Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

The author offers a few worthwhile criticisms of Rand's philosophy, but there is far too much spite. He regularly claims her philosophy is vague and superficial, simply her subjective prejudices, lacks empirical support, and consists of verbalisms having little to do with reality. Despite this, he agrees with significant chunks of it! In the Introduction he says, "None of Rand's views on human nature, epistemology, history, ethics, or politics bother me all that much." Why then all the spite?

To a great extent the Introduction is one long rant and could be skipped or read after the rest of the book. Such a start undercuts the author's credibility and highlights his emotional dislike of Rand. Then there are his own flawed ideas. For example, he says there is no such thing as induction, yet repeatedly makes generalizations about Rand.

Chapter 1 - Theory of Human Nature

The author gives two basic conceptions of human nature - naturalistic and utopian. He considers himself an extreme naturalist and Rand a utopian. Are there no other alternatives? Rand was surely an idealist (ordinary sense, not the philosophical one). She thought the world could be a better place. If he completely disagrees with that, he is as much fatalistic as naturalistic.

He regards her philosophy not as the search for truth, but her means of projecting the ideal man. Her standard of human greatness is so unrealistic no man could ever meet it. Only her fictional characters could. Of course, some of them are near superhero status, but that doesn't imply real people can't be geniuses, rational, courageous, or have integrity.

The author says Rand's theory of human nature is based on the human mind having complete control over the body and will. Saying that a man must "create himself" is a lot like saying man has no given nature. This is a gross exaggeration. She held there are automatic mechanisms, which undercuts "complete control." She also had plenty to say about man's given nature. How did Nyquist miss it?

Rand says the ideal man has no "inner conflicts" between his reason and emotions. The author says this is wrong; conflicts are between different desires. This is a valid point for real people much of the time. I doubt that Rand would have disagreed. Nyquist has an "inner conflict" between his reason and emotions at least when it comes to Rand. Emotions aside, he finds much to agree with. Let emotion enter, and his antagonism overwhelms him.

He critiques Rand and her disciple Leonard Peikoff on the choice to think and innate emotions. Peikoff says there are no innate emotions and wrote some things I haven't found in Rand's writing, so it's hard to know if she would have agreed. In any case he makes some valid criticisms of their claims, especially on the choice to think. Peikoff claimed there is no `why', and Nyquist rightly jumps on it. On the other hand, he makes false or dubious claims and misrepresents them. For example, Rand wrote that man's emotional mechanism was tabula rasa. However, she also wrote that the physical pleasure-pain mechanism of man's body is automatic and innate, which Nyquist ignores. This undercuts his depiction of Rand's position. Also, "blank slate" does not mean "no slate."

He claims Rand could not bring herself to reject the fundamental impulses toward religion, man's spiritual salvation. She wanted to save men's souls, but instead of looking to God, thought she could do it herself.

Chapter 2 - Theory of History

Much of this is about Peikoff's theory of history. Rand wrote very little on the topic. The author rightfully criticizes Peikoff's theory for its exaggerated importance assigned to philosophers. He claims instead that history is driven by more practical matters like human sentiments and desires and their unintended consequences. A good example is money qua medium of exchange. He endorses Vilfredo Pareto's idea that desires and sentiments are the primary determinants of the social order.

The chapter is not without the author's own misconceptions. For example: "There is absolutely no reason to believe that ideas become more influential as their degree of abstractness increases. If anything, they probably become less influential. . . . How can principles so vague and indefinite possibly guide man's concrete actions?" He seems oblivious to the phenomena that "more abstract" extends the range of application. For example, in biological taxonomy genus is more abstract than specie. Genus applies to multiple species and thus more organisms.

Chapter 3 - Theory of Knowledge

He critiques Rand's claim about the significance of the problem of universals and Rand's solution to it, which rests heavily on her theory of measurement omission. I largely agree with the author's criticisms here, especially on measurement omission. It is not that measurements are never omitted, but that she grossly exaggerated their role and was inconsistent.

The author's comments on abstraction show his misunderstanding of it in regard to concept-formation. Abstraction is the selection of common characteristics of the referents and thus central. In contrast Nyquist says it is purely secondary and approvingly cites Santayana that "the abstract is what is less familiar to the speaker." Huh?

He misunderstands Rand's words or distorts them for polemical purposes. One of many examples: "Rand's most serious epistemological error is her assumption that all human knowledge is ultimately conceptual in nature and can only be formulated through a process of deliberate conscious reasoning." But in Rand's own words, knowledge is "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation" (ITOE, 1979, 45).

He notes that Ayn Rand did not solve the "problem of induction" and he agrees with Karl Popper about it.

Chapter 4 - Theory of Metaphysics

The author says he detests metaphysics; it's too abstract, speculative, and non-empirical. I agree when the metaphysics is of somebody like Hegel, who gets Nyquist's attention. Moving on to Rand, he goes after her axioms and oft-repeated "A is A" as verbalisms empty of empirical content. (I think there is more to them than he acknowledges, when their meaning is elaborated.) He even agrees with them on some level, but criticizes the way Rand and other Objectivists use them polemically against other people.

The author's own view on logic is common but incoherent. On page 98, he says the following. "Reality is neither logical nor illogical; it just is. Logic is a quality that applies only to the realm of thought." . . . "Those who, like Rand, assume that reality is logical, are guilty of confusing our ideas about reality with reality itself." (I have even seen some who call themselves Objectivists express this view.) "Our thoughts about reality must be logical if they are to correctly represent reality." I must ask: How can thoughts -- logical or illogical -- be compared to reality if reality is neither logical or illogical (in his view)?

Chapter 5 - Theory of Morality

The author wholly agrees with Hume's attack on the so-called naturalistic fallacy, that one can derive an `ought' from an `is.' He contends Rand's morality is a complete failure, critiques her positions like `life is the standard of value' and the tension between bare survival and survival appropriate to man's nature, and altruism versus egoism. As an aside, this issue is often debated elsewhere as "survival versus flourishing." Despite all the criticisms, he believes there are some elements of truth in the Objectivist ethics.

One of several topics he undertakes is the dictum honesty is the best policy. After noting some exceptions given by Leonard Peikoff, Nyquist declares: "Once you admit that your moral principles do not apply `under all circumstances,' then you have, in effect, given yourself the right to break your moral principles any time you choose." Really? It's a policy, not a rule without exception. It may mean that the policy is a not quite as broad as expressed earlier. An exception to `all X are Y' leaves `some X are Y' or `most X are Y', not `no X is Y'.

Chapter 6 - Theory of Politics

He starts on the wrong foot. Citing Peikoff: "Politics, like ethics, is a normative branch of philosophy." Nyquist says: "No where is the basic problem of Objectivist theory of politics more aptly expressed . . . Peikoff is expressing the Objectivist view that political philosophy is primarily concerned, not with the basic facts of political conduct in the real world, but on how politics ought to be conducted." I disagree. Peikoff is saying a political theory, no matter whose, follows some ethical principles. For example, some would say "it's moral to rob Peter to pay Paul." Two pages later Nyquist in effect says the same thing: "the overwhelming influence of sentiment on political thinking".

Oddly enough, he concedes to Rand "her every normative claim about social, economic and political relations." Nevertheless, he can't resist inserting ridiculous comments. "She suffered from the delusion that political problems could be solved by manipulating conceptual constructions."

"It should be obvious that Rand and her followers have little if any, notion of how many real-life obstacles stand in the way of the implementation of their theory." And where is Nyquist's vaunted empirical support for this? I doubt he knows more than a handful of her followers, so he can't know what they think about this. Two obvious and enormous real-life obstacles are the prevalence of the sentiment that it's moral to rob Peter to pay Paul and business should be heavily government-regulated. I'd bet the vast majority of her followers would state these real-life obstacles instantly.

Chapter 7 - Theory of Aesthetics

Like he indicates in the Introduction, his fiercest antagonism towards Rand is inspired by her views on aesthetics. Reportedly Rand often inferred others' philosophical positions on the basis of their aesthetic valuations, and she had many negative ones. There was a lot of art considered great by many that Rand despised. Oddly enough, his antagonism to Rand's aesthetics is quite constrained in this chapter.

Chapter 8 - Final Thoughts

He tackles the question of whether Objectivist principles are harmful or beneficial to those who accept them. He believes beneficial in many cases. But they are "useless to those who know how to think critically or are familiar with the facts of history and the social sciences." What a non-empirical claim and subjective prejudice! How does Nyquest presume to know so much about so many people he doesn't know?

He turns to the question of what effect Objectivism will have on the future. With intrigue like that, I will make my final comment. For those who might be tempted to throw the book in the trash after encountering a few criticisms of Rand and her philosophy, they will at least miss some food for thought.

In search good supplement to my continuing rehabilitation from my Ayn Rand addiction, I looked to this book. I wanted a solid rebuttal of some of the contradictions I had gleaned off of Rand's writing. As Greg will tell you, academic philosophers have largely ignored Rand, and he promises to clear all that up. Needless to say, I was excited to read this book, because as much as I respect Rand's philosophy, I haven't heard any criticisms. Maybe I was just being sucked in to the infamous Randian cult lifestyle, I wanted a complete picture.

However, I was let down. There are points worth noting, some mistakes of Rand that are elucidated, some knowledge to be had from this book... But most if not all of it, I feel, was gone about in an unbecoming to a philosopher and sometimes childish manner. As far as tackling Ayn Rand goes, I was expecting Nyquist to show her up on her own ground. That is, clear and unambiguous discourse on errors in thinking Rand had committed. Not so. My expectations were shattered.

This book is littered with personal slander of Ayn Rand that supposedly discredits objectivism. Constant misrepresentations of her philsophy, either through ignorance by Nyquist or maybe he thought the reader wouldn't notice. Appeal after appeal to a "that's just how people are, everyone says so". Ayn Rand probably knows best of all that her philosophy and "people" don't match the best, as you can tell from her fiction. Often Nyquist simply stoops to generating controversy by using a word in a different sense that Rand has.

More often was a pulling my hair in intellectual agony than picking out any tidbits of worthwile criticism. I want my money back Greg. Paypal me.

A long-term "student of Objectivism," I welcome books which offer an intelligent, thoughtful, unbiased evaluation of Rand's ideas. Rand herself said, "Think!" Thinking is good for everyone, and that is just what Nyquist has done.

As background and preparation, he has undertaken the strenuous initiative of seriously studying a great many prominent thinkers and philosophers who wrote work relevant to this book. Perhaps because he has maintained a website featuring critical discussion of Rand's work, he has drawn fire in some of the book's reviews. While there are passages and words which are going to be inflammatory in this book, I personally chose to ignore all of these and focus on only the abundant reason and many supported conclusions herein presented.

It seems that Nyquist studied Rand quite well; I believe in one or two places, he missed Rand's meaning or intent; overall, it is a good representation with references, albeit with many times quotes by Leonard Peikoff written after Rand's death. At points, it appears as if Peikoff is clarifying or even extending Rand; yet it seems true that now, for most people, Peikoff speaks fully and finally for Rand. These days, even the new edition covers of her novels indicate they are authored by "Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff."

This book begins by noting that Rand's works make her one of the most widely read philosophers of the twentieth century and one of the most enduring writers of any generation, yet Rand's work has not been subject to a genuinely intelligent and penetrating criticism. For me, the books of Albert Ellis and Jeff Walker are intelligent as well as penetrating. Nevertheless, Nyquist is right that there are few (or no) other books which challenge Rand from the standpoint of academic philosophy, and at the same time explain the more technical terms so that laypeople can easily understand the meanings and intent.

In other words, for many Rand readers, no study of philosophy has been pursued beyond the works of Rand, yet some books critical of her seem to assume a philosophy degree. Nyquist attempts to bridge this gap by explaining the meaning of concepts he uses in terms the average person can follow. This is a forward step in making Rand's ideas more widely known and evaluated.

One of Nyquist's most striking points for me is his pointing out that Rand grossly overlooked formulating any intelligent discussion of the issues grappled with by thinkers such as Burke, Weber, Michel, Schumpeter, Pareto, or numerous others.

I also agree with the key premise of the book, that many of Rand's key ideas do not accurately reflect human nature. However, I differ somewhat with the author's means of reaching that conclusion. Essentially, Nyquist believes that man/woman has a certain, rather regrettable, nature and that he/she has always behaved and will always behave accordingly. In contrast, Rand's views were idealized (more on that later.) The author finds abundant evidence that strength, force, manipulation, even deceit, have regularly trumped empathy, reason, negotiation, honesty. He feels that this is the given character of man, who is doomed to exist in a confusing world of selfish and conflicting desires, sentiments, passions, emotions.

This characterization of the nature of humankind is not new but has its roots in a very ancient doctrine which is central to Judeo-Christian theology, holding that man's very nature is sinful, that humans are born sinful, that no amount of good acts are sufficient to convince the deity and his earthly church representatives otherwise, and that it is by the grace of the deity alone that they are accepted for "salvation," provided of course that they keep faith with the churches.

Rand critically examined this doctrine at length and I highly recommend reading what she had to say about it (and other problems she delineated with theology, more below); but suffice to say for now, that this doctrine of original sin and sinful nature, besides being an unproven matter accepted on faith alone, has had countless derivative, corrosively destructive, effects on the human spirit for as long as it has been in existence. I agree with Rand on her refutation of this doctrine.

Nyquist disagrees with many of Rand's assertions: that man's life as man is the proper standard of value; that happiness is life's purpose; that honesty is always the best policy; that evil is ultimately impotent; that reason is one's only judge of values or one's only guide to action; that sex is an expression of one's highest values. He calls her philosophy "Utopian to the core;" and feels that little historical or current empirical evidence exists to support it.

Rand is centrally wrong or at best, half-right, about the nature of man; and, as a consequence, her theories of knowledge (epistemology), metaphysics, morality, politics, history, and aesthetics are either confused, corrupted, or both, and must fall, asserts Nyquist.

He goes further: intellectuals in general are pretty useless.

A notable failure on Rand's part, says Nyquist, is what he terms her emphasis on empty verbalizing, especially in the empirically important area of metaphysics. On the other hand, he himself quotes numerous writings of philosophers; could not any similar criticism be leveled at those others as he levels at Rand?

In epistemology, there is a well-known problem with inductive reasoning. The scientific method rests not only on induction to develop a premise, but also deduction, to test that premise to find where it fails to describe reality. Thus has physics, for example, progressed from Newton to Einstein to quantum mechanics to string theory, and it continues to test.

Rand, on the other hand, says Nyquist, relies exclusively on induction and abstraction, and her approach fails to solve the inductive problem of "how many cases are enough to prove a point?" Here I would observe that, in some instances, statistics and induction are useful in scientific investigation, for one example, double blind studies used in medical research; statistics used in areas of research such as sociology, politics, marketing.

Nyquist advises that ideas have relatively little to do with causing emotions, motivations, and behavior. This is in marked contrast to the emphasis given thinking (cognition) by modern psychology. Albert Ellis, in his book "Is Objectivism a Religion," admits to having been either first influenced or in early accord with Rand's concept of thoughts as an important (not the only) cause of emotion and his derivative Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) accords with this recognition. Ellis has been in clinical practice some 60 years and is one of the world's most respected psychologists and prolific writers of books on human behavior.

The research and writings of Aaron Beck, M.D., David Burns, M.D., Matthew McKay and many others; as well a voluminous body of research and clinical evidence, accord with this recognition that thinking and common thinking errors are important in determining emotional health or illness and corresponding motivation. Today's gold-standard treatment is cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Nyquist would equally exclude influences of environment (for example he says that children learn language due to an inborn drive to do so, presumably instead of modeling language); this is a matter that is not settled in the field of psychology. It is believed that both heredity and environment each play significant parts in early human development.

Nyquist posits that action-directing emotion is nearly always a function of frustration or fulfillment of objectives and not of philosophies as Rand claims. There is truth in this but, as always, it is a matter of degree. There is also credibility in the central tenet of Rand's that men and women can build character and live successfully and happily by the judicious use of their minds.

Please however take into account that this endorsement in no way extends to Rand's subsequent ideas of "psychology," of which she had no known formal training, and which were largely speculation. Recognizing that thoughts do affect emotions and behavior is not the same thing as formulating a system of psychology from the armchair. Dr. Ellis, mentioned above, wrote an entire book delineating the many differences between his REBT system and elements of Rand's system ("Is Objectivism a Religion?")

Many if not most psychologists would disagree with ideas Rand claimed followed from her main premises (examples below.) And well they would disagree, as they make their living working with real people; if Rand's entire system of "psychology" were to be used for this purpose, as it was during the days of Nathaniel Branden Institute, it would be expected to have the same disastrous results it did then, both for Rand and Branden and many of the students and others.

In this regard, please see the books of Ellis and Walker. Walker is not a psychologist, but he has assembled hundreds of quotes from people who were in Rand's inner circle. The books of the Brandens also are relevant concerning Objectivist "psychology."

One of Rand's major, and to me, most valid, points is the following. Heretofore, most major philosophies and systems of morality have been intricately tied to religions. The majority of Americans claim to be religious. Presumably they believe the central teaching that commandments have been received by revelation from a deity to a few chosen men and women who went on to assemble them in writings which have been spread widely among humans usually as bibles. These claims of seeing and hearing deities have been taken on faith. Thus, for example, on our currency is printed, "In God We Trust."

To these writings of revelations were added more accounts and stories over generations; some of these were notably edited out, for example by the early Catholic church, to suit later purposes. The end result is a system, such as Christianity, in which we have stories of the creation, the garden, the fall of man, the flood, heaven, hell, coming of the messiah, etc.; lessons; commandments; institutions; and rituals.

While the moral imperatives may be perfectly valid, people tend to be skeptical and rightly so. Some thinkers will believe the complete system by the letter; others might believe that the deity exists but that he did not speak to those who claim revelations; others may say he did not specify all or some of those particular commandments; others could feel that the commandments are fine but that there are hardly enough of them to cover all situations and they are too vague; others will ignore the whole, the alternative being those human desires, wishes, whims, and emotions leading to aggression, manipulation, deceit, the behavior author describes.

Rand sees this as the reason the history of humankind has been bloody, and her assertions are credible. She felt that religion was better than no morality at all, but she saw the weaknesses in it and the need to take morality from religion to reason.

I believe that what Rand recognized about this was world-changing and fundamental. She said that the burden of proof is not on those who dispute the existence of a deity, but on those who claim a deity exists. This was Rand at her best. And as long as churches come up with rationalizations but no proof, the unproven elements and mysticism and the basic reliance on faith will always weaken the credibility of the entirety.

Rand also recognized that besides the fact that we are all unique individuals, we are interdependent beings. If we have any hope of resolving our differing interests, we need morality. Her concept of inalienable rights correlates with our U.S. Constitution - can you imagine America without the Constitution? - and rights call for a supporting morality. She discussed the principle of trade as most appropriate for human beings; trade, to succeed and continue, requires morality.

Besides resting on yet-unproven precepts and containing vague commandments, religions have propounded the idea of a speculative eternal life after death; Rand would have morality assist us, not in some unproven eternal life, but rather in the life we all know we have, the one here on this earth for a specific time.

Many people, she pointed out, squander the one and only life that is proven, this one, because they count on tales of a life after death, a contradiction, she said, without evidence.

As to formulating a secular morality, that should not be insurmountable. Work on this has already been underway for centuries in the development of common law, enactment of legislation by elected officials, and enforcement of laws by means of civil or criminal damages, fines, community service or other enforcements. Our common law comes from England; other countries have civil law, which is a secular system which differs in some respects. Legal systems rest on the recognition that morality is both right and necessary.

This does not necessarily mean larger government; it does mean that more people should know what is expected of them and what they can expect from others and what results will follow for specific behavior.

Thus, for example, Rand proposed that people should get the idea that no one has the right to deliberately take the life of another yet continue to live their own life; killing is making a choice that carries consequences. You can readily see the difference here between the bible commandment "thou shall not kill", which seems like preaching and has done little to stem killing, and Rand's concept of education, voluntary choice, and corresponding consequences.

Likewise Rand formulated a secular concept of private property and its protection, again, necessary in a capitalist economy.

Please note my disagreement with Rand as to many of the further specifics she derives and prescribes. Rand negates altruism as a fundamental tenet of her suggested morality, claiming it is an evil precept; there was no proof of this mind-boggling assertion. Nyquist aptly points out that Rand's view of altruism categorized it as evil:

(Quoting Rand): "It was the morality of altruism that undercut America and is destroying her." (1961,62) "Altruism is incompatible with freedom, capitalism and individual rights. One cannot combine the pursuit of happiness with the moral status of a sacrificial animal." (1964b,95)

In this regard, understand that Rand used certain words in a sense very different than those words are used commonly. As defined by the American Heritage Dictionary New College Edition (1980), sacrifice is defined: "The act of offering something to a deity in homage, especially the ritual SLAUGHTER of an animal or person for this purpose; the forfeiture of something highly valued, as an idea, object, or friendship, for the sake of someone or something considered to have a GREATER VALUE or claim; a relinquishing of something at less than its presumed value." Altruism is defined: "Concern for the welfare of others, as opposed to egoism; selflessness."

The sense in which Rand commonly used the word "sacrifice" accords more with the words "masochism" or "immolation," diagnosable mental illnesses; and the sense in which she used the word "altruism" accords more with the words "codependence" or "neuroticism," diagnosable mental illnesses.

Example of common usage - sacrifice (relinquishing at less than presumed value): Businesses often make sales at "sacrifice" prices because the item did not sell and room must be made for new merchandise
Example of common usage - altruism (selflessness): Mothers and fathers are often selfless in caring for their young
Example of common usage - sacrifice (sake of greater value or claim): Rand declared that she would step in front of a bullet to save her husband Frank because he was that important to her
Example of common usage - altruism (concern for welfare of others): Working in teaching, firefighting, law enforcement, nursing, psychology, military; not because these careers make one rich, but because of the satisfaction derived from assisting with the welfare, safety, healing, or education of humanity

Ellis' book covers in more detail Rand's tendency to exaggerate toward the negative. This is a classic habit of persons with who have emotional illness such as depression. (Beck, Depression, 1967) Accepting Rand's advice regarding altruism as evil will not only make people unhappy as she herself was (B. Branden; Walker) but the widespread use of such advice could lead to larger scale problems and handicaps for our country and threaten its security and its position of leadership in the world.

I do not feel that her unbridled capitalism is viable in the absence of a controlling system of rational morality which she was the first to say we don't have yet.

I particularly liked Nyquist's analysis of Rand's theory of history. First, was Christianity responsible for the Dark Ages, as Peikoff wrote? (1982, 338) Many facts are given which cast doubt on this particular theory; reference is well made to Weber and his Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism, in which Weber posits a strong connection between religious morality and productive enterprise.

Nyquist pointedly asks, "Was (Rand correct that) German philosophy (was)responsible for the rise of Hitler and the Nazis?" Peikoff avers that Plato, Kant and Hegel more than any others were the intellectual builders of Auschwitz (1982,37)

It so happens that the German psychiatrist, Alice Miller, in her book "For Your Own Good," carefully and thoroughly establishes the connection between the German psyche, Hitler, Nazism and the severely harsh disciplinary childrearing practices common in Germany at the time. Hitler's own history is spelled out in detail in Miller's book. Nyquist is correct that the question of how Plato, Kant and Hegel caused these ruinous practices is yet to be explained by Rand/Peikoff.

To conclude, this book opens up many of the leading ideas of Rand to serious investigation. As her works are increasingly being used in universities, I can see such books as this one also having a future there as fuel for thought and discussion. I would agree with the conclusion implied by title of the book while differing with some of the premises used to reach that conclusion.

This is a book I will revisit again and am recommending it to friends.

Suggested Further Reading:
Thoughts and Feelings by McKay, Davis, Fanning
Depression by Aaron Beck
Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy by Albert Ellis
Is Objectivism a Religion by Albert Ellis
For Your Own Good by Alice Miller
Thou Shalt Not be Aware by Alice Miller
The Ayn Rand Cult by Jeff Walker
When Anger Hurts by McKay, Rogers, McKay
Anger by Carol Tavris

Thank you for reading, and comments are welcome.