Defense of Japan 1945 (Fortress) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

As author Steven Zaloga notes, most books on the closing months of the war in the Pacific in 1945 tend to focus on the US decision to use the A-bombs and the B29 bomber fire-bombing of Tokyo. However, relatively little effort has been made to study the various defensive efforts made by Imperial Japan in 1944-45 to defeat an American invasion, if it came. Defense of Japan 1945 is a new volume in Osprey's Fortress series and it attempts a systematic analysis of Japan's coastal and air defensive capabilities, as well as other last-ditch measures, taken to prepare for the expected final campaign of the war. Since this campaign was aborted by the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese defenses were never fully tested, but the author sheds a great deal of light on their strengths and weaknesses. The author provides an extensive number of supporting tables with the text, ranging from Japanese air defense radars available to the number of kamikaze aircraft produced. This is a solid, well-written and very useful volume - it should be essential reading for anyone studying the merits of the A-bombs vs. conventional invasion decision.

The volume begins with a brief introduction that orients the reader to Imperial Japan's desperate situation in early 1945, with its naval and airpower shattered and U.S. forces already penetrating the inner defensive ring and beginning intensive bombing of Japanese cities. As the author notes, Japanese strategic doctrine had relied upon offensive strategy and consequently, little effort had been expended on coastal or air defenses. The opening section details the last-minute efforts to build up coastal defenses in the likely invasion areas, but the author repeatedly makes the point that this effort was only one-tenth of what the Germans put into the Atlantic Wall. Tables in this section list both army and navy coastal artillery batteries in 1945 and there is a color plate showing a 37-mm gun casemate. About one-quarter of the volume covers Japan's strategic air defenses, which were also quite anemic at the beginning of the war - the limited assets in place were focused on possible Soviet air attacks, not American. The author makes an important point here that the shock of the American Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in 1942 stimulated the Japanese into doubling the size of their air defense forces, meaning that thousands of troops and hundreds of fighters that might have been employed on the frontline in the Solomons were instead kept to defend the homeland. Not a bad result for "thirty seconds over Tokyo." This section has tables on AA gun production, batteries available and radar capabilities, along with three color plates. Very thorough. There were even some captured British 3.7-inch AA guns captured at Singapore used to defend Japan, and the author discusses how the capture of British radars at Singapore and U.S. radars in the Philippines aided Japanese radar development efforts. Nevertheless, Japan never developed the kind of integrated air defense system that could inflict serious losses on U.S. bomber raids.

The author also discusses the development of the Ketsu-Go plans to counter the expected Allied invasion. By early 1945, the Japanese had learned some valuable lessons about resisting American amphibious invasions and had decided to minimize beach defenses in favor of an inland defense to avoid naval gunfire. Tables list the Ketsu-Go mobilization plan and the order of battle of the Japnese Army in the home islands (a map shows dispositions). Ketsu-Go also relied heavily upon the use of special attacks (Kamikaze, Tokko) and National volunteers (civilians). There is also quite a bit of coverage on naval suicide craft, combat swimmers and submersible coastal defenses. One area that the author does not discuss is any Japanese planning to counter airborne landings, which would have been used at least in Operation Coronet in 1946. In the final section, the author discusses the collapse of Japanese air defenses under U.S. bombing in 1945 and a overview of the value of Japanese defenses. In essence, most of the Japanese defensive efforts were poorly-resourced, last-minute improvisations that would have done little to blunt U.S. offensive capabilities. The only tool that the Japanese had that had any real teeth were the special attack units, which would likely have inflicted significant damage upon a U.S. invasion fleet. However, these desperate measures would only have served to sharpen the ferocity of an already savage war in the Pacific, with lethal consequences for the Japanese civilian population and homeland.

This book provides a good overview of Japan's defensive preparations during the last year of World War II. When I ordered the book I was expecting that - like most books in this series - it would be focused on Japan's fixed defensive positions. Instead I was pleasantly surprised to find that it provides a wide ranging description of the Japanese Army and Navy's mobile units and air defences as well as covering the fixed defences. Despite the book's short length Zaloga has packed in a lot of detail and supports the text with a large number of excellent photos and maps. The balance of the coverage given to the different types of defences seems appropriate and the conclusions Zaloga draws are well supported. Unlike many Osprey books the book also features an excellent bibliography.

For all that the book does have some weaknesses. To my mind the main weakness is that Zaloga doesn't discuss what appears to be the miss-use of Japan's increasingly limited resources through a scattershot approach in developing defences. For instance, the adoption of outlandish plans such as frogmen armed with mines on poles waiting for American ships on the seabed at a time in which the Army was struggling to find the men and materials it needed to build up a more credible defence seems unjustifiable, but Zaloga simply provides a 'flat' description of these plans without making any criticisms. I also felt that the book would have benefited from at least another 20-40 pages given its wide scope and the wealth of material Zaloga was drawing on, though this is a common problem with Osprey's 48-page series of books and he has made very good use of the available space.

All up, this book is a useful addition to the literature on the last months of the Pacific War. Zaloga has done readers a service by assembling this material on Japan's defensive efforts and providing an excellent bibliography to guide further reading, and it should be of great value to people with an interest in the Pacific War.

As usual Mr Zaloga has done his homework and has written a very practical and informed essay on the Japanese defensive preparations for the coming invasion of their home islands in 1945. Ever since their victory against the Russians in 1905, the Japanese military has had a philosophy of an offensive nature. They would engage the battle on the enemy's turf, saving their islands from destruction. With this ingrain philosophy the Japanese were slow to change when it was obvious by late 1943 the Americans were coming after them. So it wasn't until late 1944 that the Japanese accepted the seriousness of the situation and begain considering their options. By April, 1945 the accelerated Ketsu-Go Plan was in place but by this time their ability to build and defend themselves was highly reduced. Oil and natural resources were limited as were their industrial capacity. By 1945 the number of planes, tanks, guns and ships and radar systems were limited, old and no match against the Allies.

This is the background the author presents before starting the main developments of the book. The author includes other background info throughout the book that will add to the readers understanding but its on a secondary level. As part of the new Fortress series, Mr Zaloga will limit his discussion primarily to the defensive preparations for the invasion and excludes for the most part civilian considerations, troop deployments and readiness and logistical matters. The bulk of the book will describe the design and development of the actual defenses like bunkers and gun and radar emplacements. There is much discussion with photos included of the many bunkers that would face the invasion forces. Though having many bunkers, it was still not enough to do the job and the guns were old and a mixture of varying sizes. Some of the guns and radar systems used came from the Allies of fallen garrisons in 1941-42. A brief mention is made of the artillery duels between these coastal guns and the American fleet. The five inch guns of the destroyers were on par but the big guns of the battleships could outdistanced and punish the Japanese guns with impunity.
A smaller section deals with strategic air defenses, particularly against the B-29. By 1945 the Japanese didn't have much to defend against the high flying B-29. Many of their aging antiaircraft guns could not reach the bombers and while their Kawasaki Ki-45 heavy fighter was capable there weren't many and didn't last long against the Mustangs that accompanied the bombers.

Along with the discussion are three maps, 55 well chosen photos, 9 terrific illustrations and 14 interesting statistic tables. Some of the tables include gun production, general deployment of aircraft and troops, the locations of the largest fortresses in and outside the home islands. This supplemental info is a great enhancement to the understanding of the narrative. The photos and illustrations will show two things. First, the Japanese had created some interesting defenses: protected bunkers for the rail catapult system for their jet powered kamikaze aircraft, Shinyo crash boat bunkers, the mini suicide subs, the submersible gun platforms and the special Submersible Pillbox that resupplies the gun platforms. The coastal caves and inland mountain tunnels were also put to good use. The Japanese were masters of camouflage as well and is shown in some of the photos. Its also shown that some of the latter bunkers were incomplete due to lack of cement and other building supplies. Some fortifications were unfinished when the war ended. The huge underground HQ near Matsushiro, the national communication bunker are also illustrated and described.
There is also an interesting discussion comparing the German effort to fortify the Atlantic Wall as to the Japanese effort. The Germans outdid the Japanese by ten times in bunkers and gun emplacements. Estimated casualty figures which were staggering are also given if Operation Olympic had launched.

The author also provides a four page listing of reading material of primary and secondary sources that includes American and Japanese references. Its an invaluable list if further study is desired. An Index closes out the book.
For a small package with a page limitation, the author has packed a lot of interesting information on the Japanese attempts to defend themselves. Its suitable for new or casual readers for its photos, brevity and directness and as a supplement for experienced students or collectors of the Pacific War and is highly recommended.