John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper clearly set the stage for how to invest and profit from what they call the "Endgame." The Endgame follows the "Debt Supercycle." The debt supercycle refers to the unsustainable rise of debt over a period of 60+ years mostly in the private sector of the developed world that culminated into the global financial crisis that erupted in 2007-08 (pp. 8; 12; 15; 25; 40; 108). The endgame points to a crisis in the public sector debt, which (will) occur when (Western) governments run into the limits of their ability to borrow money at today's low rates (p. 25).
The transition from the debt supercycle to the endgame is characterized, for the most part, by a transfer of debt, not an extinction of it, from the private sector to the public sector (pp. 24-25). Western governments and central banks have run large fiscal deficits and printed massive amounts of money to reduce the impact of the multiyear balance sheet recession in the private sector (pp. 8; 13; 24-25; 29; 58-63; 98-104; 136-141; 155; 158; 172-174; 227; 230; 252; 267-272). To their credit, Mauldin and Tepper clearly explain why deficits matter. Unfortunately, countries like the United States have mostly not run surplus and pay down debt in good times so that there is room for a policy response in bad times (pp. 54-57; 178-180; 188-196; 224; 235; 249). Unless central banks print money, the financing of large government debt runs the risk of crowding out business investment that relies on savings of consumers and businesses (pp. 53; 121-122).
Mauldin and Tepper are not surprised at all about this policy of kicking the proverbial can down the road that will result into greater systemic instability with more macroeconomic volatility and greater variability of inflation rates (pp. 29; 34-44; 73-89; 154; 240; 254; 271). Most politicians in the developed economies have a hard time to address any long-term problem because most voters prefer to opt out of a long-term gain if a short-term pain is required (pp. 3; 7; 118; 129; 182; 188; 218; 238). The authors warn public decision-makers and their respective electorate that the longer hard decisions are put off, the more pain their country, state, or city will have to ultimately endure (pp. 6; 89; 92; 100; 155-156; 219; 226; 239; 245; 253-259). Like the private sector, the public sector will be hold accountable for trying to borrow its way out of a debt crisis (pp. 41; 55-56; 100; 259).
Mauldin and Tepper recommend that:
1. Americans reduce their personal leverage and save more. Policy makers have relied on debt and income transfers to mask the fact that low-end wages have become too high under the relentless pressure of globalization;
2. The U.S. economy shift from consumption, real estate, and finance toward manufacturing to start addressing the structural decline in its civilian participation rate. Germany has been thriving because the world has been buying its goods;
3. The United States put in place more tax policies to encourage new businesses and therefore new jobs;
4. The United States restructure Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security thoroughly. No reasonably foreseeable rate of economic growth will overcome the structural deficit associated with these three major programs. Otherwise, a substantial value added tax will be needed to cover the cost and result into even slower growth;
5. The United States, its states, and its cities revisit the total remuneration package of their respective workforce. The status quo is unsustainable;
6. The United States take a cue from Canada by giving a higher priority to legal immigrants with degrees and money for a few years;
7. The U.S. economy reduce its over-dependence on foreign oil through steep taxation on gasoline to make alternatives more competitive that they are today. The tax burden in the United States is low compared to other countries around the world;
8. The United States use some of the proceeds, of a significantly higher taxation, on gasoline to fix its infrastructure, which is badly in need of repair;
9. The United States get serious about the much-touted nuclear renaissance by approving the building of a large number of new reactors (pp. 67-69; 85-86; 88-89; 118-119; 124-125; 137; 160; 167-169; 181-214; 243-244).
Mauldin and Tepper point out that there is no way to know in advance when bondholders will suddenly lose confidence in the ability of a government to pay its debt, even if that debt is denominated in a currency that the government can print (pp. 13-14; 32; 54-55; 57; 94-98; 125-127; 186-188; 259; 263; 279-281). When countries have too much debt, they usually inflate away excessive debt. Devaluation and default on debt are the two other options available to over-indebted countries (pp. 25; 110; 122-125; 128-131; 158; 180; 200; 229). To compensate for this higher perceived risk, bondholders will press for a rise in interest rates, which will further debilitate the capacity of a country to refund its debt (pp. 55; 105; 123; 231). A program of austerity becomes a necessity to bring the debt back to acceptable levels and to reinvigorate the confidence of bondholders (pp. 12; 154). Without the precarious and fickle confidence of bondholders, the ability to roll over (large) debt, especially short-term one, or borrow new debt at affordable rates, crumbles concomitantly with the liquidity of the financial markets and the economy (pp. 94; 96; 278).
Although Mauldin and Tepper do not offer any practical investment advice, they give a non-exhaustive list of possible investments to consider if one believes in either deflation and/or inflation (pp. 284-292; 294-296). The authors believe that deflation will precede inflation (pp. 133; 295). Mauldin and Tepper have a low confidence in the ability of Western central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, to appropriately transition their respective economies from a deflationary era to one of controlled inflation. Therefore, timing will be critical to capitalize on an era of increasing volatility (p. 296).
