Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

Following a brilliant Introduction by the authors (although technically, editors and commentators), the reader is provided with a Preface to the aforementioned Posthumous Edition written by Clausewitz's widow: Marie von Clausewitz, born Countess Bruhl, First Lady in Waiting to Her Royal Highness, Princess Wilhelm. I was fascinated to learn from Frau Clausewitz that her late husband "arranged his papers, sealed them in individual packages, gave each one a label, and bid a sad farewell to this activity he held so dear. [A military transfer required Clausewitz to set his writing aside.]...The packages that his hand had sealed were not opened until after his death. It is those posthumous works that are now published in the following volumes, just exactly as they were found, without a word added or deleted."

Following Frau Clausewitz's Preface, the authors arrange the material within five sections: The Genius of Strategy, The Theater of Strategy, Thinking Strategy, The Virtues of Strategy, and Beyond Strategy. Brief but insightful comments are provided to introduce each section. As indicated previously, the basic text is a condensation of those ideas most relevant to the given subject. Here are a few brief excerpts

When discussing The Genius of Strategy, Clausewitz observes that war is "a wondrous trinity when considered as a whole and in relation to its predominant tendencies, composed of the inherent violence of its fundamental nature, the hatred and enmity that must be considered as a blind natural instinct; of the interplay of probability and chance in war that give the mind room to act freely; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, making it subject to pure reason."

Clausewitz on Thinking Strategy: "Strategy is the use of the engagement to achieve the objectives of the war; therefore, it must give an aim to the whole military action that corresponds to the goal of war. Strategy, then, determines the plans for individual campaigns, and orders the engagements within them."

Clausewitz on The Virtues of Strategy: "Moral forces are among the most important topics of war. They are the spirit that permeates the entire aspect of war; they adhere more quickly and more readily to the will,, which sets into motion and guides the entire panoply of forces. At the same time, they merge at one with the will, because the will is itself a moral force. Unfortunately, they are not the sort of thing that can be codified in books, because they resist being grouped by number or class. They prefer to be seen or felt."

What the authors (i.e. editors and commentators) of this book have done is quite masterful. First, they devised strategies of their own to organize the material and then to select appropriate portions from more than one thousand pages of Clausewitz's writings. Next, they created an Introduction to that material, followed by a truly interesting Preface by Frau Clausewitz. Then they created brief comments to introduce each section. Finally, they selected what they call "Sources for Sidebars" to assist the reader's further study. I also commend them for resisting what must have been a strong temptation to formulate groups of "lessons" or "key points" to conclude chapters. They also resisted the temptation to add a "Summary" section in which they suggest what they view as the most important correlations between Clausewitz's ideas and the 21st century business world. The reader is thus responsible for drawing such correlations. Those who share my high regard for this book are urged to read Sun Tzu's The Art of War, Machiavelli's The Prince, Crainer's The Management Century, and Strategic Thinking for the Next Economy which is edited by Cusumano and Markides.

After having read the book, I must say that Clausewitz's ideas are still not terribly relevant to business strategy. As the introduction points out, the circumstances of war and battle are simply different than in business. Making a connection with the customer is more important than wiping out a competitor. Also, you may be cooperating with a competitor in one case, and competing in another.

The principles that carry over are that strategy must be developed in the context of what the organization's objectives are, and tactics must be pursued in ways that effectively take advantage of the strategy. In all circumstances, surprise is the element that we should expect, and quickly shift our focus to turn it to our advantage. Moral force is important in business as it is in war. Keeping attack and defense in your mind at the same time is also important. Many of the lessons about how attacks will usually fail are well taken, except for the potential of technology or new business models to make a difference. Clausewitz assumed a more static state of affairs with regard to technology and military innovation than actually occurs now.

I can even more heartily endorse this book for people who want to learn from what Clausewitz had to say about war. That subject is over 90 percent of the book's contents. I rate the book at over 5 stars for that purpose. You will probably be fascinated, as I was, by the opening section in which Clausewitz plays a role as a secret negotiator to cause the withdrawal of the Prussians from both French and Russian armies during Napoleon's invasion of Russia.

After you finish reading this book, think about Clausewitz's assumption that war is a constant state of affairs. Should we be assuming today that fierce business competition is the norm? Or should we be assuming that a race to innovate is the nature of the task? Or should both views be held? To the extent that innovation is the battlefield today in business, then perhaps we need to also consider those who think and write about how to be more effective and rapid innovators. Those lessons are different from the ones described here.

Look for ways to improve the value of what you do . . . always!