Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Hull writes a flawed, but interesting, study about the relationship between the ideological underpinnings of the Imperial Germany Army and Germany's military failures since the Franco-Prussian War. Hull main point is that the Prussian (and then Imperial German Army's, Gr. Reichswehr's) overwhelming bias toward operational effectiveness both created, and was created by, a view of warfare so dedicated to the dstruction of enemy forces that it was blind to the political and strategic dimensions of war. As a result, Hull claims, German logistics were problematical, German Military Occupation was disastrous, German strategy was neglected, and German policy was virtually non-existent. Put more broadly, she believes that the German Army was so focused on winning battles and campaigns that it did not have the foggiest idea of how to win (or emerge favorably from) a larger war.

Hull also aims at some bigger points, which she only touches on indirectly. First, her analysis would imply that Germany's conduct of World War II was largely a continuation and (great) amplification of its conduct in World War I and in Africa. Many prominent Nazis -- Hitler, Roehm, and many others come to mind -- were front line soldiers in World War I and had absorbed that military culture. Second, and related, the Imperial German State in general had so completely absorbed and deified that military culture that the German government shared the same failings as the German military.

There is much in what Hull says. But there are also several significant faults in her analysis. First, she dislikes the German Army, despite attempts to remain objective, and thus sometimes makes it look less effective than it was. For example, she claims that German and French losses at Verdun were about equal, something few others would support. Second, she is sometimes ambivalent, if not contradictory. For example, she condemns the German High Command for failing to acknowledge when it was beaten, as for example when the United States entered the war. Yet she condemns its 1918 offensive strategy as reckless gambling, claiming that Germany could have held out far longer if it had adopted a more defensive strategy. Now Hull is probably right -- once the United States entered the war, Germany was probably doomed. But if this is true, Ludendorff and Hindenburg would seem to have done Germany a favor by ending the agony in one year rather than three or four through their adoption of an all-or-nothing strategy.

Actually, Germany came fairly close to a favorable result in World War I, even if it could not have "won" outright. If it had continued to negotiate in good faith, eschued unrestricted submarine warfare, and maintained a relatively defensive posture in the West, Russia would have collapsed and there would have been a real chance at an acceptable peace. Of course, as Hull's own analysis suggests (it would have been helpful if she had been more explicit here, but her fixation on Germany's weaknesses prevents her from doing so), Germany was incapable of formulating such a policy. She was commited to absolute victory and her civilian government was too fragmented and too military-minded to carry out a flexible political strategy. For this inflexibility, Hull rightly claims, Germany military culture was greatly to blame.

This is a study of institutional extremism. It examines the German conduct of war from 1870 through 1918 (from the author's introduction). Part I of the book begins with the suppression of Native revolts in German Southwest Africa in 1904-1907. Part II speaks to Military Culture and the lessons of 1871 and Part III covers WW I.

The author uses an extensive amount of primary resources to present a very compelling case, yet, also draws unsubstantiated conclusions from incomplete records and entries. Despite the attempt to remain objective, there is a readily detectable tone of bias.

As a military analyst and instructor I felt the book was useful as a tool for comparing the lessons of the German experience with the US Military experience over the last 10 years. For instance: is the US Military only capable of thinking in Military terms? In light of Joint and Combined Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has the US Military morphed into a "polycratic" institution? Does the Diplomat stand with the soldier? Is there a set of mutually reinforcing values and characteristics that inhibit decision making?

Regardless if these lessons are German, Indian or American, the questions for any Military are the same, are essential and must be asked.

All in all, a good book that is a little heavy to read with some very compelling evidence, yet, also some bias and speculation in presentation.

Dr. Terry Tucker

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

In this fascinating look at military culture in Imperial Germany, Isabel Hull has broken down the topic into three major categories: the development of the military culture, the definition of military culture in Germany, and how the military culture played out in the Great War during the period 1914-1918.

In her opening section, Hull explains how the colonial wars of the early 20th century, where the Germans were attempting to suppress internal rebellions, became the precursor of an organizational culture that moved beyond suppression and into utilizing the mindset of total annihilation. Hull has largely examined the Herero (in Southwest Africa) as her case study, and the commanders of the German forces dispatched to quell the uprising. By examining military manuals and private papers of the military leadership, Hull demonstrates, quite convincingly, that the development of this strategy of utter destruction began during these wars.

Hull then proceeds to explain how the military culture fit into the German military - almost like any organizational culture would pervade into a company. Further examination of diaries, letters, and other military papers explain how this strategy became the widely accepted tactic of German warfare. She explains how this concept differed from that of Britain's use of force to suppress rebels during the Boer War in an effort to explain that the pervasiveness of this thought process really only permeated the German psyche and not other European nations.

Finally, the author explores how this strategy played out during the First World War (the "Great War"). By evaluating everything from the execution of the Schlieffen plan to the use of civilians as hostages, Hull offers the reader a carefully constructed argument that this war was fought using the tactics developed over the last several decades, though that led to Germany's defeat since the German commanders were unable to accept losses in battles and simply pushed on instead.

Overall, this is a very well written book, and one that is a good addition to the historiography of the Great War; we can now better understand why the German troops acted as they did on the battlefield, and how this war paved the way for the National Socialist ideology that would creep into German society and cause another, greater, war only two decades later.