An American friend in Beijing once said that anyone who has
spent time among the Chinese eventually concocts a "grand
unified theory of China."
To a remarkable extent, Chris Patten didn't.
Patten was the last British governor of Hong Kong, and during
his five years there he gained a reputation as a combative
opponent of the Chinese Communist government and as a champion
of Hong Kong's nascent democracy.
One might expect, therefore, that his book would be another
example of the "China-bashing" so popular among those Western
opinion-makers who relish a fight with Beijing. Instead, Patten
offers calm, non-alarmist advice, with the wise observation that
we would be better off not treating China as a special case.
"The alleged uniqueness of China," he says, "blurs
comprehension and mangles policy-making."
He notes that one side of the how-to-deal-with-China debate is
dominated by appeasement-minded "Old China Hands," while the
other features hardliners who see China as "the last evil
empire."
Both outlooks are wrong, Patten says: "We are lured into
thinking that there is a special, an exact way of dealing with
China - which turns out on close examination to be one part
correct and four parts mumbo-jumbo."
While both the confrontational and appeasement mindsets
distort Western policy, what is even worse is the Western
tendency to oscillate between the two approaches.
Patten observes that "one minute we sell arms to Taiwan and
stamp our feet about human-rights abuses, the next we are
prepared to eat the humblest of pies and even curtail our own
civil liberties (trying to segregate demonstrators, for example,
lest they are seen by a visiting Chinese leader) to accommodate
Chinese Communist prejudices."
This gives the hard men in Beijing the opportunity to play the
two sides off against each other, particularly during the
ludicrous annual debate in the U.S. Senate over China's
"most-favoured-nation" trade status.
Patten sarcastically describes how senators bluster about
China having to shape up, whether on human rights, arms
proliferation, property rights or market access. The Chinese
respond with a few symbolic gestures and muse about buying their
new jetliners from Europe's Airbus rather than Boeing.
Meanwhile, business interests furiously lobby the senators and
worry publicly about losing access to the "world's biggest
market."
The senators eventually endorse the status quo for another
year and the Chinese come away with all their cynicism about
Western "values" intact.
Patten recommends a different approach, tougher than the Old
China Hands might like but not overtly confrontational. Simply
put, he says China should be treated like any other country,
held to the same standards.
If China mistreats political dissidents, the West should be as
critical as it was regarding the Soviet Union and South Africa.
On trade, Chinese access to Western markets must be matched by
openness and transparency in the Chinese economy. Sensibly,
Patten recommends delinking trade from political issues so China
cannot play its usual game of releasing a few dissidents in
return for trade concessions.
There are weaknesses in East And West, including long sections
of political boilerplate and a studied unwillingness to confront
the legacy of Western imperialism in China.
But Patten displays admirably clear thinking on the current
situation and good counsel regarding future dealings with
Beijing's red mandarins.