Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815 [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

Kevin Kiley's first book is a handsome volume that examines Napoleonic artillery, its theories and practices during the time when artillery began to become an equal partner in the business of battle. Its 290 pages are liberally filled with fascinating period engravings, clear maps and sixteen pages of black and white plates. Although it leans towards the French experience it also contains an abundance of material on Austrian, British, Prussian and Russian usage & mentions many more countries including the Americans at New Orleans in 1815.

Napoleon himself began as a gunner. You would expect a plethora of works focusing on the artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, but Mr Kiley's book, "Artllery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815" is the first of its kind written in English.

I think it will be a landmark volume and an important part of anyone's Napoleonic library.

The book contains a panoramic view of the artillery of the period & the men who used it to such deadly effect & a detailed analysis of the science & art of gunnery of the era.

It encompasses a breadth of knowledge that pays heed to developments of the seventeenth century as well as a depth that explains how primers were made, for example. It ends with eponymous chapters on some of the great artillerists of the Age such as Smola, Senarmont, Eble, Ramsay & Drouot.

The book is peppered with primary source quotes that support the authors' views. Indeed, the work is well-supported with a cornucopia of diverse sources.

I must emphasize that the book is extremely readable. It marries a passion for the subject with a the cool technical eye of a former gunner who certainly knows the business. It will bear several readings and serve as a source of information indefinitely.

It does deal with some controversial issues. The author acknowledges such, clearly makes his case and, I daresay, the reader will make up their own mind. I found it credible.

I would recommend this book. I believe the recent rash of Osprey books on various national artilleries may prove to be a useful supplement but nowhere else will you get one volume that covers so much, so clearly, so well.

This is a book that I really wanted to like. The author knows his subject backwards and forwards, and the contemporary drawings that are included are extremely rare. Unfortunately, too often I found myself reading material in one chapter that had previously appeared in another chapter (sometimes peviously on the same page). Although his narrative passages were excellent (albeit borrowing heavily from Elting et al), when repeated ad nauseum, they lost some of their potency. Hopefully this very able author will soon be able to match his impressive knowledge with the writing skills that it requires.

Having seen a good deal of discussion of this book in various Napoleonica forums, I was cautious in my anticipation, but was still not prepared for how goofy it is. Given comments about repetition and editing, I was expecting that occasionally the same information would show up in two different sections. But, no, that is not the problem. The problem is that the book is written almost as if it were a verbatim off-the-cuff lecture, and the same things are said 3-4-5 times in the various chapters, the sections, right down to paragraphs, where sentences within three lines of each other can say exactly the same things with different words.

The repetition draws attention to another weakness, the thinness of the material. Most of the book describes the development of artillery through eighteenth century. The story of Gribeauval's contribution to French artillery is oft told, but not because his reforms, modeled after those of the Austrian Lichtenstein, are particularly notable. But rather because his long running conflict with Valliere is a case book example of bureaucratic infighting and court patronage under Louis XIV. The author ignores this conflict, while touting Gribeauval's ideas, a generation old by the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars, as superior to every other nation's development, although they all borrowed from one another and pretty much followed the same paths.

His argument is undercut, however, because he does not understand the technical aspects of his subject. So while he can identify distinctions in details, he cannot explain why they are better, except by assertion. The continental coalition powers elevated their guns with a screw driven wedge; the French with a screw driven platform. This is better, we are told, because, well, it is more "advanced" and more "precise". While there is no mechanical reason for it to be more precise, it's unclear what advantage that would offer since a recoiling gun needs to be repositioned anyway. But then the excellent illustrations (courtesy Steven H. Smith, I understand) clearly show the French heavy howitzer was elevated with a wedge, while a Hannoverian gun with a ratcheted chain driven platform goes entirely unnoted.

The French used a prolonge - a piece of rope that tied an unhitched gun to the limber. This, we are assured, gave the French an advantage moving over rough ground. Why a gun careening behind the limber, catching every rock or sapling the limber avoided, or crashing into a braking team, would be an advantage seemed entirely counter-intuitive to me. So I was much relieved when another author pointed out that the short trail of the French guns tended to make them unbalanced and caused the muzzle to catch on the ground when hitched, unless the onerous process of prying the gun from one mount point to another was undertaken. The prolonge wasn't a feature, it was a bug.

The horizontal boring of gun tubes is superior to vertical boring. Why? Boring a solid tube is superior to finishing a hollow core. Why? Guns were lightened by advances in metallurgy. Which were? The block trail is superior to the bracket trail, if "for no other reason" than its tighter turning radius. Uh, that's clearly a function of the hitch design, and what exactly is the turning radius of a horse team? Lichtenstein's team included Rouvroy who was born in Luxembourg, left Saxon service for Austria in 1753, and was general by 1763. That's nice. What exactly did Rouvroy do???

With so much hand-waving, there is less opportunity for the small errors that are difficult to avoid in these kinds of books, but the RHA was not completely re-equipped with 9pdr's for Waterloo. The Russian did not have two kinds of 6pdrs, and the Prussian did not lose the rest of the artillery at Friedland, as they weren't at Friedland. More alarmingly, the author does not seem to understand the Russian 1805 system did not fundamentally change the existing Russian equipment. But my favorite has to be the claim that a cannonball bounces erratically like a deliberately counterweighted lacrosse ball! Lacrosse balls are not deliberately malformed, and cannonballs are solid iron...

When the book finally gets to discussing the actual use of artillery in the Wars, we get the same sweeping but vague assertions. Counter-battery fire is bad, getting lots of guns together is good (doh!). Claims that Senarmont introduced a new school of artillery tactics cannot be judged, as the old school is never very clearly explained. Oh, long passages from Tousard with gems like, "Fire on an extent which covers the amplitude with the divergency of your shots." Clearly all sides started using a lot more guns as the Wars proceeded, but what practical factors determined availability and effectiveness are still a mystery. The book is speckled with quotes words and phrases, but it's often unclear if they are being used for emphasis or cited from another work. When they are footnoted, the range of sources seems limited and often based on the opinions of modern authors.

Anyone immersed in the era is not going to find anything to write home about. And those who aren't have a lot better choices than a survey of artillery generalities. I cannot recommend it, it desperately needed an editor, but it's not mendacious, so two stars...