Counterinsurgency [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

In the epilogue of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence states after reading, `Super flumina Babylonis,' he had a longing to feel himself the node of a national movement.

David Kilcullen should take satisfaction in knowing he achieved Lawrence's longing with his contribution to the United States military re-focus on Counterinsurgency during the recent and ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Kilcullen's interest in the subject is stimulated by his service as an Australian officer with experience in East Timor and Indonesia. He has done an enormous amount of interesting work on the title topic (he has a doctorate in politics from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, focusing on the effects of guerrilla warfare on non-state political systems in traditional societies).

He covers writing of the "28 articles," a concise practical guide for junior officers and non-commissioned officers engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I first read the articles in an email chain in 29 Palms after my first deployment to Ar Ramadi, Iraq as a Marine infantry officer. The email had gone viral and I assume every officer who had been or was going to Iraq or Afghanistan not only read it but printed it, highlighted it, wrote notes next to the points and tucked it away in their platoon commander's note book for future reference.

Kilicullen brilliantly takes the complex theories of counterinsurgency and boils them into simple title phrases that can be easily recalled.
#7- Train the squad leaders then trust them
# 13- build trusted networks

These were not just read and forgot but read, digested and implemented at the company and platoon level. My company commander on my second tour to Ar Ramadi in 2007, Marcus Mainz, took # 8 - Rank is nothing talent is everything and frocked two NCOs to lieutenants to run combined action teams living 10 Marines to 100+ Iraqi Police.

Kilcullen also offers an analytical approach on measuring progress in Afghanistan. My twin brother (a Marine JAG officer) who is currently serving in Afghanistan under General McChrystal has relayed to me the CGs emphasis on a new operation culture stressing the importance of measurable metrics. What does the price of exotic vegetables have to do with fighting the Taliban? Everything, Kilcullen tells us.

The Australian combat academic has a gift for straightforward style and also covers Globalization, Bottom up State Formation and Countering Global Insurgency in this definitive indispensable work on counterinsurgency.

In order to form a rational opinion on the West's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan it is necessary to have at least a basic idea of what counterinsurgency operations are all about. Without an understanding of the type of operations being conducted and their aims, it is not possible to make a considered determination of whether we are winning or losing, or whether we should get out or stay in for the long haul. Therefore a primer on counterinsurgency written by one of the world leading authorities (both practical and academic) is sorely needed as the West reconsiders its options. Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency" hits the mark accurately and with power, but it is not without fault.

For those trying to come to grips with all the talk and debate over the progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easily to become swayed by the reports in the media. Without understanding how to measure success in an insurgency and what is trying to be achieved, the general public and the media continue to view progress through the lens of conventional military operations. Killcullen's book provides the background necessary to understand what the West should try to do, why they should try to do it, how to do it, and (very importantly) how to know what you are doing is having the desired effect. This sort of information presented in language that is easy to read and understand has been sorely missing to date, and Kilcullen has done an excellent job of providing an entry level book on counterinsurgency for the layman.

As a primer the book is excellent as it draws together a diverse range of Kilcullen's work on counterinsurgency, from his work in Indonesia and East Timor, to the famous "Twenty-Eight Articles". It is therefore a one-stop shop to get your head around the big issues. However, as Kilcullen has included the articles in their original state, the book offers very little for those who are familiar with Kilcullen's work. This is unfortunate and represents a missed opportunity. Instead of updating the texts, Kilcullen has added a number of "author's notes" to highlight changes in his thinking or in the situation after the article was written. I am hard pressed to understand why the author didn't re-edit and update the articles themselves. This would have added significant value to the work rather than letting the reader know that what they have just read is no longer completely accurate. This is very disappointing.

Despite having articles that are now out-dated, the diversity of the writings that have been included provide a variety of perspectives on the issues involved in counterinsurgency. The book is more than simply a look at Iraq and Afghanistan, it contains insights into the challenges of combating a global insurgency as well as examining counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Indonesians soon after gaining independence. One article that I thought was an interesting inclusion was Kilcullen's report on the Mootain Bridge engagement following the UN intervention in East Timor. This was not so much an insight into insurgencies perse, but rather an example of the power of the media and the need for the troops to think strategically. This is something that is vital in current counterinsurgency operations.

In summary:

An excellent primer on counterinsurgency for those trying to understand it, but offers little to the seasoned campaigner.

I would recommend this book to:

(1) Journalists
(2) New military recruits
(3) Politicians
(4) The general public who wish to make an informed judgment of current operations.

For students and practitioners of statecraft, nation building, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, David Kilcullen is a living legend.

His main claim to fame is as author of the modern classic 'Twenty-Eight Articles', the writing of which apparently started on a whim in a Washington area Starbucks early one March 2006 evening and finished on his laptop at home the wee hours of the following morning. Emailed to a few colleagues for comment that early morning, the article went viral (even I received a copy!) and has now been read in its hundreds of thousands of copies, perhaps millions, translated into multiple languages and a freely available download if one but types its name into an internet search.

An experienced army officer and academic, so steeped in counterinsurgency to have written such a masterwork of community-level operations as 'Twenty-Eight Articles', must have more to say if given book-length scope to say it. 'Counterinsurgency' is David Kilcullen's second book-length opportunity to do so. I was disappointed to discover that it is not really a book but a loosely connected patchwork of his previously published articles, including a repeat of 'Twenty-Eight Articles', each with a patina of his annotations.

An initial point, tantalizingly dangled and then abruptly left hanging, is that the only two hard rules of counter-insurgency are (1) an absolute need to respect non-combatants and (2) to beware of template approaches, given that successful counterinsurgencies are ultimately custom built to fit a particular situation and may involve doing precisely the opposite of a solution that worked in a different insurgency.

The patchwork of articles approach frustrated me as it only partially illustrated any conclusions, and even that was too frequently left to the reader's own inferences. Beyond the author being a key participant and that it allowed the reprinting of a previously published article, I ended confused, for example, as to the logic behind including a 40 page discussion (about 20% of the book) on a minor 1999 engagement during East Timor's separation from Indonesia. If there were broad conclusions that could be drawn from that engagement - the Australian Army, in this instance, was arguably an ultimately successful UN-sponsored insurgent force against the counterinsurgent Indonesian Army - the conclusions should have been spelled out. I was too thick to detect them.

Even the title, 'Counterinsurgency', seems to bait and switch diplomats, aid workers and soldiers hungry for knowledge in advance of a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. One of the points the author seems guide the reader toward is that if the issue is seen as a counterinsurgency, rather than a competition between systems within which an insurgency operates, the effort may be doomed to defeat itself.

Notwithstanding the lack of organizing frame and direction, the book contained much of value. The brief, stark and sober chapter on measuring performance in Afghanistan was itself worth the price of the book. Likewise, the final chapter contained promising ideas, vexingly only partially developed, about insurgencies as systems best dealt with on a systems level. That concept, more fully elaborated, may have been the great book I was hoping for.

Perhaps my expectations were raised too high by the elegance and blinding clarity of 'Twenty-Eight Articles', but 'Counterinsurgency' ultimately disappoints as a stock and workmanlike addition to the genre, interrupted by brief flashes of blinding insight.