To End a War (Modern Library Paperbacks) [Kindle Edition]

Any diplomatic memoir written so recently after the events in question will actually shed little light on the political motives and decision-making at the highest levels, since most of the documents and decisions involved are subject to confidentiality. Thus, their primary value is in revealing details about the actual personalities involved: the politicians, war leaders and diplomats whose actions shape events. Here Holbrooke's account falls short. There's very little he says in this book that hasn't been recounted previously in any number of news reports and documentaries on the shuttle diplomacy and diplomatic negotiations that eventually led to the Dayton Accords which ended the actual fighting in Bosnia. "To End a War" tells the reader more about Holbrooke than anything else, for this is a very vain man who is attempting to secure his place in history by retelling the story of his astounding negotiating efforts. Therefore, his observations of the personalities and behavior of various Balkan politicians (with the possible exception of Slobodan Milosevic) are often superficial, although we do learn which ones Holbrooke seemed to dislike on a personal level. We also learn that Holbrooke was usually treated to tasty meals of roast lamb whenever he visited Belgrade or the Serbian strongholds in Bosnia-altogether useless facts, unless I'm misinterpreting some incredibly subtle metaphorical symbolism. The only good thing about Holbrooke's account is that the writing style is straightforward and easy to read, so if you need to read this book for some minor details on the American aspect of Balkan diplomacy in the mid-1990s, it won't take long to get through it. Otherwise, even David Owen's dry and tedious "Balkan Odyssey" is more informative, while Warren Zimmermann's "Origins of a Catastrophe" provides the most lucid and perceptive (not to mention revealing) observations of the major Balkan leaders by a high-level foreign diplomat (he was the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia). The most revealing aspect of Holbrooke's book is that it highlights the arrogance of U.S. foreign policy: Holbrooke continuously jabs at the U.N. and European diplomats for their failure in the Balkans, while stressing how America stepped in to single-handedly save the day. Not that I think the UN and the EU didn't bungle pretty aimlessly in the Balkans, but the "success" of the U.S. diplomatic initiative is subject to question. After all, Holbrooke himself notes that almost all signatories of the Dayton Accords were generally dissatisfied with the agreement--and this is reflected in the ongoing political problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A first-hand account of the endgame in Bosnia, To End A War left me thinking at times that Mr. Holbrooke had succumbed to the same nationalist passions and irrational behavior he went around accusing everyone else of. The book sticks to the facts, but they are not the most interesting part. What is more appealing are the inconsistencies in Holbrooke's personal beliefs, his almost racist approach and arrogance, and the revealing passages about the side in the conflict everyone had thought angelic so far. A disturbing book for a reader from the Balkans, this is nevertheless an excellent resource for examining the creation of the New Diplomacy, with all of its resplendent consequences today. One cannot understand the modern world without it. Read with extreme caution and with scrutiny. And, unlike Holbrooke, try to put your prejudices on hold before opening the covers.

Holbrooke's book is a must-read for anyone closely interested in the wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia. It is a chronology with, at its core, a blow-by-blow and sometimes hour-by-hour description of the summer and autumn of 1995 when the Dayton accords took shape. The book is oft-criticized as Holbrooke's attempts to win back the swarms of people he alienated with his abrasive personality during his return to public service. If that was his intent, he probably failed, because his much-publicized anti-social behavior continues unabated to this day. In the unlikely event that any of his enemies were gullible enough to be flattered by the book, Holbrooke has no doubt subsequently given them fresh reason to dislike him. However, the book is still important, and, while self-aggrandizing, Holbrooke is possessed of a certain clarity of vision regarding the balkan wars. His list of five reasons, in chapter 2, for the West's failure to intervene in Yugoslavia is perceptive, especially his remarks about "Bad History, or the Rebecca West factor". The depiction of Milosevic is consistently interesting. Milosevic's own sorry history of losing four wars in the space of nine years, and the undeniable ruin he has visited on his own people, tend to paint him in broad and inaccurate colors. Holbrooke's account of his many sessions with Milosevic show the Serbian dictator as ruthless and cunning, and ultimately without any passion or vision. Milosevic was never interested in "greater Serbia", he sold the Croatian Serbs in a heartbeat. His betrayal of the Bosnain Serbs at Dayton, and the utter contempt he felt for them, marks him as a ruthless machiavelli rather than a true Serb nationalist. The book is useful, but not without minor blemishes: some explanations reek of hindsight, such as the decision (p.166) not to allow Croatian forces to conquer Banja Luka in 1995. Holbrooke's pasted-on humanitarian concerns ring hollow. The strategic implications of such an attack, and its effect on Dayton, are much more credible as reasons to insist that the Croatian offensive stop short of the city. Holbrooke's attempts at concern for humanitarian principles and his constant pats on the back for his colleagues often sound over-done and smarmy. He did a good job at Dayton, but he ain't gonna be canonized. (A nitpick: the map on p. 25 incorrectly places Russia on Slovakia's border.)