Kurzbeschreibung
This volume of essays brings together scholars of ancient philosophy and some of today's most distinguished moral philosophers to discuss Aristotle's ethics and the problems of moral realism. One of the central and perennial philosophical problems is the question of whether our ethical assertions and beliefs can be justifiably claimed to rest on some objective foundation. As an upholder of the objectivity of ethics and as one of the most important ethical thinkers in the history of philosophy, Aristotle's writings on these questions are of the greatest interest. Indeed, much of recent moral philosophy has looked directly to Aristotle for inspiration on the problem of moral objectivity. For example, "virtue theorists" were influenced by Aristotle in their proposal that what determines the right thing to do in a particular case is what the virtuous man would do. Similarly, "sensibility theorists" have found support for their view in Aristotle's remarks about the importance of the conditioning of one's desires for the development of virtue and knowledge about the human good. One of the central issues addressed by the contributors is whether it is wrong to believe that the justification of a moral claim requires an "external" validation which goes beyond reference to human practices of moral condemnation and approval. Or does moral objectivity require ethical discourse to have an origin and explanatory power similar in important respects to that of an empirical science? The contributors range over many other issues and areas of Aristotle's philosophy, including his account of tragedy and his theory of justice. It will be welcomed by all philosophers and classicists with an interest in moral philosophy and Greek ethics.
Synopsis
This volume of essays brings together scholars of ancient philosophy and some of today's most distinguished moral philosophers to discuss Aristotle's ethics and the problems of moral realism. One of the central and perennial philosophical problems is the question of whether our ethical assertions and beliefs can be justifiably claimed to rest on some objective foundation. As an upholder of the objectivity of ethics and as one of the most important ethical thinkers in the history of philosophy, Aristotle's writings on these questions are of the greatest interest. Indeed, much of recent moral philosophy has looked directly to Aristotle for inspiration on the problem of moral objectivity. For example, "virtue theorists" were influenced by Aristotle in their proposal that what determines the right thing to do in a particular case is what the virtuous man would do. Similarly, "sensibility theorists" have found support for their view in Aristotle's remarks about the importance of the conditioning of one's desires for the development of virtue and knowledge about the human good.
One of the central issues addressed by the contributors is whether it is wrong to believe that the justification of a moral claim requires an "external" validation which goes beyond reference to human practices of moral condemnation and approval. Or does moral objectivity require ethical discourse to have an origin and explanatory power similar in important respects to that of an empirical science? The contributors range over many other issues and areas of Aristotle's philosophy, including his account of tragedy and his theory of justice. It will be welcomed by all philosophers and classicists with an interest in moral philosophy and Greek ethics.
