Diplomacy (A Touchstone book) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Neither time nor the strong reactions his person and Nixon-era actions evoke has dampened Kissinger's talent for cogent distillation of international complexity. If anything, this closely argued work, spaciously peppered with anecdotes and personal observations, is his best yet. It is not, be mindful, a diplomatic history per se, but instead a reminder of the geopolitical constraints on America's endeavor--the third this century--to fashion a new world order. Naturally, Kissinger's approach is historical, beginning with Cardinal Richelieu's policy in the Thirty Years' War, but his arguments are conceptual dissections of the principles on which the statesman of the moment operated. Whether discussing the Cardinal's raison d'{‚}etat, Metternich's (and then Palmerston's) balance-of-power, Bismarck's naked Realpolitik, Wilson's rejection of the above in favor of a vaporous collective security, the aggressive ideologies of expansion that issued from World War I, or the more solid collective security embodied in NATO, Kissinger is implicitly showing America's present (and near future) administrators the analogous choices on their post-Cold War menu. Referring often to John Quincy Adams' famed 1821 admonition that "America should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy," Kissinger cautions against the exceptional American temptation, regardless of party, to compel a democratic transformation of the world. He would prefer the revival of a balance-of-power outlook, which America has never practiced, but through which, among other outcomes, Russia becomes reconciled to its reduced, though still vast, territory. Authorial fame and powerful prose will secure Kissinger's new book a slot atop the sales lists. Gilbert Taylor -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.

The Nobel laureate and former national security advisor and secretary of state (Years of Upheaval, 1982, etc.) presents an engrossing and monumental (in every sense) historical survey of diplomacy from the 17th century to the present. Kissinger begins his narrative after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when militarily ascendant France strove for dominance on the continent, preventing the fragmented German states from coalescing into a major power. Thereafter Britain, its own internal turbulence quelled and its monarchy restored, sought to check France by creating alliances of weaker European states. Kissinger shows how wily statesmen like Richelieu, Britain's William III, Metternich, and Bismarck frankly pursued their own nation-state's interests without regard for the idealistic concepts of collective security that have motivated American policy since the Wilson administration: only Britain, because of its unique geographical position, actively pursued a policy of promoting equilibrium on the continent. Kissinger extensively discusses the unraveling of the post-Napoleonic arrangements in the decades leading up to WW I, Soviet and German consolidation and French and British demoralization in the years after the Versailles treaty, and the dominance of the Soviet-American rivalry in world politics after World War II. Kissinger draws fascinatingly on his own experiences as President Nixon's chief diplomat to illustrate his arguments about diplomacy. Finally, he argues that the ideal of collective security that American policy has promoted since Wilson's presidency and throughout the Cold War, while sometimes effective, is often weak because it is not strongly grounded in national interests. Buttressing his argument with a sweeping historical survey, Kissinger persuasively contends that leaders of the western democracies, particularly the US, should leaven their idealism in the turbulent post-Cold War era with the realistic pursuit of concrete national interests. Profound and important. (Book-of-the- Month main selection for April; History Book Club main selection) -- Copyright ©1994, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.

After nearly a dozen books and service as secretary of state for presidents Nixon and Ford, Kissinger has established himself as a major thinker, writer, and actor on the world's diplomatic stage. His newest work is a remarkable survey of the craft of international relations from the early 17th century to the present era. Beginning with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, Kissinger summarizes three centuries of Western diplomacy, giving special attenton to the influence of Wilsonian idealism on 20th-century American foreign policy. He is not shy about describing his own contributions to Nixon's foreign gambits, nor is he reticient about offering his own advice to the current administration on how to handle Russia, China, or the rest of the world. From Kissinger we learn that there is really little new about the New World Order. This is an important contribution to the theoretical literature on foreign affairs and will also serve quite ably as a one-volume synthesis of modern diplomatic history. All libraries should have this impressive book. Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 12/93.
- Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ. Lib., Ames
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.

Michiko Kakutani The New York Times An elegantly written study of Western diplomacy....Shrewd, often vexing, and consistently absorbing.

Simon Schama The New Yorker Kissinger's absorbing book tackles head-on some of the toughest questions of our time....Its pages sparkle with insight.

George P. Shultz This is a great book....Brilliant in its analysis and masterly in its sweep.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. This rich and absorbing work is both a brilliant study of the international crises that have shaped the modern world and a provocative meditation on the American style in foreign affairs.

Walter Laqueur Chairman, International Research Council, Center for Strategic and International Studies The most important work on diplomacy for thirty years.

THE SEMINAL WORK ON FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ART OF DIPLOMACY

Moving from a sweeping overview of history to blow-by-blow accounts of his negotiations with world leaders, Henry Kissinger describes how the art of diplomacy has created the world in which we live, and how America's approach to foreign affairs has always differed vastly from that of other nations.

Brilliant, controversial, and profoundly incisive, Diplomacy stands as the culmination of a lifetime of diplomatic service and scholarship. It is vital reading for anyone concerned with the forces that have shaped our world today and will impact upon it tomorrow.

Offering a panoramic view of history and a description of firsthand diplomatic encounters, the former Secretary of State describes his ideas about diplomacy and power balances, showing how national negotiating styles influence outcomes.

Henry A. Kissinger, geboren 1923 in Fürth, emigrierte 1938 mit seinen Eltern in die USA. Dort lehrte er ab 1952 an der Universität Harvard und hatte als politischer Berater aller Präsidenten seit Eisenhower sowie als Außenminister großen Einfluß auf die internationale Politik. Er gilt als Motor der chinesisch-amerikanischen Annäherung, der Entspannungspolitik gegenüber der UdSSR sowie der diplomatischen Voraussetzungen für einen Rückzug aus Vietnam und einer Friedensregelung in Nahost. 1973 wurde er mit dem Freidensnobelpreis ausgezeichnet. Henry A. Kissinger ist auch als Autor hervorgetreten und hat mehrere Bücher zur Zeitgeschichte verfaßt, u.a. "Die sechs Säulen der Weltordnung", "Die Vernunft der Nationen" sowie die ersten beiden Bände seiner Erinnerungen "Memoiren 1968-1973" und "Memoiren 1973-1974".

CHAPTER ONE

The New World Order

Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values. In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain elaborated the concept of the balance of power, which dominated European diplomacy for the next 200 years. In the nineteenth century, Metternich's Austria reconstructed the Concert of Europe and Bismarck's Germany dismantled it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics.

In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope.

The singularities that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America's values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world. Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment, though, since the end of the Second World War, the realities of interdependence have predominated.

Both schools of thought -- of America as beacon and of America as crusader -- envision as normal a global international order based on democracy, free commerce, and international law. Since no such system has ever existed, its evocation often appears to other societies as utopian, if not naïve. Still, foreign skepticism never dimmed the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Ronald Reagan, or indeed of all other twentieth-century American presidents. If anything, it has spurred America's faith that history can be overcome and that if the world truly wants peace, it needs to apply America's moral prescriptions.

Both schools of thought were products of the American experience. Though other republics have existed, none had been consciously created to vindicate the idea of liberty. No other country's population had chosen to head for a new continent and tame its wilderness in the name of freedom and prosperity for all. Thus the two approaches, the isolationist and the missionary, so contradictory on the surface, reflected a common underlying faith: that the United States possessed the world's best system of government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America's reverence for international law and democracy.

America's journey through international politics has been a triumph of faith over experience. Since the time America entered the arena of world politics in 1917, it has been so preponderant in strength and so convinced of the rightness of its ideals that this century's major international agreements have been embodiments of American values -- from the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The collapse of Soviet communism marked the intellectual vindication of American ideals and, ironically, brought America face to face with the kind of world it had been seeking to escape throughout its history. In the emerging international order, nationalism has gained a new lease on life. Nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle, and have competed more than they have cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age-old mode of behavior has changed, or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead.

What is new about the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. America cannot change the way it has perceived its role throughout its history, not should it want to. When America entered the international arena, it was young and robust and had the power to make the world conform to its vision of international relations. By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States was so powerful (at one point about 35 percent of the world's entire economic production was American) that it seemed as if it was destined to shape the world according to its preferences.

John F. Kennedy declared confidently in 1961 that America was strong enough to "pay any price, bear any burden" to ensure the success of liberty. Three decades later, the United States is in less of a position to insist on the immediate realization of all its desires. Other countries have grown into Great Power status. The United States now faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities. One of the new necessities is that a world comprising several states of comparable strength must base its order on some concept of equilibrium -- an idea with which the United States has never felt comfortable.

When American thinking on foreign policy and European diplomatic traditions encountered each other at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the differences in historical experience became dramatically evident. The European leaders sought to refurbish the existing system according to familiar methods; the American peacemakers believed that the Great War had resulted not from intractable geopolitical conflicts hut from flawed European practices. In his famous Fourteen Points, Woodrow Wilson told the Europeans that, henceforth, the international system should be based not on the balance of power but on ethnic self-determination, that their security should depend not on military alliances but on collective security, and that their diplomacy should no longer be conducted secretly by experts but on the basis of "open agreements, openly arrived at." Clearly, Wilson had come not so much to discuss the terms for ending a war or for restoring the existing international order, as he had to recast a whole system of international relations as it had been practiced for nearly three centuries.

For as long as Americans have been reflecting on foreign policy, they have ascribed Europe's travails to the balance-of-power system. And since the time Europe first had to concern itself with American foreign policy, its leaders have looked askance at America's self-appointed mission of global reform. Each side has behaved as if the other had freely chosen its mode of diplomatic behavior and could have, were it wiser or less bellicose, selected some other, more agreeable, method.

In fact, both the American and the European approaches to foreign policy were the products of their own unique circumstances. Americans inhabited a nearly empty continent shielded from predatory powers by two vast oceans and with weak countries as neighbors. Since America confronted no power in need of being balanced, it could hardly have occupied itself with the challenges of equilibrium even if its leaders had been seized by the bizarre notion of replicating European conditions amidst a people who had turned their backs on Europe.

The anguishing dilemmas of security that...