After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (Vintage) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Although Spector is correct that the Tet Offensive in January of that year was not the complete surprise that some contemporary observers reported, the extent and ferocity of the attacks were a public relations disaster for the American military command, which had been issuing generally optimistic reports about the war. Spector reports these grim statistics: "More than 40,000 civilians had been killed or wounded in the fighting, and 1 million new refugees had been created." As Spector puts it succinctly, "the Tet Offensive had shown that no place in Vietnam was truly safe." In late March 1968, President Johnson met with an informal group of elder statesmen and advisers referred to as the "Wise Men," and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned: "We cannot do the job we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must begin to take steps to disengage." The President bitterly complained that "the establishment bastards have bailed out," but the Wise Men were merely articulating the consensus public sentiment: The United States could not win the war, so it had to get out! Both the political and military leadership of the American war effort changed in March 1968. President Johnson first announced that General William Westmoreland, the top commander in Vietnam, would be promoted to Chief of Staff of the Army, a move widely viewed, according to Spector, "as a clear sign that Washington had lost confidence in Westmoreland's leadership." A few days later, Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. But little changed on the ground. According to Spector: "Over the eight weeks following the March 31 speech, 3,700 Americans would be killed in Vietnam." According to Spector, American combat forces "faced a formidable enemy." He quotes a Navy corpsman attached to the Marines: "You'll never hear Marines say the North Vietnamese aren't tough. They're probably the toughest fighters in the world as far as I'm concerned." They also were determined. Spector reports: "A study commissioned by the Defense Department in 1967 had concluded that 'the enemy's morale was well-nigh indestructible and therefore not likely to be significantly lowered by pressures on soldiers in battle." Spector explains that "the continued presence of 550,000 American soldiers in South Vietnam continued to provide the Communist soldier with his strongest incentive to keep fighting." Endemic South Vietnamese corruption undermined the American effort. According to Spector: "Although South Vietnam received lavish U.S. aid after [Ngo Dinh] Diem consolidated his power in 1955, much of the aid money found its way into the pockets of Army officers, provincial officials, and members of the Ngo family." Spector provides these details: "Beside the sale of jobs and misappropriation of funds and materials, South Vietnamese generals engaged in a wide array of other rackets, including the use of their military forces to protect or promote criminal activities...Drug trafficking was widespread, and many of Saigon's top officials and generals were rumored to be heavily involved in smuggling and protection of the opium trade...Another source of profit was trade with the Viet Cong. Large quantities of food, gasoline, medicines, and equipment, much of it supplied by the United States were sold to the Communists by South Vietnamese soldiers, usually through middlemen. " In the summer of 1968, a major riot occurred at the largest military prison in Vietnam, the U.S. Army stockade near Long Binh. According to Spector, "the rioters [were] almost all blacks...Virtually everyone in Vietnam, from newspaper reporters to stockade guards, joined in labeling the...uprising primarily a race riot." Spector explains: "The most common source of dissatisfaction was the feeling that African- Americans were discriminated against in promotions and job opportunities. A universal complaint was that blacks were overrepresented in combat units. It was also widely believed that in line units African-Americans were always assigned the most dangerous jobs....Another source of friction was the alleged discrimination on the part of the military police, most of whom were white." According to Spector: "With the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1968, signs of racial polarization and tension became clear and unmistakable." In addition to racial troubles, Spector writes that, "by the end of the year an even more serious problem, growing drug abuse, had also made its appearance." According to Spector, although "[m]arijuana was as readily available in Vietnam as whisky or cigarettes," its "[u]se of marijuana was a crime subject to fairly harsh punishment, including possible imprisonment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice." He adds: "By the end of 1968 more and more GIs were turning to drugs to help them escape the heat, tedium, fear, and loneliness of Vietnam and to hold on to thoughts and memories of life 'back in the world.' The younger the GI and the lower his rank, the more likely he was to be a drug user."

According to Spector, 1968 "ended as it had begun, with bloody yet inconclusive struggles on the battlefield and continued diplomatic deadlock." In Spector's view: "The battles of 1968 were decisive... because they were so indecisive...[T]he Vietnam War remained what it had been and would remain until 1973: a stalemate." Spector concludes: "After 1968 both sides recognized that they could never completely destroy or drive out the opponents from the mountains, jungles, rice paddies, and villages of South Vietnam." To paraphrase Spector's opening question: How did the United States ever think it could win this war?

Spector, who was a U.S. Marine attached to the III Marine Corps Amphibious Force in South Vietnam in 1968-69, offers compelling evidence which indicates that the turning point of the war took place during the nine months in 1968 following the Tet offensive and President Johnson's announcement that he would halt most of the bombing of North Vietnam and would not seek re-election. This was a period of some of the most intense fighting of the war. It was a period of great disarray for the American forces. They were growing increasingly frustrated with their South Vietnamese ally "with all its chronic weakness and corruption, (who) would weather the storm but emerge with its fatal flaws intact and as unchangeable as ever" (25). Spector also paints a vivid picture of the inner turmoil of the U.S. troops, who were not only plagued by growing frustration and discontent on the front but also by strife back home.

Spector deserves to be commended maintaining a considerable amount of emotional distance in his documentation of combat. As a Marine stationed in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, it is highly likely that he either took part in combat or at least witnessed the gruesome aftermath of battle. His accounts are devoid of prejudice or emotion and thoroughly documented. He is able to provide a vivid and realistic portrayal of some brutal battles without resorting to gore or sensationalism. The battles reported are at times quite harrowing, but Spector does not aim to shock the squeamish or titillate the bloodthirsty.

Nevertheless, the stories of combat will arouse many emotions from even the most remotely patriotic reader. One can't help but feel frustrated and fearful for these overwhelmingly young troops campaigning in "temperatures (that) could often exceed 100 degrees" or braving the torrential wind and rain of the monsoons(47). Not only did they were they forced to face an enemy that could be incredibly difficult to identify, but they were thrust into an environment that was incredibly hostile. Not only did they have to worry about the heat or the monsoon, but "mosquitoes, leeches, and red ants ... seemed to thrive everywhere in Vietnam" (48). There were also high numbers of poisonous snakes and hungry rats. Last but not least, there was the elephant grass "eight to fifteen feet high, so thick as to cut visibility to one yard, possessing razor sharp edges. Then try to imagine walking through it while men all around you are possessing automatic weapons and trying to kill you" (47). Spector never forces the reader to accept a "you are there" scenario, but I couldn't help but be drawn in with his vivid descriptions of the environment.

Spector effectively conjures up a vivid portrayal of the South Vietnamese government, exposing many of their faults and shortcomings. But he never points an accusatory finger at the South Vietnamese, who were "by 1965 ... openly and directly moving towards a military dictatorship" (95). Instead, he cites a wealth of sources who overwhelmingly agree that a vast majority of the high ranking officials in South Vietnam were incompetent, nepotistic and driven more by the prospect of graft rather than defense of their own country. They "did not want the war to end - not while it was protected by half a million troops and a golden flow of money"(299). All of these factors led to the festering frustration of the troops. They were trapped in a miserable tropical environment, fighting an enemy whose unorthodox methods were a perfect counter to their own command's strict adherence to convention, supporting an ally who "had learned ... too little about how to fight" and were troubled by the clashes back home (116). For the first time in the war, many soldiers began to question the war's motives. Cracks were bound to surface.

It is well documented that "out in field blacks and whites got along a whole lot better than in the units that was way back" and "that the greater the degree of danger and discomfort for the combatants, the greater the racial harmony and solidarity" (259). "The closer life in the rear approximated life in the United States, the more likely it was to mirror stateside racial tensions as well" (257). Racism was not the ugly aspect of life abroad that surfaced due to the culmination of fear, boredom, frustration and loneliness. "More and more GIs were turning to drugs" such as marijuana and heroin (276). Spector shows several surveys taken, which claim incidents of drug abuse ranging from 30-75 % of the troops. Spector is neither scornful nor sympathetic towards this dilemma, forcing the reader to draw his own conclusions on this and many other issues.

Even though Spector was himself a combatant during the time documented, he is able to do a masterful job at remaining dispassionate with his text. He is ableto provide a well-crafted history and does not cloud or distort the text with personal feelings. Instead of using personal experiences to add shadow and light to the work, he employs a wealth of resources. The finished text is able to provide a fine source that provides an accurate reflection of our vets' hopes, fears and struggles.

I suppose my only complaint is that Spector only gives a cursory acknowledgment or fails to mention the thousands of servicemen in Thailand, the troops secretly inserted in Laos and Cambodia and the sailors stationed in the East China Sea during this period. All of these men were in harm's way and all deserve mention. Nevertheless, this was a very enjoyable and informative read.