In The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, William Rottschaefer attempts to build what he calls a synoptic view of moral agency. He hopes to ground human moral activity within the sphere of natural science, rather than leaving it to religion or a priori philosophizing. The book is an excellent summary of the present state of out knowledge, but a few gaps and weaknesses prevent my endorsing it fully. The author's prose is dense, making the small print book even harder to read than it need be.
The author develops a model of moral agency that includes four levels. 1) The base level created by evolutionary forces, including our learned tendencies and basic beliefs. 2) The behavioral level, a set of moral beliefs and desires that motivate our actions. 3) The reflective level, the set of normative beliefs that influence the lower levels. 4) The self-referential level, which has the notion of a separate self acting morally.
After discussing his model, Rottschaefer spends a great deal of effort trying to show that the human capacity for moral action was created by evolutionary forces, in particular natural selection. He then gives a detailed account of the development and extension of empathy in children. Rottschaefer argues that empathy has its origin in natural selection, and that it can serve as one of the basic capacities in the first level of his model.
The rest of his book is dedicated to an overview of the leading theories of behavioral development, including Skinnerian behaviorism, Piaget and Kohlberg's theories of cognitive development, and Bandura's social cognitive theory. He spends some time dealing with the philosophy of neuroscience, arguing that cognitive and behavioral levels are not necessarily reducible to mechanism.
The book is a triumphant overview of the major components of developmental theories, especially cognitive theory. His discussion is dense but lucid, and graduate students and academics in sociology, philosophy, and psychology ought to find the book quite stimulating. His discussion of infant and toddler empathy is fascinating.
Some caveats need to be attached, though. First, as with most practitioners in evolutionary psychology, Rottschaefer assumes at the outset that moral capacities are products of evolution, and in particular natural selection. For a biological theory of moral agency to have any meaning, they assume, the moral capacity must have had some utility or advantage in our remote past.
As with all such stories about the origins of a given human trait, there is little evidence to back it up. We have few closely related species to draw from in any comparative study of human traits, and cross cultural studies cannot remove the effects of universal human experiences such a birth, the presence of a mother, and life in small groups. Indeed, the fact that such experiences are universal is one of the major problems with assigning them a "genetic" or "evolutionary" origin. It is possible that these features are in fact the result of evolution. It is also possible that many of these features are due to the dynamics of self organization among living animals. Stuart Kauffman argues explicitly for this latter option in his popular book, At Home in the Universe.
Alternatives to evolution aside, there is no reason to assume that a trait with an evolutionary origin is the result of natural selection. Rottschaefer gives the alternatives to selection only the briefest discussion. I don't think it would weaken his model if human morality was an emergent trait rather than an evolved one, or if it evolved by chance rather than through selection. In the absence of a compelling case for an evolved basis for morality based on comparative data between species, Rottschaefer's arguments about evolution seem irrelevant. Unless we know which species had moral capacities and when, and what the consequences are, every evolutionary argument is just a story. Since this book deals only with humans, I must assume that Rottschaefer is telling a grand yarn, rather than presenting concrete evidence that morality is an evolved capacity.
Although his description of human empathy is detailed and interesting, it is not clear that empathy can be used in the way Rottschaefer wants. Empathy is a response to the sight of others in distress. It is a long way, indeed, from helping children in Africa or believing that contraception is immoral. Rottschaefer might argue that empathy is just one of his Base Level capacities, but he does not examine any other candidates in detail.
Also, Rottschaefer's case for the evolutionary origin of empathy is quite weak. In addition to the more general concerns outlined above, others must be added. Rottschaefer states that 1) empathy is present at all ages in humans, 2) all humans display empathy, 3) empathy involves the limbic system, which is evolutionarily old. Each of these arguments has its own limitations, but even together they are not sufficient. Without comparisons between related species in different habitats, or unrelated species in the same habitats, the above evidence neither favors nor weakens the assertion that empathy has a genetic or evolved basis.
Finally, despite his mention of the limbic system, Rottschaefer's chapter on the neurphysiology of moral agency has no mention of brain areas that might function as moral circuits. Such areas as the amygdala, the hippocampus, the ventral tegmental area, and the inferior temporal cortex might play a role in recognizing and responding to distress, but they are not discussed. Instead, the "neurophysiology" chapter is really a chapter on the philosophical debates surrounding reductionism.
Overall, the book is an excellent overview of human moral learning and development. Its summaries and critiques of cognitive theories are very enlightening and useful. The evolutionary and neurobiological sections of the book are incomplete and lacking in depth. I would not recommend this book to anyone outside of the relevant fields of science and philosophy.
