Kurzbeschreibung
Original publisher: Washington : U.S. G.P.O., 2010. LC Number: KF27 .S39 2010m OCLC Number: (OCoLC)731720981 Subject: Helium -- Isotopes -- United States -- Management. Excerpt: ... 9 At the same time that production was declining, the demand for Helium-3 has been increasing since 9 - 11. Helium-3 has been a critical component in the portal radiation monitor programs at DHS and approximately 60,000 liters have been used in the current PVT systems alone. The ASP systems that Raytheon designed would have required, if a full acquisition had gone forward, approximately 200,000 liters of helium-3. The Department of Energy has its own radiation detection program in mega-ports with additional liters of helium-3 used in that program. Handheld and backpack radiation detection systems at DHS, DOE and also DOD are another ongo-ing source of expanded demand since 9 - 11. In addition to this new security-related source of demand, the Spallation Neutron Source project, also a DOE program was moving towards conclusion, with its main detector requiring an additional 17,000 liters. With countries around the world all pushing to get into SNS-style research, the global demand in coming years for He-lium-3 from these detectors alone is expected to exceed 100,000 liters. Since the shortage was inevitable, does it matter that DOE failed to see that their stockpile was evaporating? Yes, it absolutely does matter. If DOE had noticed the disconnect between growing demand and declining supply, they could have managed the stockpile with clear prioritization for highest use, and led an aggressive and timely search for alternatives to helium-3. These actions would have helped us avoid this crisis. It is astonishing that DOE did not see this coming. It also astonishes me that DNDO did not validate that sufficient resources of he-lium-3 were available for the ASP program. A cautious and reasonable analyst would have sought a complete accounting from DOE before wagering years of effort and h...