristic combination of incisive analysis and charming style. Hume's goal is to describe the bases of human moral conduct. As stated by Tom Beauchamp, EPM is descriptive rather than prescriptive. While Hume clearly has strong opinions about what constitutes appropriate moral conduct, in EPM his focus is really on moral psychology rather than moral direction. This approach is what would now be called metaethical. As with his work on epistemology, Hume is also concerned with establishing the limits of human reason. In Hume's analysis, reason has an important but limited role in moral judgements, crucial for reaching appropriate judgements but does not establish the basic principles for moral judgement. Hume sees morality as based on an interesting interplay of moral sentiments, which he sees as intrinsic to human nature, self-interest, and social utility. The importance of each of these varies with considerably in different social settings. In family life and close personal relationships, moral sentiments dominate but the force of moral sentiment weakens as the range of socieity increases. In more complex social settings, Hume sees a form of utilitarianism as restraining self-interest. For Hume, specific moral systems are variable, somewhat situation dependent, and historically contingent. Thought provoking and very readable.

Hume, for most people, is largely defined by his work in metaphysics and epistemology. There's no doubt that his work in these areas is of signal importance, but I think a tendency to focus on these areas at the expense of his moral thinking suggests a somewhat misleading interpretation of what he's up to. It's really only in his non-moral works that the picture of Hume as a radical skeptic has much plausibility. For here it seems clear that Hume's primary aim in his moral works is to ground his philosophical theses in a careful consideration of human nature; and it's also clear that he doesn't intend this to be a skeptical and debunking account of morality.

Now, it's true that there are ways in which Hume is skeptical about a certain way of thinking about the origin and nature of morality. The fact that he thinks morality is based in human sentiments show that he is, in some sense, a subjectivist about morality. He doesn't think there is any plausible account of our moral thinking as based on reason or empirical inquiry alone. Against the view that our awareness of moral distinctions is based on the exercise of reason, he argues that we do not figure out whether a person is virtuous or vicious, or an action good or bad, simply by thinking about things. And against the view that our awareness of moral distinctions is empirical, he argues that we do not figure out which things possess which moral qualities by going out and looking or by anything else of this sort. Morality, then, is more a matter of feeling than a matter of thinking, observing, and reasoning.

Hume's basic argument for the conclusion that morality is based on human sentiment is that the essential practicality of morality requires us to understand its basis in this way. Morality is about action, and neither reasoning nor ordinary empirical inquiry can be the source of our moral thinking since they are impotent to prompt us to action. Reason does not motivate, and our moral judgments, concerns, sentiments are intimately connected to motivation. Nor does recognition of the empirical facts motivate all on its own. Motivation always requires the existence of certain conative states in addition to the relevant beliefs arrived at through reason and empirical inquiry. So, in order to account for the practicality of morality (i.e. for the connection between morality and motivation), we need something to make us care about moral goodness and badness; and that something is to be found within the emotional part of our nature.

But, importantly, Hume doesn't think this is indicative of some problem with morality, and so he doesn't understand himself to be undermining ordinary morality. His aim is to expose the groundless pretensions of reason in order to make room for a wholly naturalistic account morality; it's not to show that morality doesn't have a firm basis. For he does not think that morality would ideally be based on reason and empirical evidence rather than sentiment. Rather, he thinks there is a sort of philosophical overreaching involved in trying to base morality on reason or empirical evidence as opposed to sentiment.

So far, so good. But what is the relevant sentiment? According to Hume, it is a general sort of benevolence, of concern for others. At least where our own interests do not intrude on this feeling, we can take pleasure in the pleasure of others and we can be disturbed and pained by their pains and difficulties. Our possessing such a feeling does not mean that we'll always set aside our own interest in the interest of others; nor does it mean that we are not largely self-interested. It does, however, mean that we're not wholly self-interested, as we are motivated to do (and not do) certain things even when they do not affect our own interests and desires. Such a feeling, Hume argues, must be the basis for the sort of general and unselfish concern for welfare of others that morality requires of us. And since this sentiment is a common component of human nature, it provides morality with a non-parochial basis. The moral point of view, Hume argues, is one we take up when our sentiments and feelings about people and actions are based on a shared perspective based in human nature. And since we share similar sentiments and sensibilities in virtue of our shared nature, morality possesses a sort of intersubjectivity.

But what inspires these sentiments, and how exactly do they translate into moral judgments? Morality, Hume argues, is based on sentiments of approbation and disapprobation that are prompted by a recognition of the connection between human actions, dispositions, etc. and what is in the best interest of oneself and of mankind in general. What we take to be virtues, Hume argues, are those dispositions that lead a person to perform actions tending to promote his own happiness and the happiness of others, whereas vices are dispositions that do the opposite. And this allows us to see the source of Hume's optimism. For it is his view that being moral is in our own interest, and in the interest of others. The morally good person is one whose actions are for the good of himself and for the good of others, and this is why we approve of such people. This is why we find them pleasant, why we enjoy their company, and why we think it's a good thing to be virtuous. So this is anything but a dark, self-denying account of morality and our moral obligations. Morality is not a set of chains holding us back from realizing ourselves, from expressing our true nature. Given what our nature is actually like, Hume claims, there is no need to understand morality as involving self-abnegation for nothing more than self-abnegation's sake.

If I had to recommend a single book in moral philosophy to the general reader, I suppose it would be this one. There may be greater works of moral philosophy--Kant's works and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, for instance--but those are works for the philosopher and this is a book for everyone. It's wise, accessible, inspiring, beautifully written, occasionally quite funny, and largely convincing.

Hume treats of morals in two distinct fashions. His major and last contribution is his "Enquiry," which was written late in his life; the other is Part III of his "Treatise on Human Nature," which was written much earlier in life. The two treatments are very different, and of the two, I much prefer the latter, as it is "demonstrated" a posteriori that man has a "natural inclincation" to maximize pleasure and to avoid pain. Besed on this natural inclination, humans endeavor to do those things that produce happiness, pride, joy, etc., because it maximizes pleasure, whereas humans endeavor to avoid those things that produce uneasiness, disturbances, misery, etc., because those things produce pain. From this a posteriori of natural inclinations, Hume explores the reasons why some things count as virtures (because they maximize pleasure), while some things count as vices (because they produce pain).

His "Enquiry," however, takes an altogether different approach, one based on the sentiments of utility and beneficence. Here humans do things that maximize their usefulness to themselves and to society that concomitantly bring beneficence. Those sentiments that are distinguished in natural language such as dexterity, perserverance, chastity, endurance, honesty, etc., count as virtues because they are "useful," while those that produce in natural language such things as sloth, lethargy, dishonesty, misery, etc., count as vice because they are "not useful." Our language itself is the measure of their untility.

The two theories, juxtaposed, are not at odds with each other, but definitely have distinctively different aetiologies. What I prefer about the "Treatise" is that one can infer the logical necessity of "natural inclinations" (dare I say "instinct") to maximize pleasure and avoid pain. This seems indisputably true empirically. Morals are indeed an a posteriori part of the human constitution. All the virtues and vices derived from this single principle have a solid foundation in human nature itself. Conversely, to merely posit that virtues and vices are merely sentiments according to their "utility" is less grounded in the person's natural inclinations, and is something one observes about human behavior in general.

Which approach will the reader prefer? That's difficult to determine, which is a good reason to read both the "Treatise" and the "Enquiry." As I already mentioned, they are not at odds with each other, they just have different starting points. Personally, the approach in the "Treatise" appeals because it starts with a intrinsic feature of what it is to be human, i.e., it seems to have a stronger foundation and logically inferred consequences from observances. Yet, the approach in the "Enquiry" is more vivacious, but is less grounded, because it is merely posits observances of ephemeral conditions that continually change from time to time and from culture to culture. If one wants to affirm that morals do have a solid foundation in human nature, you'll probably prefer the "Treatise," but if one wants to affirm that morals are merely "preferences" built into our natural language that differ from culture to culture and from time to time, you'll probably prefer the "Enquiry." Either way, however, they take us away from pie-in-the-sky metaphysical speculations!