Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (Vintage) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Fred Anderson, a university professor, writes well and he avoids a narrow, parochial viewpoint in favor of a broad canvas that depicts the struggle as a multi-dimensional global conflict. Unfortunately, Anderson often only scrapes the surface and fails to provide real detail on important issues, like what was the actual balance of power between New France and the British colonies (figures on population, economic productivity and military potential would have been useful). Instead, Anderson spends many tedious pages detailing various treaties with Indian tribes, inter-colonial bickering and the land interests of the Penn family. The real weakness of the book is that Anderson fails to properly address the meat and potatoes of this subject: the military campaigns fought between 1755 and 1760 for the control of Canada. Anderson eschews details such as order of battle, casualties or analysis in favor of selected eyewitness accounts, which add little. Major military operations are glossed over quickly: the siege of Louisburg gets only four pages but the post-war land squabbles between Connecticut and Pennsylvania get six. Only eight pages are spent on the Battle of Ticonderoga in 1758, but more than thirty pages are spent on the Stamp Act. The only exception to this is the climatic Battle on the Plains of Abraham, which Anderson dismisses as a "dubious battle" that was neither decisive nor brilliantly fought. In his most controversial interpretation, Anderson claims that the British General Wolfe blundered into the battle without a plan, as part of a suicidal death wish. No evidence is presented to support this revisionist accusation, nor does Anderson disclose how he knows what was going on in Wolfe's mind. This leads to a second weakness of the book, which is that while many historical characters parade through the chapters, they remain ciphers because the author makes little effort to detail their backgrounds or pre-war experience.

This book desperately needs several appendices, covering topics such as a list of the British regular units that served in America during the war, a list of colonial units raised and war-expenses of each colony, and capsule biographies of all the major participants. Anderson does provide some additional detail in the 85 pages of endnotes, but he often finds it sufficient to cite a source without telling the reader what additional information it contains. To be sure, Anderson's book is impeccably researched. Yet the book is sadly lacking in detail on many important topics, including Britain's naval superiority and economic mobilization, both of which were crucial to the outcome. Interesting topics, such as the creation of Roger's Rangers and the British condoning of scalping are glossed over. In order to make sense of Anderson's sketchy detail, I frequently had to consult other books on the war. A 746-page volume should not force a reader to conduct so much extra legwork. French perspectives are also given short shrift, and their strategic objectives are never explained (what did France hope to gain?). After the fall of Montreal in 1760, France drops out of Anderson's account and we hear no more of them - which is pretty ridiculous given that the effect of losing Canada upon France is never discussed. In another area, Anderson's use of colonial-era maps, while quaint, was a poor choice since they are very difficult to read and hence constitute only useless eyewash.

Finally, the real crux of this book comes down to one issue: Anderson wants to break from standard historical accounts that depict the war as merely a prelude to the American Revolution and instead, to portray it as a stand-alone event that did not inevitably lead to revolution. However much his intent, Anderson actually does tend to use foreshadowing of future British-American friction throughout his narrative. At heart, Anderson is a colonial-era historian and his main interest is in the political and emotional ramifications of the war. Indeed, less than half of the book is actually devoted to the war and the last 180 pages are pre-occupied with post-war taxation policies. Nowhere does Anderson summarize the war's human and financial costs, which are certainly more germane than the antics of various colonials in frustrating British customs policies. Contrary to what other reviewers might claim, Fred Anderson has not written the definitive account of the Seven Years War or even come close; most of his work covers well-trodden ground with few new revelations. If you want to learn a lot about the Stamp Act, read this book. If you want to learn a lot about the Seven Years War, keep looking...