78 von 88 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
David M. Dougherty
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This is an outstanding scholarly work well deserving of five stars. In some respects I wonder if it could have been written by an American (the author is Finnish) since it sharply contrasts with the politically correct myth of the American Indians, always fighting in defense of their homeland and way of life against the overwhelming encroachments of evil Europeans. Some will use the term "revisionist" to describe this work, but more accurately it should be described simply as Comanche history for two centuries from the Comanche viewpoint. To put the contrast in more familiar terms, until recently almost all books on the World War II Eastern Front between Germany and the Soviet Union have been told from the German side. Now David Glantz and others are writing books that tell the Soviet side. Are they "revisionist?"
The author traces the Comanches from origins among the Shoshones, moving through Colorado and becoming allied with the Utes (other authors describe the Comanches as being forced out into the Great Plains by the Utes), acquiring horses and guns from Mexican traders, then spreading into Northern Texas and surrounding country. There they established a virtual "empire", or more accurately, a sphere of hegemony and influence, that extended into six US states and several states in Northern Mexico by 1840. This can be considered as a region controlled loosely by semi-nomads who would eventually face the problem of maintaining their "empire" through population growth in permanent settlements. (The reader should look for parallels to the Golden Horde on the plains of Southern Russia.) The Comanches did not always exterminate all other people in their sphere of influence, but rather used them for trade, a source of slaves, and goods acquired through war and negotiation.
The Comanche collapse came swiftly through a combination of factors, notably drought, disease, and the decimation of the Bison herds through natural causes and over-hunting. By the time they faced serious opposition from Americans (Texans), they were already in steep decline. But until 1840, Comancheria was ruled by the Comanches, taking what they wanted from people on their borders, whether Anglos, Mexicans, or other Indians.
The Comanches were not a benign people, frequently murdering, raping, and enslaving those who opposed them or simply had nothing else of use for the warriors to take. The author describes their society extremely well (much like the Apaches except for the roles of the horse and bison.) Their warrior society was able to undertake raids over 1,000 miles from the heart of Comancheria into Mexico, and even the Lipan Apaches were forced to migrate to escape annihilation. The author points out that the Comanches were fortunate in their timing in that they were able to build their empire in an area not particularly coveted by the Mexicans or Americans until a hundred years later. But his model of an expansionist Indian nation is in direct opposition to the paternalistic tomes normally emanating from academia, although it also fits to a large degree with the history of other aggressive tribes such as the Aztecs, Pohatans, Iroquois and Sioux (Lakota.)
This work is an easy read and stuffed full of facts not normally found in books on the Comanches, or for that matter, on any Indian tribe. All to often, the Indians are simply the enemy and described from the viewpoint of the settler or Army officer, or if the work is coming from academia, it's a discourse on victimhood and how the Indians were mistreated, cheated, and faced with genocide. This book shows them to be real human beings, warts and all, aggressive and defensive, merciful and cruel. There is much to learn here, and if the reader re-assesses his opinions and attitudes towards American Indians as a result, it is all to the good.
If the reader is interested in American history, buy and read this book. Its importance goes far beyond the Comanches.
A less-than-brief review by Frank McLynn in the Literary Review (it escapes me why the LR would ask a Brit to review a book by a Finn on America -- although he did write Villa & Zapate and Wagons West) (Google "Frank McLynn on the Commanche Empire) will give you a pretty good idea of the book's detail content, but be forewarned that some of McLynn's comments are wrong. The Comanches did not war against the Fox Indians and McLynn apparently does not understand the author's math in regards to the bison herd. 6.5 bison per person per year yields 260,000 animals taken if the Comanche and allied population is 40,000, not 20,000. His remarks about the required academic jargon for peer acceptance are correct however -- the author should have avoided the garbage so loved in the ivory towers in a book slated for wide dissemination. For me, the appearance of academic jargon at various times was this book's only flaw.
23 von 27 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
T. J. Monika
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When I was growing up in eastern Missouri it was de rigueur that the man-children of the clan become Boy Scouts. Thus, despite little aptitude or interest, I was duly enrolled in the Cub Scouts and spent summer weekends attending den meetings and going on the occasional camping trip. (Don't fear that this diversion is going to descend into horror stories about mental and physical abuse - happily my life as a Scout was quite banal. I never got beyond the Cub stage, truth be told, and my parents were "cool" with that.) I bring this episode in my life up because it was as a Scout that I first encountered the Native American. Admittedly it was a highly white-washed (there's a loaded word!) version that stressed the most admirable aspects of Indian culture (at least "admirable" in Anglo eyes) and ignored the complexities and less savory history of relations between Indians and Europeans (and between Indians and Indians). It also tended to focus exclusively on Plains Indians, blinkering my perception of non-Plains tribes for the longest time. Subsequent reading (remember, I'm not the Grizzly Adams type) led me to other works sympathetic to the Native perspective. In particular I remember a YA biography of the Seminole chieftain Osceola (giving me the animus I bear toward Andrew Jackson to this day). It was a kid's book so the more gruesome details of the war against the Seminoles didn't figure in the narrative but I understood that the white man had been grossly unjust to the Indian. Even my fiction reading favored the Indian (or at least sympathized with their plight). I remember a book about the lost Roanoke colony (they were saved and incorporated into one of the local tribes); and Andre Norton wrote many novels with Native characters (The Sioux Spaceman, among others, and one (title unremembered) where, in an alternate Earth, there's a powerful, modern Iroquois empire). All this prepared me to accept the great myth of our national epic with an appropriately jaundiced eye; all this prepared me to accept this wonderful book about a near-forgotten era in the history of the New World.
Despite a writing style that's sodden with academic jargon (like "fundamentally a study of indigenous agency"), I'm giving this book four stars because of the intense pleasure I felt discovering a world and era I never realized existed and enriching my understanding of my country's history. To be fair, Hamalainen's language becomes less turgid once you get past the first chapter or so (he only relapses in the Conclusion but I'm all for forgiving him). This book is divided into eight chapters that cover an era from about 1700, when the Comanches arrived in the southern Great Plains with their then-allies the Ute, to 1874, when the tribes were finally confined to reservations by the US Army. The author chronicles the Comanches' rise as the dominant power on the plains and their sudden, catastrophic collapse.
Before going on, I wanted to say that one of the strongest overall features of the book is that Hamalainen doesn't ennoble or demonize anyone. The Comanches are not noble-but-doomed indigenes standing up to European imperialism; nor are they mindless savages futilely resisting the advance of modern civilization. They (and the other actors in our drama - Spaniards, Mexicans, Texans, Americans and other Native nations) are just human beings acting like human beings have acted for thousands of years. There are instances of noble and generous behavior just as there are instances of the most savage cruelty. That balance, for me, makes the book all the more convincing.
What follows are brief synopses and impressions gleaned from reading each chapter. If you're interested in Hamalainen's arguments and proofs, read the book yourself :-)
Introduction: If you can hack through the jargon, the Introduction sets up the basic arguments of the book. Thus: (1) The rise of a Comanche hegemony on the southern Great Plains (roughly from the Arkansas river south to the Rio Grande, and stretching c. 200 miles from the eastern face of the Rockies) foiled Spain's (and Mexico's) attempt to create a stable inland empire. (2) Again, we have an examination of a frontier zone as a region of flux and innovation similar to the situation along the Rhine in the Roman histories I've been reading lately. And (3), an examination of the character of Comanche imperialism and an analysis of why it failed in the face of US expansion.
The first five chapters - Conquest, New Order, The Embrace, The Empire of the Plains, Greater Comancheria - document the Comanches' rise from just one of many tribes moving into the area in the 18th century to the zenith of their power in the first half of the 19th.
In the early 1700s, the first tribes that could be called "Comanche" wandered down out of Utah with the Utes, one of the first Native cultures to adopt the horse. "Comanche" is the Spanish form of a Ute word that probably meant "enemy" or "those guys who won't stop attacking us" (I freely paraphrase here as I don't have the reference in front of me but that's the gist). Comanches called themselves numunu, which (as is often the case) simply means "The People" (cf. German deutsche).
Though Spain claimed northern Mexico and the southern Great Plains it could not colonize it nor even properly hold it, and the Comanches moved into the power vacuum. The Apache, the original, dominant power in the territory, were overmatched by the newcomers' command of horses and their more cohesive political organization. This shouldn't suggest that the Comanche had any form of government recognized by Western eyes nor that they had a conscious plan of expansion. To the Spaniards (and their American successors) the Comanche appeared as savage marauders without mercy, appearing out of the plains to murder and ravish. To most of them. Spain was fortunate in mid-century to have a man named Cachupin as the territory's governor. He possessed an understanding of Comanche culture and sensibilities that allowed him to create a modus vivendi that gave the provinces of New Mexico room to prosper in (relative) peace. Not surprisingly, it was rare that a man of Cachupin's quality occupied the post so Spanish/Comanche relations always hovered close to outright hostilities. Even under Cachupin, Hamalainen argues that the Spaniards made a fundamental error in believing that they were in control of the situation. Much like our own politicians in Washington, those in Mexico City and Madrid ignored the reality and the reports of their agents on the ground in preference for a world where their desires and power signified. It made for a delicate balance that only the ablest governors could maintain.
Spanish policy attempted to make the Comanche dependent upon them but the exact opposite occurred - the Spanish colonies became dependent upon the Comanche for their survival. This dependence became so great in New Mexico's case that she had practically severed relations with the Mexican government. Texas' case became so desperate, Mexico invited American colonists into the province.
Internally, Comancheria (the region dominated by the Comanche) could be divided into eastern and western halves, which developed differently and faced different challenges along their borders but which maintained unity via complementary trade and periodic general councils that met to deal with regionwide issues. Below these councils, Comanche political/economic society rested on nomadic rancherias of a few hundred souls (at their largest). Chiefs, called paraibos, ruled by common consent of the adult males. Warriors (sometimes from several rancheria) would organize under warchiefs for raids but such figures only commanded during the raid, they had no authority otherwise (though often paraibos in their own right).
In the 1820s, Spain disappeared as a factor in plains history to be replaced by a newly independent Mexico and a rapidly, aggressively expansionist US. For the moment, though, no one enjoyed an overwhelming advantage. Mexico's position steadily eroded as it proved incapable of creating an effective presence north of the Rio Grande (and only a minimal one south of the river). The US's attention was focused on lands beyond the Rockies - the plains were just a path to the riches of the far West. Without direct interference from the Americans, Comancheria continued to expand and tighten its economic stranglehold over the region. In 1840, no Comanche would have believed that in a little over a generation they would be a broken remnant dependent upon American generosity to survive.
Children of the Sun - the anthropology chapter: And one of the most fascinating. Comanche society was in a constant state of flux, balancing hunting vs. pastoralism, a market vs. a subsistence economy, localism vs. centralization, egalitarianism vs. inequality, the individual vs. the group and slavery vs. assimilation.
Two animals - the horse and the bison - were essential to creating and maintaining Comanche superiority. Hamalainen contends that the Comanche were the only Native culture to wholly devote itself to an equine-based, pastoral lifestyle. In the process, they sacrificed the "gathering" side of their previous hunter-gatherer existence, becoming dependent upon the more sedentary Native and European societies around them for goods (like metal tools and guns) and staple crops. In essence, the Comanches became the New World equivalent of the steppe tribes of Eurasia.
Becoming pure pastoralists brought about a significant change in the division of labor and a deleterious shift in women's status: Boys tended the great horse herds; women maintained the households and provided much of the labor that converted horse and bison products into marketable goods; and men occupied themselves with scouting for pasture, taming feral horses, raiding and commerce (two sides of the same coin in Comanche eyes). Beyond relegating women to servility, the changeover to pastoralism also militarized Comanche society - a man's worth depended upon his prowess in battle and his ability to secure and protect his wealth (i.e., horses). This chapter is all too short and I would have liked more information about Comanche society. Evenso, I haven't touched upon the author's discussion of slavery or the Comanche tradition of individualism and meritocracy that mitigated the strong pressure toward political centralization and economic stratification.
As the final chapters - Hunger and Collapse - show, by the 1830s, the Comanche had created a flourishing and stable polity that preserved much of traditional Comanche culture while accommodating the demands of "empire." But it was supremely vulnerable to the disruption of its foundation - the horse and the bison. Comancheria's tragedy was that its success sealed its doom. Access to the wealth generated by their trade monopolies led to larger populations and pressure to expand. Combined with treaties which allowed outsiders to hunt the bison, the Comanche fatally weakened the herds. A 20+ year drought beginning in 1845 broke the "empire." The only reasons the Comanche didn't succumb until 1874 was that America was distracted in the 1850s and 1860s with the slavery question and the Civil War and the rains returned in the mid-1860s. Comancheria enjoyed an "Indian" summer (sorry, couldn't resist) but when the US government determined to eliminate the Comanche threat, it unleashed a total war against them (tactics perfected in the Civil War); Comancheria proved unable to survive the onslaught.
In a pattern repeated a few years later in the northern Great Plains, the final days of Comanche resistance were dominated by an apocalyptic religious movement that fell apart at the "battle" of Adobe Walls, when its leader (Isatai) fell to US Army-issue bullets. In 1874, all resistance disappeared and the remnants of the Comanche nation were herded into reservations and forced to give up their way of life, enduring second-class status in the triumphant American empire. This last point brings up a characteristic of Comancheria that I neglected to mention earlier: the Comanches' Roman-like capacity to accommodate and assimilate. Like Rome, as long as Comanche partners adopted or accommodated Comanche culture, stable and relatively peaceful relations pertained. A far cry from America's xenophobia. It still smacks of imperialism but of a "gentler" species. (And we shouldn't forget that when neighbors couldn't mesh with the Comanche, they suffered the savage raids the nation was known for.)
In concluding, Hamalainen asks, "Why the Comanches?" and comes up with 5 answers:
1. Geography favored horse breeding and bison hunting, and the Comanches were in the right place at the right time to exploit it.
2. Their timing was also fortunate in that they could play the Europeans off against each other to achieve hegemony.
3. Comanche culture was remarkably flexible and innovative.
4. The horse allowed Comanches to shift wholly to pastoralism, opening routes to wealth and the ability to dominate the trade routes across the plains.
5. Diseases which decimated more sedentary Native tribes had a smaller impact on the dispersed populations of Comancheria, and the Comanche were able to maintain a relatively larger population up through the 1840s.
This is only a snapshot of the wealth of information contained in this volume. Considering the rating I've given Comanche Empire it should come as no surprise that I highly recommend this book to the interested, especially as you don't need a particularly deep background in Southwest American history.
10 von 12 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
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I regret having to lower the rating to three stars. The author clearly put a lot of research into writing this book. Reading this book has enhanced my understanding of the intricate dynamics that led to the emergence of the USA "empire" in North America, as well as the relative stagnation of New Spain/Mexico. For a period, the dynamics between the two empires led to the emergence of the Comanche as a forceful business and "way of life" on the plains. This is fascinating, though to me not unexpected, for reasons I'll detail.
Before going into the review proper, I'd provide a tip: read Chapter 6 immediately after Chapter 1. Had the author put the chapter on the Comanche way of life at the beginning one would have known from the outset what Comancheria was. I'll also add a warning: beware of the author's hyperbole ("horse herds were colossal..." pg. 290; "prodigious creation with an enormous, at times hemispheric reach" - pg. 349), and be wary of the figures. The Comanche may have created large-scale mayhem, but they probably never went beyond 40'000 people altogether on a territory well over 100'000 square miles.
The author has failed to give himself a coherent conceptual framework. He wavers between opposite views of what Comancheria was: once it is a centralized entity, once it is a loose federation. These contradictory views follow each other on the same page, or so. My copy is littered with incredulous question marks.
The reason for this is the author's choice of thesis - that Comanche built an "empire". The author uses the term "empire" without definition. Empires are pre-industrial structures. According to GELLNER (Nations and Nationalism, Second Edition (New Perspectives on the Past)) and CRONE (Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World), sedentary extractive elites impose their rule of self-contained and fragmented peasant societies. Such elites are interchangeable and wage war on each other vying for aggrandizement. The elite can mobilize the resources of its territory at will. This they use for war. Elites eject or replace each other; we may obtain an empire by agglutination. Empires are essentially territorial (nomads may replace extractive elites as they settle, but nomadic empires have not existed).
Nomadism does not allow easily for concentration and mobilization of power. People can move away, hence consensus is the rule. Consensus is difficult - unless a clear economic advantage like raiding/trading as well as charismatic leaders underpins the process. Economic advantage comes from proximity with settled people (empires). Charismatic figures are occasional. Nomadic preponderance never lasts long. Most of what the author describes in his Conclusions is not unique to Comanche and their culture - successful nomadic polities tend to behave in analogue fashion.
When adjacent to empires, nomadism can develop a strong commercial dynamic of interaction with them. One may describe the Comanche way of life as "parasitic" and adaptive to empire - a "shadow empire" of sorts. The author tells it well: shifting to bison hunting thanks to the horse, the Comanche were forced to raid Apache for grain and vegetables. Such raiding also brought in livestock and captives. The surplus was sold to the surrounding empires. This was the beginning of the "raiding/raising industry" the Comanche developed and characterized them.
Comanche took to trading with a vengeance after they came in contact with settled societies. We have had similar phenomena in other times and places. The most illuminating example is the complex duality between sedentary China and nomads to the north. One of the outcomes was the Silk Road. See LATTIMORE (Inner Asian Frontiers of China, BARFIELD The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China 221 B.C. to AD 1757 (Studies in Social Discontinuity), or DI COSMO (Ancient China and its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History) as well as YÛ (Trade and Expansion in Han China: a Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations for compelling analogies. "Tributary systems" emerged there too (though never as unilateral as in Comancheria).
In the institutional field, we find analogies also with groups outside the Roman Empire. In particular, when in contact with vertically structured polities, institutional "copying" occurs. The ancient "Germans" emerged from a rather uniform Neolithic society of the northern European plains in response to Roman power structures and opportunities for contact and trade. The "centralized, multilevel political system" of the Comanche (if it ever did exist) may simply be a mirror image of the societies with whom they dealt (the author admits to this on pg. 135).
Fifteen hundred years later, the novelty with Comancheria was that it lay between a pre-industrial society (New Spain) and an emerging industrial society (USA). Comanche took to arbitraging on a grand scale. They stole from New Spain so as to trade with America. The raid/trade involved horses, mules, weapons, hides and robes. This was no longer subsistence exchanges: this was a proto-capitalistic business expanding very rapidly. It destroyed Mexico and paved the way for US expansion into the south west. The unintended outcome was the destruction of the Comanche's business model.
The author makes much of the "social nature" of gifts and their bonding role in their relation to outsiders. I'm puzzled, however: the culture of gifts in the American Northwest rests on giving (potlatch) rather than receiving - see MAUSS The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. The Comanche extorted tribute and gave nothing is return - this might be an indication of a dysfunctional if adaptive social system.
If the author had indicated the import of the "gifts" in terms of New Spain's state budget would have helped. We know that the "tributes" to the nomads beyond the Long Wall accounted to about 10% of China's state budget. The matter in China is complex: "tribute" included the price for the acquisition of horses, which the Chinese were unable to raise. How momentous a drain was the "gifting" on New Spain's budget? The lack of quantitative data here can be confusing. Gifts to Comanche amounted to "several thousand pesos". On pg. 228 one learns that authorities rewarded a warrior's scalp with up to 100 pesos. The gifting must not have been extortionate...
The author is puzzled by Comanche "foreign policy". On one page, it is centralized ("top-down controlled activity" on pg. 273); on the next it is the opposite ("paraibos inability to curb raids stemmed from institutional restriction" pg. 274). On pg. 281 we read: "an example of these inclusive diplomatic processes is the 1822 treaty with Mexico...": no such treaty was discussed earlier in the book. The difficulty the author could not resolve is the contradiction between the directive view of foreign policy an "empire" requires and the obviously adaptive and bottom-up behavior of the Comanche society when looked at from within. This, however, was also typical with the Xiongnu and other nomadic groups, and reflects the nature of nomadism.
Comanche: did such a "nation" exist at all? Demography is not the author's strong suit (nor is quantitative analysis). From what I've gathered, a small band moved south in 1706 looking for horses. They might have been one thousand souls. Over the next two hundred years, the numbers waxed and waned, not going much beyond 40'000 Disease ravaged the numbers repeatedly. Comanche achieved such growth by ruthlessly acculturing captives, and other social groups. How a distinctive "Comanche culture" (if it ever existed, given the small starting base) travelled from generation to the next is open to debate. Horse, gun, and trade also contributed in transforming the social relations within the group and a coarsening, which the author describes splendidly in Chapter 6. To call this a "nation" with a stable "culture" strains belief. We have here mongrelization ("ethnic incorporation) on a grand scale.
The author treats the topic of raiding for people quite poorly. He fails to connect the facts and numbers. Unlike horses, humans do not travel easily and captives slow down a retreating horse-mounted warriors. Comanche raided people for forced inclusion in the tribe, for resale as domestic slaves (a more limited market than exploitation in mines or plantations); they also returned them for ransom. The numbers are not spectacular. Between 1816 and 1821, 400 people were taken away yearly (pg. 223); this amounts to 1% of the putative Comanche. In 1849 the total of slaves was 800 as against 20'000 Comanche. I might be wrong, but the fault lies in failing to show the quantitative (i.e. economic) importance of the phenomenon.
The description of Comanche society (pg. 247) is not a pretty picture. It is one dominated by militarism and greed. This is not surprising: "parasitic" societies tend to simplify around the core economic function (we see this with biological parasites too). One wonders whether this crude alignment on economic goals might not have contributed to the Comanche undoing. One is reminded of the sudden rise and fall of the Qin empire: "Ultimately, war was fought not for gain, but for loss, to expend energies and wealth that would otherwise accumulate..." (see LEWIS The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (History of Imperial China)).
The incorporation of Comancheria into the territory of the US spelled the end of the "parasitic" way of life of the Comanche. The commercial business that was the basis of Comanche preponderance suddenly came to an end. It probably did not help that an industrial state found entrepreneurs ready to supply horses and mules in competition with the Comanche. The Comanche business model was partly revived after 1865, when Comanche began raiding cattle out of Texas toward New Mexico. The US finally put a stop to that. The collapse of the Comanche business opportunities would seem to be the most plausible explanation for the precipitous decline of the nation.
The author weaves in a story of Comanche depleting bison herds. The way he presents it, the story makes little sense. Comanche culling was half the natural death rate, or less 5% of the very fertile bison herd. This would not seem enough to explain the precipitous drop of the herd by 50% over a decade. Given the drought years in the 1850s, over-culling the herd would have conserved the rest, so it was pro-bison rather than anti-bison. It is unclear how 100'000 horses and mules could have driven 7 million bison into a tailspin. One discovers, however, that unbeknownst to the observers innocent cattle by the million had begun roaming Texas.
For all its talks about "empire", the book remains more descriptive than analytical - or at least the analytical framework could be improved. As a result, the book has significant structural problems. Its merit is to have pointed out the vital role the Comanche played in shaping the future of the American South West. With a firmer pen, the book could have been a landmark.