Ben Kiernan has realized a tour de force in clearly explaining to his readers the four usual ideological features of genocides: antiquity, agrarianism, racism, and expansionism. These ideological factors have motivated, in greater or lesser degrees, all military, civilian, racist, or religious perpetrators of genocide over time (p. 572). Kiernan focuses most of his analysis on the six centuries since 1400 C.E (p. 3).
To identify present and past genocides, Kiernan mainly draws on the 1948 C.E. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and on legal judgments based on that convention for consistency purposes (p. 12). The crime of genocide requires the act of "killing," or another of the specific acts, committed with "intent to destroy" at least part of a protected group (p. 17).
Although Blood and Soil mainly documents genocides committed by Europeans, they have no monopoly on that crime (p. 6). Think for example about Maoism in China (pp. 512-38), Rwanda in Central Africa (pp. 554-68), or non-state actor al Qaeda (pp. 596-604), to quote three recent examples. Kiernan excludes some genocides from his book due to space constraints. Think for instance about the Mongols' slaughter of the inhabitants of Baghdad in 1258 C.E., the Spaniards' destruction of the Inca empire in the 16th century C.E., or the Congo Free State of Belgium's King Leopold II at the turn of the 20th century C.E. (p. 38).
Kiernan notes that genocides are usually undertaken by radical, unstable regimes, who often try to squash any domestic dissent by focusing attention on an external, supposedly common threat (pp. 34, 55-58, 339-49, 393, 409-14, 441, 505, 510-11, 547, 559, 567, 569, 590). Furthermore, Kiernan observes that technological, political, organizational changes that happened in the 20th century make it possible to commit genocide on an "industrial" scale (pp. 393, 454). Think for example about the huge advances in weaponry and the progress made in both communication and transportation in the last 100 years.
Kiernan often quotes verbatim (would-be) perpetrators of genocide in different periods and locations so that readers better recognize the four recurring reasons that are usually advanced to justify genocide.
1) Antiquity: The destruction of Carthage by Rome sets a precedent for genocides committed by Europeans (pp. 51, 58, 186, 387, 422, 605). Al Qaeda has a politicized cult of Islamic antiquity for its projected caliphate (pp. 599-600). In contrast, Russia's Bolsheviks and China's Communist revolutionaries sought a sharp break with their respective country's past, seeking all-out modernization (pp. 394, 512).
2) Agrarianism: The more ancient image of the Garden of Eden, whether as pristine ethnic preserve, uninhabited pastoral idyll, or superior agricultural economy, was widely used by European colonists as an excuse to deprive natives from land ownership, and in some cases, obliterate their presence (pp. 79, 165-69, 217-18, 284, 311-18, 327, 367, 374, 423, 436, 486, 605). Interestingly, Russia's Bolsheviks and China's Communist revolutionaries were against the peasantry because they considered it an alternative power structure to be crushed (pp. 489-503, 526-31). Although the world is increasingly urbanized and industrialized, the aversion to cities and industries, which springs from this same faith in rural virtues, remains potent in the mind of many genocidal perpetrators (pp. 32, 424, 430-32, 536-38, 545, 564, 575, 580, 592, 603-06). For example, Serb perpetrators of the Bosnian genocide regarded their Muslim victims as city dwellers, in contrast to Serb peasants (p. 592).
3) Racism: Many perpetrators have used biological metaphors to justify genocidal massacres (pp. 280-81, 309, 313, 375, 388, 394, 431, 439, 450-51, 475, 483, 559, 566, 587-88, 602). For example, the slogan "Nits make Lice" was used to justify the massacres of Native Americans in the American West and Aborigines in the Australian outback in the 19th century C.E. Other examples include the comparison of Jews to "lice" by the Nazis or the reduction of the Shi'a community to the locus "where the disease lies" according to al Qaeda (p. 606).
4) Expansionism: Imperial and territorial conquests often result in the extermination of local populations (pp. 77, 88, 95, 99-100, 248, 270, 284, 374, 386, 438, 446, 453-55). Think for example about what happened to many Amerindians who were "in the way" of white settlers before and after the independence of the U.S. (pp. 213-48, 310-63). Kiernan also observes that (future) genocidal leaders regularly hail disproportionately from previously "lost" territories beyond the supposedly shrinking prewar homeland. Think for instance about the Young Turks, Nazi Leaders, or the Khmer Rouge (pp. 393, 433, 551-52).
Although some quotes of (would-be) perpetrators of genocide can look and feel like delirium, they should be taken seriously to prevent future genocides (pp. 569, 606). Kiernan demonstrates with much conviction that would-be perpetrators of genocide often telegraph in advance what is awaiting the "undesirables" on their target list once they are at their mercy.
Here follow two recent examples:
1) From 1986, Hutu chauvinist historian Ferdinand Nahimana became a highly influential, multimedia ideologue of the Hutu resistance to Tutsi intrusion which culminated in the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi (pp. 560-62).
2) In 1987, the Committee of the Arab Gathering in Darfur, Sudan, sent an ominous letter of ethnic complaint about non-Arab Africans living in the region to the Sudanese prime minister in Khartoum. As the cliché says, the rest is history (pp. 594-96).
As a side note, Kiernan could leverage his in-depth expertise on the subject to write another book that helps countries better deal with the aftermath of genocides. Prosecuting the worst perpetrators of genocides is not enough (p. 415). The recent controversy in the U.S. about what happened to the Armenians living under Ottoman rule during WWI shows that no reconciliation can be seriously considered as long as the past is not dealt with appropriately (pp. 395-415).