Critique of Pure Reason (Penguin Classics) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Über-translation of the Kritik...
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The Critique of Pure Reason is the sine qua non of modern thought, as it incorporates the most significant earlier critiques of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, and Descartes, in turn becoming the point of departure (on one hand) for Schopenhauer, and (on the other) for Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze--besides its further influence on social and literary criticism (e.g., Marx, Mill, Arnold, Eliot, Adorno, et al.).

Of course the Kritik is a very complex and dry text--(more readable than Hegel and Heidegger; less readable than Schopenhauer and Nietzsche)--which requires much moisture of psychic perspiration.

Question: which English translation should one get?

Modern English readers have five choices:

1) Kemp Smith (1929) based on Müller (1881) [based on Meiklejohn (1855) and Haywood (1838)];
2) Politis (1993) based on Meiklejohn (1855);
3) Pluhar (1996);
4) Guyer/Wood (1998);
5) Weigelt (2007) based on Müller (1881).

(F. Max Müller was the son of Wilhelm Müller who supplied Schubert with the texts for his immortal song-cycles The Lovely Mill-Maid, and the Winter's Journey.)

Bottom line: Guyer/Wood (Cambridge UP) though touted to be "definitive," in fact contains numerous errors.

Conclusion: scholars and thinkers of all walks would be doing themselves a favour in utilising Weigelt's fine translation featured here.
For Weigelt is a perspicacious scholar of great intellectual integrity and technical accuracy who writes a nice English with a sense of humour.
Weigelt's 60 page introduction is invaluable.
Moreover, the design of the text and the physical dimensions book itself are of the most propitious and gratifying qualities.

As with any great text--however many superb commentaries, criticisms, and explications one may read--there is absolutely NO SUBSTITUTE for personal interaction with the primary text itself.

Therefore, this English version of the Kritik is recommended.
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I studied the Critique back in the '60s using the Kemp Smith translation, and have reread it every number of years since to see if my mind is aging. When I read this translation, I was amazed at how much I understood. Then I compared it to the Kemp Smith and realized that the real reason was that the translation was eminently more readable and understandable than even the Kemp Smith, which itself was an improvement over Meiklejohn and Muller.

There are scholarly endnotes which explain the translation issues and changes between the first and second editions, and an incredibly helpful lengthy introduction which provides a great overview of the Critique. This is THE translation for me. I am extremely grateful to the translator for his efforts! If you're going to read the Critique -- and it is hard and you probably will need a teacher to help you through it, as I did -- you will not find one that is better and more carefully translated.

Insofar as Marcus Weigelt has preserved and improved upon the virtues of the original Müller versions of 1881 and 1896, his work is to be commended. On the other hand he has made some poor choices in departing from Müller. In particular, his choice of "purposiveness" for "Zweckmassigkeit" is one that merits comment. Lamentably, the more recent translations made by Paul Guyer/Allen Wood and Werner Pluhar have moved toward a more "literalistic" approach and have also adopted certain questionable terminology that Müller did not. The choices they made were unfortunate in many cases, and regrettably Weigelt has followed them in this practice. What made Müller the best version available was that he avoided terms such as "purposiveness", which is anachronistic, unintelligible, ambiguous, incorrect, absurd, and therefore indefensible.

Perhaps only a tiny fraction of English speakers know the word "purposiveness", and those very few who do know what it means also know that it's the wrong word to use in a translation of Kant.

This revision is therefore to be used with caution and cannot be recommended without reservation.

The introduction is excellent, by the way, and is perhaps the most significant contribution in the volume.

I am, however, deeply disappointed in some of the changes Marcus has made.

Let's consider the changes Marcus has made in this passage from A691/B719:

Denn da dienen alle sich in der Natur zeigenden, oft nur von uns selbst dazu gemachten Zwecke dazu, es uns in der Erforschung der Ursachen recht bequem zu machen, nämlich, anstatt sie in den allgemeinen Gesetzen des Mechanismus der Materie zu suchen, sich geradezu auf den unerforschlichen Ratschluß der höchsten Weisheit zu berufen, und die Vernunftbemühung alsdann für vollendet anzusehen, wenn man sich ihres Gebrauchs überhebt, der doch nirgend einen Leitfaden findet, als wo ihn uns die Ordnung der Natur und die Reihe der Veränderungen, nach ihren inneren und allgemeineren Gesetzen, an die Hand gibt. Dieser Fehler kann vermieden werden, wenn wir nicht bloß einige Naturstücke, als z. B. die Verteilung des festen Landes, das Bauwerk desselben, und die Beschaffenheit und Lage der Gebirge, oder wohl gar nur die Organisation im Gewächs- und Tierreiche aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Zwecke betrachten, sondern diese systematische Einheit der Natur, in Beziehung auf die Idee einer höchsten Intelligenz, ganz allgemein machen. Denn alsdann legen wir eine Zweckmäßigkeit nach allgemeinen Gesetzen der Natur zum Grunde, von denen keine besondere Einrichtung ausgenommen, sondern nur mehr oder weniger kenntlich für uns ausgezeichnet worden..."

Here is Müller's original 1881 version of the passage:

For here all the aims which we observe in nature, many of which we only imagined ourselves, serve to make the investigation of causes extremely easy, if, instead of looking for them in the general mechanical laws of matter, we appeal directly to the unsearchable counsel of the supreme wisdom, imagining the efforts of our reason as ended, when we have really dispensed with its employment, which nowhere finds its proper guidance, except where the order of nature and the succession of changes, according to their own internal and general laws, supply it. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider certain parts of nature, such as the distribution of land, its structure, the constitution and direction of certain mountains, or even the organisation of plants and animals, from the standpoint of final aims, but look upon this systematical unity of nature as something general, in relation to tile idea of a supreme intelligence. For, in this case, we look upon nature as founded on intelligent purposes, according to general laws, no particular arrangement of nature being exempt from them, but only exhibiting them more or less distinctly.

Here is Weigelt's revision:

For here all the purposes which we observe in nature, many of which we only convert into such ourselves, serve to make the investigation of causes extremely easy, if, instead of looking for them in the universal laws of the mechanism of matter, we appeal directly to the unsearchable counsel of the supreme wisdom; and we thus imagine the efforts of our reason as being completed, when we have really dispensed with its use, which use finds no proper guidance anywhere, except where it is supplied by the order of nature and the series of alterations occurring according to their own inner and universal laws. This error may be avoided if we do not merely consider, from the standpoint of purposes, certain parts of nature, such as the distribution of land, its structure, the constitution and location of certain mountains, or even just the organization of the plant and animal kingdoms, from the standpoint of final aims, but instead make this systematical unity of nature in relation to tile idea of a supreme intelligence something universal. For in this case we look upon nature as founded on purposiveness according to universal laws of nature, from which no particular arrangement is exempt, but which only exhibit such arrangement more or less distinctly.

I see no improvement here. I believe that Weigelt may have erred in changing Müller's attribution of "them" from "laws" to "arrangement". The former seems more likely, i.e., that any particular arrangement exhibits the laws more or less distinctly.

Also, 'unerforschlich' is 'inscrutable', not 'unsearchable'.

I offer the following revision as being clearer and more intelligible:

For, in this case, the design which we observe in nature, and often that which we merely fancy to exist, makes the investigation of causes quite an easy task, if, instead of looking for them in the universal mechanical laws of matter, we appeal directly to the inscrutable counsel of a supreme wisdom. We are thus persuaded that reason has finished its work, when we have merely dispensed with its employment, which is guided surely and safely only by the order of nature and the succession of changes in the world, which are disposed according to immanent and universal laws. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely regard certain parts of nature, such as the distribution of continents, their structure, the constitution and orientation of certain mountains, or even the organization existing in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, from the standpoint of fulfilling particular ends, but look upon this systematical unity of nature as something universal, in relation to the idea of a supreme intelligence. For, in this case, we look upon nature as founded on intelligent purposes, though in conformity with universal laws, no particular arrangement of nature being exempt from them, but only exhibiting them more or less distinctly.